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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study was to empirically test the oft-noted hypothesis that shared 
mental models lead to implicit coordination.  Specifically, this dissertation investigated 
the underlying mechanisms of implicit coordination and how different aspects of shared 
mental models affect the process.  The research questions tested in this study were (a) 
how perceptions of sharedness affect the initiation of implicit coordination, (b) how 
actual levels of sharedness affect the process of implicit coordination, and (c) how quality 
of task mental models affects successful implicit coordination.  Sixty same-gender, two-
person teams engaged in a complex military reconnaissance planning task in which the 
team members were required to work together by exchanging information to plan routes 
for one unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and one unmanned ground vehicle (UGV).  The 
results provided partial support for the influence of different facets of shared mental 
models on the process of implicit coordination.  Specifically, individual mental model 
quality, not perceptions of sharedness or actual mental model sharedness, was the biggest 
predictor of the initiation of implicit coordination.  Additionally, perceptions of 
sharedness and actual mental model sharedness interacted with one another, such that 
teams in mismatched conditions (high perceptions of sharedness but low actual 
sharedness [false consensus], or low perceptions of sharedness and high actual 
sharedness, [pluralistic ignorance]) tended to increase their communications.  The 
implications and recommendations for future research on implicit coordination and 
shared mental models are discussed.  Additionally, the implications for operators of 
unmanned vehicles are also discussed. 
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 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
 Teams are fundamental to success in a variety of complex domains, ranging from 
potentially life-threatening environments (including the military, emergency response 
efforts, aviation and air traffic control, and medicine), to the business world, 
entertainment, and leisure activities (e.g., team sports).  Success in these domains is often 
characterized by the skilled and coordinated performance of highly interdependent tasks, 
which require team members to interact with one another in order to accomplish team 
goals.  Furthermore, teams are often required to perform complex tasks under conditions 
of extreme workload and great time pressure (as when emergency first responders and/or 
surgical teams are fighting to save lives or when air traffic controllers are trying to 
manage a large number of airplanes in a restricted space), heightened security concerns 
(such as when overt communication might be heard by opposing forces during military 
operations), and/or great social or organizational pressure (such as with business 
operations and sports teams that are looking to beat the competition). 
In instances such as these, successful team performance requires team members to 
share information and task resources, have an understanding of the team goals, and 
coordinate their activities in order to achieve established goals.  In high-pressure, high-
workload domains, it is important for team members to be able to adjust their team 
coordination processes in order to maintain team performance in the presence of 
increasing task demands.  For example, previous research has found that when high-
performing teams experienced conditions of increased workload, they adaptively shifted 
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 from explicit forms of coordination to more implicit forms of coordination in order to 
maintain performance levels (Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989).  Specifically, team members 
tended to volunteer more information or behaviors without specific requests to do so, thus 
facilitating team coordination in order to accomplish team goals.  This beneficial adaptive 
strategy was named implicit coordination, which was thought to occur because the team 
members had shared mental models (SMMs) that allowed them to anticipate one 
another’s needs (Kleinman & Serfaty). 
 Most prior investigations of implicit coordination have been conducted within the 
military domain.  Yet, it certainly seems reasonable to assume that if implicit 
coordination is advantageous to teams in one complex domain, it may very well be useful 
in other complex domains as well.  Currently, however, relatively little is known about 
implicit coordination and the conditions under which it can be invoked to enhance team 
coordination processes and performance.  Because research in this area is limited and the 
related concepts are not fully understood, it is currently impossible to design team 
performance and team training situations that fully exploit the use of implicit 
coordination processes.  However, gaining insight into the processes of implicit 
coordination and the conditions under which it can best be utilized could have 
tremendous potential for enhancing team processes, team performance, and team training 
scenarios in a variety of domains.  If such information were available, it might be 
possible to develop new team training methods and scenarios so that future teams could 
be trained to be aware of and to use implicit coordination in order to maintain or enhance 
their own processes and performance. 
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 Purpose of the Current Study 
In a variety of modern operational domains, teams are required to perform 
complex tasks in time-sensitive, high-pressure environments.  It is essential to ensure that 
these teams are equipped with the skills required for successful team performance.  
Harnessing the strengths of implicit coordination might be a strategy from which these 
teams could greatly benefit.  While a number of studies have suggested that teams 
employ implicit coordination under some conditions (e.g., Entin & Serfaty, 1999; Urban, 
Weaver, Bowers, & Rhodenizer, 1996), little research has sought to examine the 
antecedent conditions and underlying mechanisms of implicit coordination.  More 
specifically, it is currently not known what activates implicit coordination or what role 
SMMs play in this process.  In order for implicit coordination to be utilized to its fullest 
potential, therefore, it is crucial to understand the mechanisms behind the process, the 
conditions that are necessary for implicit coordination, and the conditions under which 
implicit coordination is a beneficial strategy.   
Thus, the purpose of the current investigation was to examine the factors that play 
a role in implicit coordination.  This study was designed to investigate the process of 
implicit coordination, specifically focusing on the roles of (a) mental model sharedness, 
(b) mental model quality, and (c) team member perceptions of sharedness.  The 
overarching goals were to determine which specific aspects of SMMs are relevant and 
necessary for the initiation of implicit coordination and for the successful maintenance or 
enhancement of team processes and performance.  The current study was intended to 
provide a better understanding of implicit coordination.  This, in turn, will make it 
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 possible for others to both develop and train teams that are characterized by factors 
conducive to implicit coordination.  This could lead to improved team processes and 
performance in any number of domains that require team coordination to accomplish 
complex tasks. 
 
 4
 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Implicit Coordination 
In 1989, Kleinman and Serfaty published the results of a study that investigated 
adaptive team coordination strategies.  Using a resource allocation task, the authors 
required two-person teams to perform under varying levels of workload (manipulated by 
task tempo).  Dependent measures were timeliness and accuracy in assigning resources, 
as well as the frequency of different types of communication.  The results of the study 
showed that the workload manipulation had a significant impact on overall team 
performance and on the type of communications exhibited.  Specifically, as task tempo 
increased, communication rates changed such that: under low and moderate tempos, 
explicit communication was more prevalent, while under high tempo, performance 
remained constant but communication rates decreased.  The authors interpreted this 
decrease in resource requests and the concomitant increase in unsolicited resource 
transfers as a shift to what they termed implicit coordination. They further suggested that 
this strategy occurred because the team members had “mutual mental models to 
anticipate each other’s resource needs and actions” (Kleinman & Serfaty, p. 25).   
A few years later, Serfaty, Entin, and Volpe (1993) further explored the concept 
of implicit coordination by studying team adaptation to stress.  The authors noted that 
implicit coordination “relies on anticipation of the information and resource needs of the 
other team members as obtained through the exercise of mental models of the other 
decision-makers, or via the exercise of a common mental image of the situation” (p. 
1229).  Further, they noted that implicit coordination requires both shared and accurate 
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 mental models.  Serfaty et al. had manipulated three variables, uncertainty, time-pressure, 
and ambiguity, to ascertain how high-performing teams would adapt to stressful 
situations.  The results showed that, under stressful conditions, the teams that were able 
to maintain performance levels and very low error rates were also characterized by 
changed communication patterns.  Specifically, these team members significantly 
increased their unsolicited and anticipatory behaviors, which the authors interpreted as 
evidence that the teams were coordinating implicitly. 
Potential Evidence of Implicit Coordination 
 Following this early research by Serfaty and others, a number of studies have 
found that teams seem to adopt an implicit coordination strategy under certain conditions.  
These studies have also served to identify the primary behaviors that have been 
associated with the occurrence of implicit coordination.  The following review discusses 
the specific behaviors that have been observed and associated with implicit coordination 
in prior studies and the hypothesized linkage between implicit coordination and SMMs.  
Reduction in Information and/or Resource Requests 
One of the main findings that has been presented as evidence of implicit 
coordination is that higher-performing teams tend to reduce their communications related 
to requesting information and/or resources, as well as asking questions in general.  For 
example, Kleinman and Serfaty (1989) found that, in higher-performing teams, 
communication requests for resources were dramatically reduced in the high-workload 
condition, as compared to both the low- and moderate-workload conditions.  Similarly, in 
her study of crewmember decision making in the aircraft cockpit, Orasanu (1990) found 
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 that, during periods of high workload, good captains tended to reduce communications 
overall, including the amount of requested information.  On the other hand, poorer-
performing captains actually increased their overall communications, including their 
information requests.  In addition, Urban, Bowers, Monday, and Morgan (1993) found 
that, under conditions of high workload, higher-performing teams asked more questions 
overall, but asked fewer questions about resources and responsibilities than lower-
performing teams.  In a follow-up study, Urban, Bowers, Monday, and Morgan (1995) 
found that, overall, higher-performing teams asked fewer questions and provided fewer 
answers that included requests.  Finally, Waller, Gupta, and Giambatista (2004), in their 
study of nuclear power plant control crews, found that higher-performing teams engaged 
in significantly less information collection than lower-performing teams.  Thus, it appears 
that under high workload conditions, higher-performing teams engage in fewer requests 
for information, regardless of whether their overall communication rates fluctuate.  These 
occurrences of reduced communication have been identified as a component of implicit 
coordination. 
Increase in Unsolicited/Voluntary Information and/or Resources 
The other major finding that suggests the presence of implicit coordination has 
been an increase in the amount of information or resources that are provided without 
specific requests.  Kleinman and Serfaty (1989) noted in their initial study that almost 
every single resource transfer was unsolicited in higher-performing teams under high 
workload.  Stout, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, and Milanovich (1999) found that higher-
performing teams were characterized by a higher rate of information provided in 
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 advance, specifically during conditions of high workload.  Likewise, Volpe, Cannon-
Bowers, Salas, and Spector (1996) found that higher-performing teams volunteered 
significantly more information, but this finding was not specific to conditions of high 
workload.  Thus, it appears that implicit coordination occurs when team members provide 
information or resources voluntarily without explicit verbal request, making it possible 
for teams to reduce their requests for information without experiencing disruptions in 
team performance. 
Anticipation Ratios 
Because both a reduction in requests and an increase in unsolicited information 
and/or resources are representative of implicit coordination behaviors, some studies have 
looked at the ratio of requests to transfers as an indication of implicit coordination.  
Specifically, anticipation ratios, which are the number of transfers divided by the number 
of requests for each specific team member, have been used to investigate the presence or 
absence of implicit coordination. It is thought that higher anticipation ratios are indicative 
of information and/or resources being sent more often than they were requested 
(MacMillan, Entin, & Serfaty, 2004).  For example, in Serfaty et al.’s (1993) study of 
team adaptation and coordination, it was found that the anticipation ratios for teams under 
high time pressure were significantly higher than under either low or moderate time 
pressure, although it was not specified whether these results were applicable overall or 
applied only to high-performing teams.  Entin and Serfaty (1999) found similar results; 
namely, that higher-performing teams were characterized by higher anticipation ratios.  
However, these were overall results and not specific to high workload.  Thus, the results 
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 of both studies suggested that better performing team members had increased their 
unsolicited resource transfers but decreased requests for those resources. 
Before leaving this topic, a word of caution should be noted regarding the use of 
the anticipation ratio metric.  While this is a convenient way to represent the number of 
transfers made per request given, examining data in terms of this single index alone can 
obscure the richness of the underlying team processes.  Very different components of 
team coordination occur when requests are reduced as compared to when unsolicited 
behaviors are executed.  These behaviors might occur in different team members, at 
different times, for different purposes, and with different consequences.  Therefore, 
investigations of team processes should include assessments and analyses of both reduced 
requests and increased unsolicited behaviors.  Failure to understand the relationship 
between these separate measures of team interaction could result in a limited 
understanding of the nature of team processes under different conditions.  Consequently, 
the current study will focus on the sequence of behaviors that begins with an unsolicited 
behavior (and a lack of request) and leads to improved team processes.  
Implicit Coordination and Shared Mental Models 
Beginning with Kleinman and Serfaty’s (1989) initial assertion that implicit 
coordination was associated with SMMs, many other authors have followed suit, 
suggesting that observed changes in communication could be attributed to SMMs.  For 
example, Entin and Serfaty (1999) suggested that team members rely on mental models 
of each other’s tasks to anticipate their resource needs and that the resulting higher 
anticipation ratios are at least “partial confirmation” (p. 322) of the existence of SMMs.  
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 Urban, Bowers, Monday, and Morgan (1995), without explicitly stating that their study 
was evidence of implicit coordination, posited two possible explanations for their 
observed changes in communication patterns: (a) effective teams simply communicated 
more clearly, or, in line with implicit coordination, (b) team members of more effective 
teams were better able to anticipate the needs of their teammates.  Moreover, Orasanu 
(1990) also suggested that team members of higher performing teams developed SMMs 
that enhanced their team performance, via improved communication processes, under 
conditions of high workload. 
Two prior studies have actually used measurements of SMMs in an attempt to 
support the existence of implicit coordination.  First, Stout et al. (1999) conducted a study 
of the relationship between planning, SMMs, and team coordination.  The authors used 
the rate of communication provided in advance as their assessment of coordination 
between team members.  As previously mentioned, these authors found that under 
conditions of high workload, team members in better performing teams provided higher 
rates of information in advance.  However, Stout et al. found no significant relationship 
between SMMs and the rate of communication provided in advance.  More recently, 
Waller et al. (2004) conducted a study of nuclear power plant crews, focusing on what 
they called SMM development.  While they found that higher-performing teams engaged 
in less information collection, they also did not find a significant relationship between 
information collection and SMM development.  Thus, neither study actually established a 
link between SMMs and the behaviors indicative of implicit coordination. 
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 One likely explanation for these null findings is because none of the prior studies 
have measured or manipulated SMMs in ways that would allow the determination of 
whether SMMs were actually related to the communication pattern changes thought to be 
indicative of implicit coordination. Therefore, there are no available data to demonstrate 
that SMMs are decisively linked to the use of implicit coordination.  Indeed, without 
having or providing empirical confirmation, these prior studies have assumed the 
existence of a relationship between SMMs and implicit coordination and have used the 
concept of SMMs as an explanation for the occurrence of implicit coordination. 
Summary 
 The studies reviewed above indicate that implicit coordination is associated with a 
decrease in requests for information or resources and/or an increase in the voluntary, 
unsolicited provision of information or resources.  Together, these may be measured in 
terms of the anticipation ratio.  However, it should be noted that these studies all focused 
on communication analysis and that their findings were interpreted post hoc as 
demonstrating implicit coordination.  That is, implicit coordination was defined post hoc 
as the pattern of team coordination behaviors that (a) often occurs under conditions of 
high workload and (b) is characterized by a reduction in certain aspects of 
communication.  It should be further noted that the observance of implicit coordination in 
prior studies has been attributed to the presence of SMMs among the team members.  
However, to date, no empirical studies have conclusively and causatively linked SMMs 
to implicit coordination.  What is known is that high-performing teams tend to exhibit 
different communication patterns than lower-performing teams, often under conditions of 
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 high workload.  Whether or not this differential communication pattern is a function of, 
facilitated by, or limited by SMMs, however, has not been irrefutably shown.  In order to 
examine these issues further, the following section provides a discussion of the definition 
and operationalization of implicit coordination. 
A Working Definition of Implicit Coordination 
Prior studies on implicit coordination have generally taken a macro or global 
approach to team coordination by analyzing patterns of behavior or ratios of behavior.  
While this approach was sufficient in uncovering the pattern of behaviors, it has not been 
particularly useful in determining whether implicit coordination is the result of a process 
or sequence of behaviors.  In this study, a more micro level approach was taken, focusing 
on a specific sequence of behaviors.  This approach is taken in an attempt to determine 
the specific steps involved in the process of implicit coordination and to determine 
whether, in fact, teams shift their behaviors in a standard way or in a haphazard way. 
The American Heritage Dictionary (2000a) defines the term “implicit” as 
“implied or understood though not directly expressed.”  Communication is defined by the 
American Heritage Dictionary (2000b) as “the exchange of thoughts, messages, or 
information, as by speech, signals, writing, or behavior.”  Finally, to coordinate means to 
“harmonize in a common action or effort” (American Heritage Dictionary, 2000c).  
Combining these definitions, it appears that communication is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for coordination, and thus implicit communication is encompassed in 
implicit coordination.  In addition to implicit communication though, successful implicit 
coordination requires some action or follow through that brings a team closer to its goals.  
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 Thus, the behaviors constitute “coordination” because multiple team members are 
actively interacting, and this coordination is “implicit” because the initiating behaviors 
are performed without explicit requests.   
Beyond the above definitions, recent writers have described implicit coordination 
as “team members offering each other voluntarily the necessary information” (Rasker, 
Post, & Schraagen, 2000, p. 1169), “the ability of team members to act in concert without 
the need for overt communication” (MacMillan et al., 2004, p. 63), and the interactions of 
team members “without consciously trying to coordinate” (Espinosa, Lerch, & Kraut, 
2004, p. 107).  While each of these descriptions of implicit coordination is helpful, none 
fully operationalizes the construct.  In addition, none of the definitions is specific enough 
to allow one to differentiate implicit coordination from similar constructs, such as 
anticipatory, supporting, or back-up behaviors (see Porter, Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Ellis, West, 
& Moon, 2003; Smith-Jentsch, Zeisig, Acton, & McPherson, 1998).  Therefore, based on 
the above definitions and other related literature, the following discussion provides a first 
attempt to operationally define implicit coordination, specify what makes it different 
from similar constructs, and describe the types of behaviors that are encompassed in this 
term. 
Definition 
Successful implicit coordination is defined here as the act of one team member 
voluntarily initiating team coordination behaviors that are recognized and exploited by 
another team member, and which should result in improved team processes.  For the 
purposes of this discussion, team performance is assumed to occur in situations that 
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 require team members to interactively share task-related information and performance 
resources, share an understanding of the performance requirements and team goals, and 
coordinate their activities dynamically in order to achieve the performance goals of the 
team.  Furthermore, a period of team performance is assumed to include performance 
sequences in which one team member typically requests information or a task-related 
action from another team member at the appropriate time in the performance sequence.  
If the second team member responds in a timely manner by providing the requested 
information or action so that team performance occurs, team coordination has occurred; 
in this instance, the coordination is referred to as explicit coordination.  However, 
according to the current definition, an occurrence of implicit coordination consists of a 
sequence of unified behaviors that exhibit the following three specific criteria: (a) the 
team member initiating the coordination must do so without an explicit request from 
another team member, (b) the team member on the receiving end must recognize the 
behaviors of his/her teammate and be able to exploit that behavior, which should lead to 
(c) an observable positive impact on team processes.  In a specific team performance 
situation, teams that exhibit more of these behavioral sequences, as compared to 
behavioral sequences that are initiated by a request for information or resources (e.g., 
explicit coordination) are said to be implicitly coordinating.  
 It should be noted that the above definition expands previous definitions by 
placing more emphasis on the role of the second team member.  This emphasis allows for 
a differentiation between implicit coordination and other behaviors, such as backup 
behaviors.  Dimensions of backup behaviors include: (a) providing assistance to team 
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 members who need it, and (b) ensuring that the second team member recognizes that 
assistance was provided (Smith-Jentsch, Johnston, & Payne, 2000).  The proposed 
definition of implicit coordination takes backup behaviors one step further, incorporating 
the second team member’s actions directly into the definition.  Specifically, if the 
behaviors by the first team member are neither recognized nor exploited by the second 
team member, then the attempt at implicit coordination has not been successful.  
Furthermore, if the behaviors are not useful to the second team member, then 
performance will not be improved and implicit coordination has not been successful.  
Thus, implicit coordination can only be successful if the three criteria of the definition 
have been met.   
Figure 1 depicts the essential steps that define the proposed definition of 
successful implicit coordination.  This depiction and the following descriptions of each 
step are presented here for the first time.  They are not products of previous research, but 
are the proposed steps of implicit coordination that will be tested in this study. 
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Figure 1. Graphical representation of the essential steps that define successful implicit 
coordination.  
 
 
 
Initiating Behavior 
Under the above definition, any coordinative behaviors, including explicit, verbal 
communications, can be encompassed in implicit coordination, as long as the defining 
criteria are present.  When a team member initiates a behavioral sequence in the absence 
of a request to do so, and another team member can exploit the initiating behavior to 
improve team processes, then that behavioral sequence can fall under the rubric of 
implicit coordination.  It should be noted that while some highly proceduralized, 
sequential tasks could also fall under the above definition of implicit coordination, these 
types of tasks are not the focus of the current study. For example, tasks that require teams 
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 to follow a detailed checklist, such as in the handling of hazardous materials, or in the 
firing of nuclear missiles, will not be the focus of this study.  The reason for this is that 
transferring information or resources could simply be the next step in the procedure and 
thus would not be indicative of implicit coordination.   
So, initiating behavior is the first step in the process of implicit coordination.  In 
this step, the first team member initiates and carries out a team performance behavior, 
action, communication, procedure, etc. in an effort to coordinate with a second team 
member.  By definition, an initiating behavior must be some observable, measurable 
behavior on the part of a team member who seeks to coordinate with another team 
member.  Further, this behavior must serve to initiate a behavioral sequence that leads to 
a response on the part of another team member.  In fact, this behavior could even be the 
absence of an action (for example, realizing a team member is overloaded and therefore 
not passing him or her additional work); however, because of the difficulties in observing 
and measuring an intentional lack of behavior this form of behavior has been excluded 
from the current definition and experimental study.  As used here, the initiating behavior 
must simply be some observable behavior on the part of one team member to coordinate 
with another team member. 
Recognition 
It is important to emphasize that a second team member plays an active role in the 
process of implicit coordination.  In order for successful implicit coordination to take 
place, the second team member must recognize that the first team member has initiated a 
relevant and useful behavior.  If the second team member does not notice the first team 
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 member’s initiating behaviors, then the behavioral sequence initiated by the initiating 
behavior will be broken and implicit coordination will not occur.  Recognition of the 
initiating behavior and its significance is a necessary, but unobservable, part of implicit 
coordination.  It is assumed to occur as a cognitive event that takes place in the second 
team member when he or she responds appropriately to an initiating behavior. 
Interpretation 
Next, the second team member must correctly interpret the initiating behavior.  
That is, after a second team member has recognized the occurrence of an initiating 
behavior, he or she must interpret the meaning and performance implications of the 
behavior and select an appropriate response.  Interpretation is also considered to be an 
unobservable cognitive event.  Its occurrence is assumed to have occurred when the team 
member makes an appropriate response to the initiating behavior. 
It is hypothesized that SMMs become important during this step and the next one.  
The team members must have a shared understanding of what is happening and what 
needs to be done in the context of their team performance situation.  If the team members 
do not have SMMs, then it is possible that either (a) the first team member will have 
performed some behavior that is actually not useful to the second team member, or (b) 
the second team member will not know how to exploit the behavior of the first team 
member.  Either way, implicit coordination cannot result if either team member fails to 
understand and predict the other’s actions. 
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 Responding Behavior 
This step in implicit coordination is critical because it is part of what distinguishes 
implicit coordination from other similar constructs, such as backup behavior.  The 
occurrence of a responding behavior is the step in which the second team member 
actually uses the initiating behavior to the advantage of the team.  For example, if 
information or a resource has been passed, it is at this point that the second team member 
uses that information or resource.  Responding behaviors can include any behavior that 
directly exploits the initiating behavior in some way--hopefully to improve team 
processes--and that is observable and measurable.  If the second team member recognizes 
the behavior and knows what is expected but does not follow through, then according to 
the current definition, implicit coordination has not resulted.  Further, without the 
occurrence of the responding behavior, the prior occurrence of recognition and 
interpretation cannot be assumed.  Again, it is recognized that in some highly 
proceduralized, sequential tasks, one team member might transfer a resource because he 
or she knows that his or her teammate will need it at some later point; however, these 
types of tasks are not the focus of this study.  Implicit coordination necessitates that the 
second team member can exploit the actions of the first team member so that team 
processes are maintained or improved. The occurrence of the responding behavior makes 
it possible for the final step to occur in the team performance sequence that constitutes 
implicit coordination. 
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 Expected Outcome 
The expected outcome from successful implicit coordination is the observable 
maintenance or improvement of team processes.  This outcome relies on both team 
members completing their respective steps in the process as defined above.  Specifically, 
it requires that the first team member performs some observable initiating behavior.  
Furthermore, it requires that that the second team member (a) recognizes the initiating 
behavior, (b) correctly interprets the initiating behavior, and (c) exploits that behavior to 
result in improved team processes.  All of these steps are thought to be mediated by 
SMMs that allow the second team member to correctly interpret the actions of the first 
team member. 
Facilitating Factors of Implicit Coordination 
 While the above definition of implicit coordination helps to operationalize the 
construct of implicit coordination, there are other important factors that must be taken 
into account when discussing the underlying mechanisms of implicit coordination.  These 
facilitating factors are important because they can serve to increase the likelihood that a 
team member will attempt implicit coordination.  While implicit coordination can take 
place in the absence of these factors, the presence of these factors might greatly increase 
the likelihood that team members will engage in implicit coordination.  Table 1 provides 
a list of these facilitating factors and a description of each. 
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 Table 1 
Factors that Facilitate Implicit Coordination 
Facilitating Factor Description 
1. Motivation  
The more motivated a team member is to improve team 
performance, the more likely is it that he or she will attempt 
implicit coordination 
2. Belief that an initiating 
behavior exists 
If a team member believes that there exists a behavior that 
can help improve team performance, the more likely it is that 
a team member will engage in implicit coordination attempts 
3. Belief that initiating behavior 
will be interpreted correctly 
If a team member believes that another team member will 
interpret the initiating behavior correctly, the more likely it 
is that he or she will attempt implicit coordination 
 
 
 
Motivation 
 The first factor that should facilitate attempts of implicit coordination is the 
motivation on the part of a team member of wanting to engage in implicit coordination.  
As long as this motivation does not stem from an explicit request for help from another 
team member, it can facilitate the process of implicit coordination.  This motivation can 
be based on the recognized critical nature of the situation, or an interpretation of a sign 
from another teammate, including obvious signs of frustration, such as yelling or 
swearing, and from less obvious events, such as a sudden increase or decrease in 
communication.  The motivation could also be derived from a desire to maintain the 
current level of performance under increases in the perceived level of workload, or from 
the fact that a team member wants to improve performance on the given task.  
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 Belief in the Efficacy of Initiating Behavior 
Implicit coordination is also likely to be facilitated by a belief on the part of the 
first team member that he or she can do something that will improve the situation.  This 
facilitation to the process is actually derived from two sources: (a) the first team member 
believes that there exists a behavior, communication, method, or procedure that, if 
executed, will improve the situation and (b) the first team member believes that he or she 
will be successful in carrying out this coordination behavior (i.e., the first team member 
has self-efficacy).  If either of these conditions does not exist, then it is unlikely that an 
attempt at implicit coordination will even take place.  If the first team member is unaware 
of a viable available behavior to perform, then there is nothing to attempt.  On the other 
hand, if there is a viable option but the team member does not believe that he or she will 
be successful in completing that option, then it is also unlikely that implicit coordination 
will be attempted.  Thus, implicit coordination attempts will be facilitated by both a belief 
that something can be done and that it can be done successfully. 
Belief that the Initiating Behavior will be Interpreted Correctly 
The third factor facilitating attempts of implicit coordination is the belief that the 
second team member will interpret the initiating behavior correctly, which is based on a 
belief that the two team members view things similarly (i.e., have SMMs). The minimal 
condition necessary for the first team member to attempt implicit coordination is that he 
or she believes he or she shares a correct mental model with the other team member (i.e., 
a perception of sharedness).  That is, the first team member must believe that the second 
team member has a similar understanding of the task and the team such that he or she will 
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 be able to successfully interpret and exploit the actions of the first team member.  If the 
first team member does not believe that the second team member shares his or her views, 
then he or she will be unlikely to attempt to engage in implicit coordination.  As will be 
discussed further below, these perceptions of sharedness may be completely separate 
from the actual level of sharedness between team member mental models. 
Summary 
 Prior studies have demonstrated that high-performing teams can adapt their 
communication patterns during periods of high workload in order to compensate for 
increases in performance demands.  While this finding provides potential evidence for 
implicit coordination, none of the studies reviewed here investigated the process whereby 
one team member voluntarily offers information or resources and another team member 
exploits those resources to maintain or enhance team processes and performance.  In 
contrast, prior studies all focused on the reduction of requests and the increase in 
initiating behaviors.  None of the prior studies mentioned the use of any measure of 
whether there was a responding behavior resulting from the initiating behavior.  The 
results were for high-performing teams, so it is certainly possible that these teams were 
engaging in implicit coordination; however, it is also possible that the results of these 
studies can be explained in terms of backup behaviors that are the result of one team 
member’s efforts.  Thus, a more thorough investigation into the process of implicit 
coordination is needed in order to differentiate between these one-sided behaviors and 
team coordination. 
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 Furthermore, while prior studies have presented some evidence for the presence 
of implicit coordination, the link between the shift to implicit coordination and SMMs is 
still a hypothesis that has yet to be fully investigated.  This represents a potentially crucial 
oversight in the research to date regarding implicit coordination.  While the notion that 
SMMs play a role in implicit coordination is logical, research is needed to assess the 
nature of the relationship between SMMs and implicit coordination behaviors.  Before 
proposing specific ways to overcome this limitation in the previous literature, it will be 
necessary to discuss the construct of SMMs to determine what is currently known about 
them and to examine how SMMs might impact the use and efficiency of implicit 
coordination.  This discussion is provided in the following section. 
Mental Models 
A number of researchers have suggested that the change from explicit to implicit 
coordination between team members can be attributed to mutual or shared mental models 
(SMMs) that allow team members to anticipate each other’s needs (Cannon-Bowers, 
Salas & Converse, 1993; Entin & Serfaty, 1999; Espinosa, Kraut, Lerch, Slaughter, 
Herbsleb, & Mockus, 2001; Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989; MacMillan, Paley, Levchuk, 
Entin, Freeman, & Serfaty, 2001; Stout & Salas, 1993; Urban et al., 1996; Volpe et al., 
1996; Weick & Roberts, 1993).  In fact, even researchers not specifically referring to 
implicit coordination have suggested that SMMs should lead to improved team processes 
(Kraiger & Wenzel, 1997; Rentsch & Hall, 1994; Rouse, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1992; 
Walsh, Henderson & Deighton, 1988) and team performance (Langan-Fox, Code, & 
Langfield-Smith, 2000; Porac & Thomas, 1990; Rentsch & Klimoski, 2001).  
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 Mohammed and Dumville (2001) noted that the general consensus in the SMM literature 
was that increased sharedness should lead to improved team effectiveness.   
 In their review of the literature on this topic, Cannon-Bowers et al. (1993) asked 
whether too much sharedness can be detrimental to team performance.  Specifically, 
might too much sharedness lead to a phenomenon similar to Janis’ (1972) notion of 
groupthink, where a singular view might lead team members to make incorrect or poor 
decisions in order to preserve the group’s cohesion?  Cannon-Bowers et al. did not think 
so and instead concluded that teams that do not have SMMs are more likely to perform 
poorly or fail altogether, and, thus, “shared mental models [should] be fostered among 
team members as much as possible” (p. 237).  Furthermore, Cannon-Bowers et al. offered 
two potential strategies to overcome possible negative effects of too much sharedness: (a) 
emphasize assertiveness skills to make team members more likely to challenge or 
question decisions, and/or (b) provide decision support systems that could suggest 
alternative options for the team to consider.  
 The following section describes those aspects of SMMs that are relevant to the 
current study.  First, mental models and SMMs are defined.  Next, the various types of 
mental models are differentiated and discussed in terms of their importance in this study.  
Finally, the section concludes with a discussion of the daunting nature of research on 
mental models and the difficulty involved in comparing results across studies.  
Definitions of Mental Models 
There is no single definition of a mental model that is universally accepted.  What 
researchers do agree on is that a mental model is an internal representation of how 
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 something works or how things or concepts are connected with each other (cf. Eberts, 
1994; Gentner & Stevens, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Norman, 1988; Rouse & Morris, 
1986; Wilson & Rutherford, 1989).  The definition that best suits the purposes of the 
current research was adopted from Wilson and Rutherford, who noted that:  
… a mental model is a representation formed by a user of a system and/or 
task, based on previous experience as well as current observation, which 
provides most (if not all) of their subsequent system understanding and 
consequently dictates the level of task performance. (p. 619)   
 
Furthermore, within the team context, the concept of SMMs has arisen to explain how 
team members coordinate with one another and adapt to changing environments (see 
Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993).  Cannon-Bowers et al. defined general SMMs as:  
Knowledge structures held by members of a team that enable them to 
form accurate explanations and expectations for the task, and, in turn, to 
coordinate their actions and adapt their behavior to demands of the task 
and other team members. (p. 228)  
 
Both of the definitions above emphasize the fundamental role that mental models 
and SMMs play in how a person and/or team will perform on a given task.  It is this key 
emphasis on the impact that SMMs have on team processes that makes these definitions 
essential for the current study.  Because the current study focuses on the relationship 
between SMMs and implicit coordination, it is only logical to define these constructs in 
ways that emphasize their influence on team behaviors and performance.  Although other 
terms have been used to describe knowledge structures (e.g., schemas, action scripts, 
expectations) and shared knowledge (e.g., shared cognition, shared understanding, 
transactive memory), the concepts of mental models and SMMs have always, at least in 
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 theory, been linked to implicit coordination.  Thus, these concepts are the focus of the 
current study.  
Types of Shared Mental Models 
Cannon-Bowers et al. (1993) hypothesized that team members may have multiple 
mental models of their task and their team, including models that contribute to an 
understanding of (a) the equipment with which they need to interact (equipment model), 
(b) the task and the method of completion (task model), (c) team member roles and 
responsibilities (team interaction model), and (d) the knowledges, skills, and abilities 
(KSAs) of the other team members (team model).  Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, 
and Cannon-Bowers (2000) later reorganized the four types into two general categories: 
task-related (both equipment and task mental models) and team-related (both team 
interaction and team mental models).  
For the purposes of the current study, Mathieu et al.’s distinction between task-
related and team-related mental models will be used.  The findings of the current study 
might suggest that future research should delve into the more specific categories. 
However, because the current goal is only to determine whether SMMs are related to 
implicit coordination, the simpler team vs. task delineation is appropriate and sufficient. 
Difficulties in Conducting Mental Model Research 
 Similar to the previously addressed problem of variations in the definitions of 
implicit coordination, the construct of SMMs has had its fair share of ambiguity as well.  
Cannon-Bowers et al. (1993) hypothesized that different SMMs exist, yet there have been 
inconsistencies in how researchers have defined, labeled, and evaluated these SMMs 
 27
 (Mohammed, Klimoski, & Rentsch, 2000).  The following sub-sections will specifically 
address three aspects of SMMs that are relevant to the current study; namely, (a) mental 
model content, (b) mental model sharedness, and (c) mental model assessment. For an in-
depth discussion of the various other problems that plague SMM research, please see 
Cannon-Bowers and Salas (2001), Klimoski and Mohammed (1994), or Mohammed et al. 
(2000). 
Mental Model Content 
While it has been suggested that there are different types of mental models, the 
specific content of these different mental models is still not clear.  Granted, the team-
related vs. task-related delineation put forth by Mathieu et al. (2000) seems fairly simple. 
However, the specific content of those mental models has changed from study to study 
based on the researchers’ decisions about what was and was not important.  Thus, even 
though there are different types of mental models, there are still no standards that define 
exactly what kind and specificity of information should be included in them.  One of the 
consequences of this lack of standardization is that it becomes difficult to compare results 
across studies.  While two different studies might purport to have assessed team SMMs, 
the content of those team SMMs may be completely different (Mohammed et al., 2000).  
This means that if one study found significant relationships between SMMs and other 
team variables, such as team performance, and the other study did not, the findings might 
have occurred because of the different content of the SMMs in the two studies.  In order 
to overcome this limitation, future researchers should specify not only the type of SMMs 
they are measuring, but also specify the focus or emphasis of the content.  This will allow 
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 for not only a better understanding of the SMM literature in general, but also will 
facilitate the process of comparing results across studies.  
Mental Model Sharedness 
A second aspect of SMMs that has varied across studies and made comparisons 
difficult has been the authors’ understanding of what is defined as sharedness and how 
sharedness should be measured.  There are at least three competing views on what 
“shared” actually means.  For instance, shared could mean (a) overlapping between team 
members, (b) distributed across an entire team, or (c) compatible (cf. Cannon-Bowers & 
Salas, 1997, 2001; Cooke, Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Stout, 2000).  Overlapping refers to 
how similar two mental models are to one another.  This is one of the most oft used 
definition of sharedness.  Distributed across an entire team refers to the team having a 
complete mental model by combining pieces of each team member’s individual model.  
Finally, compatible mental models should lead to expectations that are correct and/or 
similar, which lessen the importance of having identical models (Cannon-Bowers & 
Salas, 2001).  Thus, when comparing the results of various studies, it is important to pay 
attention to how the authors have defined sharedness and how that sharedness was 
actually assessed.  For the purposes of this study, the most common definition of 
sharedness, i.e., overlapping, will be used. 
Mental Model Assessment 
A third major aspect of SMM research that has differed from study to study and, 
therefore, affects the comparison of study results, is the assessment of the mental models, 
in terms of both measurement and analysis.  In fact, the major hurdles in mental model 
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 research have been how to measure one’s mental model and how to assess the sharedness 
between multiple models (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994).  A number of different 
techniques have been used in attempts to elicit and measure individuals’ mental models.  
These have included, but have not been limited to: similarity (or pairwise) ratings (cf. 
Marks, Sabella, Burke, & Zaccaro, 2002), card sorting (cf. Evans, Hoeft, Jentsch, & 
Bowers, 2002; Hoeft, Evans, Jentsch, & Bowers, 2003; Smith-Jentsch, Campbell, 
Milanovich, & Reynolds, 2001), concept mapping (cf. Evans, Hoeft, Kochan, & Jentsch, 
2005; Evans, Kochan, & Jentsch, 2003; Jonassen, Beissner, & Yacci, 1993), verbal 
protocols (cf. Ericsson & Simon, 1984), and textual analysis (cf. Carley, 1997).   
Issues of reliability and validity have been raised with regard to each specific 
method of mental model assessment.  For example, Hinsz (1995) emphasized that it is 
necessary to use more than one assessment method, especially because of reliability 
concerns.  Since mental models are dynamic and may indeed be unreliable themselves, 
using one method to assess them simply does not assure any kind of consistency.  
Because of the complexity of mental models, especially at the team level, Mohammed et 
al. (2000) advised that multiple techniques should be used and that each choice should be 
justified for a given context.  It should be noted, however, that Rouse and Morris (1986) 
believed that even an approach using multiple techniques to overcome the weaknesses of 
other techniques would still likely not capture an entire mental model.   
 Once a method or methods are chosen for analysis, the process of evaluating those 
mental models presents a whole new set of issues and concerns.  Not only can different 
measurement techniques lead to different results, but different evaluation or assessment 
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 techniques can as well.  For example, Smith-Jentsch, Mathieu, and Kraiger (2005) found 
different results when they evaluated SMMs using different ways to assess sharedness.  
Specifically, the authors measured both consistency (correlations between team 
members’ mental models) and agreement (variance of mental models across a team) and 
found that the consistency measure was more strongly related to team performance.  
Therefore, authors who use the same measurement techniques might still find different 
results based on slightly varied scoring and/or comparison methods, once again 
contributing to the complexities in comparing results across studies. 
Keeping in mind that there are difficulties in comparing the results of different 
SMM studies, the next section will review the studies that have investigated the 
relationship between SMMs and team processes and performance.   
Mental Model Sharedness 
 The most widely studied attribute of mental models in teams is the degree of 
sharedness (similarity, overlap, convergence, agreement, etc.) between team members’ 
individual mental models.  The majority of research exploring the influence of SMMs has 
used the level of sharedness as the primary assessment of SMMs, with more similarity 
suggesting that team members have better SMMs.  In general, the results have shown that 
more sharedness or overlap between mental models is associated with enhanced team 
coordination processes, which in turn have been found to be associated with better team 
performance (cf. Heffner, Mathieu, & Cannon-Bowers, 1998; Heffner, Mathieu, & 
Goodwin, 1998; Rentsch, 1993).  However, it should be noted that none of these studies 
investigated the relationship between mental model sharedness and implicit coordination. 
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 A number of the prior studies of SMMs in teams have shown direct or indirect 
linkages with multiple other team process and performance variables.  Klimoski and 
Mohammed (1994) stated that SMMs set “up a chain of effects influencing multiple 
determinants of team effectiveness” (p. 425).  Stout et al. (1999) showed that teams who 
planned better, also developed better SMMs and used more efficient communication 
strategies under conditions of high workload.  However, similar to many other published 
studies in the past, Stout et al. did not specify which type of SMM was measured.  
Mathieu et al. (2000) have noted that, due to the results of recent studies on the unique 
effects of different mental models,  “work on ‘the’ team model may be short-sighted at 
best, and confounded at worst” (p. 281).  Furthermore, Mohammed and Dumville (2001) 
stated that “team mental models should not be referenced in the abstract without 
specifying whether the focus is on teamwork [or] taskwork” (p. 104).  In attempts to 
overcome these problems, a number of studies have examined the impacts of the different 
types of SMMs on team processes and performance.  These studies are described below. 
Team-Related Mental Models 
As stated earlier, team-related mental models are representations of the different 
team member roles, their KSAs, how they are supposed to coordinate with one another, 
etc.  Various studies have found mixed results in terms of the relationships between team-
related mental model sharedness and team processes, on the one hand, and team-related 
mental model sharedness and team performance, on the other.  For a number of reasons, 
it seems reasonable to expect that sharedness among team-related mental models impacts 
team processes and performance.  First, it makes sense that the more familiar team 
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 members are with each other and the more experience they have working together, the 
easier it should be to coordinate and accomplish team goals.  Second, even a shared 
generic understanding of which team member is responsible for each sub-task should 
allow team members to predict more accurately the behaviors of their teammates, and 
also to have a better understanding of their own tasks.  Third, a shared understanding of 
the teammates and their roles should also increase the accuracy with which team 
members could interpret the behaviors of the other team members.  Each of these factors 
should lead to improved team processes, and in turn, enhanced team performance.  The 
research results, however, have been somewhat mixed, which likely has been a result of 
the previously mentioned difficulties in conducting mental model research. 
Relationship with Team Processes 
Relatively few studies have directly investigated the relationship between team-
related mental model sharedness and team processes.  Of the available studies, some have 
failed to find any relationship (Marks, Zaccaro & Mathieu, 2000; Mathieu, Heffner, 
Goodwin, Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2005; Sabella, 2000), while others report having 
found a significant relationship between the two variables.  For example, Heffner (1997) 
found that the degree of sharedness between team mental models was a significant 
predictor of team processes, which were measured along six attributes: (a) leadership, (b) 
assertiveness, (c) decision making/mission analysis, (d) adaptability/flexibility, (e) 
situation awareness, and (f) communication.  Mathieu et al. (2000) found similar results 
when looking at team processes in terms of three specific dimensions:  (a) 
communication, (b) strategy formation and coordination, and (c) team cooperation.  
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 Finally, Marks et al. (2002) found that sharedness of team interaction mental models was 
a significant and positive predictor of two team processes: (a) backup behaviors and (b) 
team coordination.   
Relationship with Team Performance 
Findings regarding the relationship between sharedness of team-related mental 
models and team performance have been equally mixed.  Specifically, a number of 
studies have found no direct relationship between sharedness and team performance 
(Heffner, 1997; Mathieu et al., 2005; Sabella, 2000; Smith-Jentsch et al., 2005).  Yet 
other studies have found direct relationships or mediated relationships between the two 
variables.  Minionis (1995) found that sharedness was significantly and positively 
correlated with coordinated performance. Fleming, Wood, Ferro, Bader, and Zaccaro 
(2003) also found that shared team-interaction mental models were positively related to 
team performance. Marks et al. (2000) found a significant, positive relationship between 
team mental model sharedness and team performance that was partially mediated by team 
processes.  Finally, both Mark et al. (2002) and Mathieu et al. (2000) found that the 
relationship between team-interaction mental model sharedness and team performance 
was fully mediated by team coordination variables.  
Task-Related Mental Models 
Task-related mental models include task-specific information about how to 
perform and complete the task, as well as the equipment needed to complete the task.  In 
terms of the number of studies that investigated the influence of mental model sharedness 
on team processes and team performance, task mental models have received even less 
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 attention than team-related mental models.  Nevertheless, there are reasons to expect 
task-related mental model sharedness to be related to team processes and performance.  
First, an overall shared understanding of the task should allow team members to 
appropriately distribute the responsibilities to ensure goal attainment.  Second, a shared 
understanding of the task should facilitate team coordination because team members 
should be aware of what needs to be done and why.  Third, a shared understanding of the 
task could even compensate for a lack of familiarity with teammates.  As long as all of 
the team members understand the task, then they should be able to predict and interpret 
their teammates’ behaviors.  Similarly, these factors should all be associated with 
improved team processes, and in turn, team performance.  The available studies in this 
regard are reviewed in the following two sections. 
Relationship with Team Processes 
No readily available studies were found that looked solely at the influence of task-
related mental model sharedness on team processes and performance. However, a number 
of the studies that investigated team-related mental models also included an analysis of 
the relationship between task-related mental models and team processes or performance.  
The three studies that have evaluated the relationship between task mental model 
sharedness and team processes have all found a significant, positive relationship between 
the two (Heffner, 1997; Mathieu et al., 2000; Mathieu et al., 2005).  While generalization 
from these three studies must be approached with caution, it can be safely noted that none 
of the available studies have found a non-significant relationship or a significant, 
conflicting (i.e., inverse) relationship between the two variables. 
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 Relationship with Team Performance 
Findings regarding the relationship between task-related mental model sharedness 
and team performance are similar to those regarding team-related mental model 
sharedness and team performance.  That is, a number of different studies have provided 
evidence for differing relationships.  At least one study found no relationship between 
task mental model sharedness and team performance (Smith-Jentsch et al., 2005).  On the 
other hand, another study found the exact opposite relationship; that is, Fleming et al. 
(2003) found a significant positive relationship between the two variables.  Alternately, 
Mathieu et al.’s (2000) results showed that task mental model sharedness had an indirect 
relationship with team performance, being mediated via team processes.  Two other 
studies have found evidence of a partially mediated relationship between task mental 
model sharedness and team performance (Heffner, 1997; Mathieu et al., 2005).  In both 
cases, the team processes were measured using the six dimensions of (a) leadership, (b) 
assertiveness, (c) decision making/mission analysis, (d) adaptability/flexibility, (e) 
situation awareness, and (f) communication.  It should be noted that the one study that 
did not find a relationship between task mental model sharedness and team performance 
(Smith-Jentsch et al., 2005) was a post hoc study that did not have a team process 
measurement; therefore, the possibility of an indirect or mediated relationship cannot be 
ruled out from the results. 
Summary 
A general overview of the above-mentioned studies can be found in Table 2.  The 
general pattern of results suggests that mental model sharedness appears to be related to 
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 team processes and team performance.  Of the ten studies that assessed the relationship 
between SMMs and team processes, seven showed significant positive results.  Of the 16 
studies that assessed the relationship between SMMs and team performance, 13 found a 
significant and positive relationship.  What is important to note here is that, even with all 
the confounding variables that affect comparisons between studies, the overwhelming 
evidence is that SMMs do have an impact on how teams coordinate and perform.   Thus, 
the hypothesis that SMMs play a role in implicit coordination is a logical one and will be 
investigated further in the current study. 
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 Table 2 
Summary of Relationships found between Shared Mental Models and Team Processes and Team Performance Presented 
Chronologically 
Study Type of SMMs Relationship with Team Processes Relationship with Team Performance 
Minionis (1995) Team SMMs Not noted Significant positive relationship between 
Team SMMs and coordinated performance 
Carley (1997) Not specified Not noted Higher performing teams had more elaborate 
and different information in their mental 
models compared to lower performing teams 
Team SMMs Team SMMs significant positive predictor of 
team processes 
Team process significantly influenced team 
performance, no direct relationship with 
Team SMMs 
Heffner (1997) 
Task SMMs Task SMMs significant positive predictor of 
team processes 
Team process partially mediated the 
relationship between task SMMs and team 
performance 
Stout, Cannon-
Bowers, Salas, & 
Milanovich (1999) 
Not Specified No significant relationship between SMMs and 
information provided in advance 
Indirect positive relationship between SMMs 
and performance via planning 
Team SMMs Significant positive relationship between Team 
SMMs and team processes 
Relationship between Team SMMs and 
performance fully mediated by team process 
Mathieu, Heffner, 
Goodwin, Salas, & 
Cannon-Bowers  
(2000) 
Task SMMs Significant positive relationship between Task 
SMMs and team process 
No direct relationship, indirect relationship 
via team process 
Marks, Zaccaro, & 
Mathieu (2000) 
Team Interaction 
SMMs 
Team Interaction SMMs significant positive 
predictor of communication processes 
Positive relationship between Team 
Interaction SMMs and team performance 
partially mediated by team process 
Sabella (2000) Team SMMs Team SMMs not a significant predictor of 
coordination quality (backup behavior) 
Team processes significantly predicted 
performance but no relationship between 
Team SMMs and performance 
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Study Type of SMMs Relationship with Team Processes Relationship with Team Performance 
Marks, Sabella, 
Burke, & Zaccaro 
(2002) 
Team Interaction 
SMMs 
Team Interaction SMMs significantly 
improved backup behaviors and 
significantly predicted team coordination 
Positive relationship between Team 
Interaction SMMs and team performance 
completely mediated by coordination 
processes 
Team Interaction 
SMMs 
Not noted Significant positive relationship between 
Team Interaction SMMs and team 
performance 
Fleming, Wood, 
Ferro, Bader, & 
Zaccaro (2003) 
Task SMMS Not noted Significant positive relationship between 
Task SMMs and team performance 
Team SMMs No significant positive relationship between 
Team SMMs and team process 
No significant relationship between Team 
SMMs and team performance 
Mathieu, Heffner, 
Goodwin, Cannon-
Bowers, & Salas 
(2005) 
Task SMMs Task SMMs significant positive predictor 
of team processes 
Positive relationship between Task 
SMMs and team performance partially 
mediated by team process 
Team Interaction 
SMMs 
Not noted Team Interaction SMMs not a significant 
predictor of team performance 
Task SMMs Not noted Task SMMs not a significant predictor of 
team performance 
Smith-Jentsch, 
Mathieu, & Kraiger 
(2006) 
Interaction between 
Team Interaction 
and Task SMMs 
Not noted Interaction significant positive predictor  
of team performance 
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 Implicit Coordination and Mental Model Sharedness 
While the studies that have assessed the relationship between both team and task 
mental model sharedness were reviewed in the previous section, the focus of the study 
proposed here was specifically on task mental models.  This decision was made based 
two factors.  First, the number of studies that have focused on task-related mental models 
are fewer than for team-related mental models.  Consequently, much less is known about 
the influence of task-related mental models.  Second, while being familiar with one’s 
teammate and his/her roles is likely to enhance any type of coordination, it was a realistic 
assumption that having a shared understanding of the task will have a stronger overall 
effect on the process of implicit coordination.  Team members might be able to 
compensate for a lack of task understanding if they have a great deal of experience with 
one another; however, this study utilized ad hoc teams brought together for the express 
purposes of participating in a research study.  Thus, especially in this environment, task 
mental models are expected to be more appropriate.   
It has already been noted that SMMs are hypothesized to be related to implicit 
coordination because SMMs allow team members to anticipate each other’s needs.  It 
makes sense that shared task mental models should facilitate team processes by allowing 
team members to coordinate more effectively with one another.  However, in discussing 
the definition of successful implicit coordination earlier, it was noted that SMMs should 
be important in making it possible for the second team member to interpret and respond 
to initiating behaviors, but not as support for the first team member to attempt implicit 
coordination.  In fact, one can go so far as to intentionally not include SMMs among the 
facilitating factors that increase the likelihood that a team member will engage in implicit 
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 coordination.  It is reasonable to conclude that teams who have shared task mental 
models can be expected to be more efficient in their coordination, because team members 
will be more likely to attempt implicit coordination at the appropriate and necessary 
times and with the appropriate initiating behaviors.  However, team members who do not 
have shared task mental models may be just as likely to attempt implicit coordination, 
which will likely be unsuccessful when they carry out an action that is inappropriate or 
do so at an inappropriate time, etc.   
There are two reasons to believe that shared task mental models, even though they 
may not be predictive of attempts to coordinate implicitly, are essential for the correct 
interpretation and response behaviors in implicit coordination.  First, if team members 
have a shared understanding of the task, then it is more likely that the initiating behavior 
was an appropriate behavior that the second team member can interpret easily.  Second, 
the second team member should know what to do in response to the initiating behavior.  
Thus, shared task mental models should facilitate the process of implicit coordination.  
Furthermore, from the reviews on implicit coordination and on mental model sharedness, 
it would certainly not be a stretch to hypothesize that the two are related.  Task mental 
model sharedness has been linked to both team processes and team performance; implicit 
coordination is an example of one type of team process.  Thus, the likelihood that shared 
task mental models are related to the use of implicit coordination is high.   
Therefore, for the current study, it was hypothesized that shared task mental 
models between team members would be positively related to the responding behaviors 
of the second team member.  That is, shared task mental models would allow the second 
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 team member to correctly recognize, interpret, and react to the first team member’s 
initiating behavior.  This leads to the first experimental hypothesis for the current study: 
Hypothesis 1: The level of sharedness (i.e., overlap) between team 
members’ task mental models will be a significant predictor of the use of 
implicit coordination, such that higher levels of sharedness will be 
associated with more responding behaviors. 
 
Figure 2 presents a graphical depiction of the proposed process of implicit coordination 
and the hypothesized relationship between shared task mental models and responding 
behaviors.  
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Figure 2. Proposed relationship between shared task mental models and implicit 
coordination. 
 
 
 
Confirmation of this hypothesis would provide the first direct empirical evidence 
to support the much-referenced hypothesis that SMMs are related to implicit 
coordination.  Specifically, it would show that shared task mental models play a role in 
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 implicit coordination by aiding the second team member to correctly recognize, interpret, 
and react to the first team member’s initiating behavior. 
Mental Model Accuracy and Quality 
 Whereas there is overwhelming evidence that the level of sharedness among team 
member mental models impacts team processes, issues related to the quality of those 
SMMs have received much less attention.  As noted previously, it has been hypothesized 
that implicit coordination requires not only shared mental models, but accurate mental 
models as well (Serfaty et al., 1993).  Other authors have also argued that the correctness 
of SMMs may be essential for effective teams (see Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1990; 
Cooke et al., 2000; Druskat & Pescosolido, 2002; Ellis, 2005; Evans, Harper, & Jentsch, 
2004; Hall, Volpe, & Cannon-Bowers, 1992; MacMillan et al., 2004; Rentsch & Hall, 
1994; Rentsch, Heffner, & Duffy, 1994; Rouse et al., 1992; Smith-Jentsch, Campbell, 
Milanovich, & Reynolds, 2001; Smith-Jentsch, Kraiger, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1998; 
Stout, 1994).  There are a number of different terms that can be used to express how 
“good” a mental model actually is; the two most often used are accuracy and quality.  In 
the past, accuracy has usually been assessed by comparing an individual’s mental model 
with one correct, referent model.  In contrast, quality has been assessed subjectively by 
an expert or by comparing an individual’s mental model to any number of “correct” 
models.  Although these terms are often used interchangeably, more detail is needed for 
the purposes of this study.  The following discussion differentiates between studies that 
emphasized accuracy vs. quality. 
Langan-Fox, Wirth, Code, Langfield-Smith, and Wirth (2001) posited that it is 
likely that team members must first develop an accurate mental model and then develop 
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 SMMs.  In fact, Converse, Cannon-Bowers, and Salas (1991) suggested that accuracy is a 
fundamental part of the SMM hypothesis.  Further, Smith-Jentsch, Blickensderfer, Salas, 
and Cannon-Bowers (2000) suggested that having both shared and accurate team mental 
models should allow team members to (a) understand coordination breakdowns, (b) focus 
on specific goals, and (c) generalize lessons learned from previous experience.  Table 3 
presents the possible combinations between accuracy and sharedness among team 
member mental models. 
 
Table 3 
Differing Combinations of Accuracy and Sharedness of Mental Models 
 Low Accuracy High Accuracy 
Low Sharedness Team members have neither accurate nor shared mental models 
Team members have accurate 
mental models that are not similar 
to those of their teammates* 
High Sharedness  Team members share inaccurate mental models 
Team members have accurate 
mental models that are similar to 
those of their teammates 
*Note: It is possible to have accurate mental models that are not shared in situations where the content of 
the mental models is different, the organization scheme or structure is different, or there are multiple 
“correct” methods or answers.  In these instances, the mental models may still be of high quality, even 
though they aren’t deemed “accurate” by some standard. 
 
 
 
While it is expected that accurate and shared mental models typically form the 
most effective combination, little of the sharedness research has actually measured 
accuracy or quality in any way.  One possible reason may be due to the increased 
difficulties in conducting research on the correctness of mental models and SMMs.  For 
instance, can an average measure of accuracy across a team truly be useful in predicting 
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 team processes?  A shared accuracy of 50% could mean more than one thing:  two team 
members could both have 50% accuracy in their mental models; one team member could 
have 10% accuracy and the other 90% accuracy; etc.  Should accuracy be measured and 
analyzed at the individual level rather than the team level?  Which is more important, the 
relationship between some team accuracy score and overall team processes or the 
relationship between accuracy of one’s own mental model and one’s behaviors?  These 
are questions that have yet to be answered.  Furthermore, there is currently no research 
available that conclusively links the correctness of mental models with the use of implicit 
coordination.   The few studies that have explored the relationship between mental model 
accuracy or quality and team processes and/or performance are described next. 
Task-Related Mental Models 
No studies that have focused on teams have looked at the accuracy or quality of 
task mental models without also taking into account the level of sharedness between team 
members.  Only two studies (Heffner, 1997; Mathieu et al., 2005) have investigated the 
relationship between task-related mental model sharedness and quality and team 
processes and performance, and the findings on the relationship between task-related 
mental model quality and team processes and performance were both the same:  no 
significant relationship was found.  Task mental model quality alone has not been found 
to significantly predict team processes or team performance.  Further, the interaction 
between task mental model sharedness and quality has not been found to significantly 
predict team processes or performance.  The findings of two studies are obviously not 
conclusive in showing that no relationship exists; however, at this time, no published 
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 studies have reported that the quality of task-related mental models is related to any other 
team variables. 
Summary 
 In light of the dearth of research examining the accuracy or quality of SMMs, it is 
clear that there is still much to learn about the interaction between the sharedness and 
quality of mental models.  It appears that prior research has placed much more emphasis 
on the level of sharedness between mental models than on the quality of those SMMs.  
As no significant findings have been found regarding the quality of task-related mental 
models, it may be that task-related mental model quality does play a secondary role to 
mental model sharedness in terms of the impact on or relationship with team processes 
and team performance.  Thus, while it seems logical to hypothesize that teams with 
accurate SMMs will outperform all other teams, this overview suggests that the quality 
might not be as important as the sharedness.    
Implicit Coordination and Mental Model Quality 
 While “quality” and “accuracy” have often been used interchangeably, the term 
quality is preferred to accuracy and will be used here because it allows for the possibility 
of multiple correct interpretations of any given situation.  Quality allows team members 
to organize their knowledge differently, focus on different constructs, focus on different 
levels, etc., while still having “correct” mental models.  Thus, the current study 
investigated the relationship between mental model quality and implicit coordination. 
The review of the mental model quality literature has shown: (a) there are only a 
small number of studies that have investigated the effects of mental model quality on 
team processes and (b) that the results of those few studies suggest that mental model 
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 sharedness may be more important that mental model quality.  No studies have found a 
significant relationship between mental model quality and team processes or 
performance; yet, quality and sharedness may interact with one another.  
Based upon the available literature, it was therefore hypothesized that the quality 
of mental models would be associated with improved team processes, the expected 
outcome of implicit coordination, but not with more attempts at implicit coordination or 
responding behaviors.  It is likely that the quality of one’s mental model will result in 
more appropriate initiating and responding behaviors, but not necessarily with more 
initiating and responding behaviors in general.  The quality of one’s mental model, 
though, should allow the second team member to correctly interpret the initiating 
behavior and follow through with the appropriate responding behavior, which should lead 
to the improved team processes.  Thus, in order to examine this relationship between 
mental model quality and implicit coordination, the following hypothesis was posited: 
Hypothesis 2: The average quality of team members’ task mental models 
will be a significant predictor of successful implicit coordination, such 
that higher quality task mental models will be associated with improved 
team processes. 
 
Figure 3 presents a graphical depiction of the proposed process of implicit coordination 
and the hypothesized relationship between the quality of task mental models and the 
expected outcome of successful implicit coordination, improved team processes.  
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Figure 3. Proposed relationship between the quality of task mental models and implicit 
coordination. 
 
 
 Confirmation of this hypothesis would lend some support to the notion that 
accuracy or quality of mental models is important for successful team coordination.  This 
study would be the first to establish a link between the quality of task mental models and 
the process of implicit coordination. 
 Additionally, an interaction between the sharedness and quality of task mental 
models was initially proposed, but upon further reflection, it was removed.  Specifically, 
if task mental models sharedness is related to the number of responding behaviors, then 
the quality of those task mental models will play a more important role when team 
members have high sharedness simply because the base rate of responding behaviors will 
be higher.  In other words, when team members do not have SMMs, then it is 
hypothesized that they will engage in less responding behaviors and therefore have fewer 
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 opportunities to reach successful implicit coordination.  However, this relationship is 
dependent on the baseline rates for low and high levels of sharedness. As can be seen in 
Figure 4, the overall base rate for low sharedness should be significantly lower than for 
high sharedness, and the difference between high and low quality is therefore more 
pronounced under conditions of high sharedness.  Yet there is no reason to believe that 
the proportion of successful implicit coordination behaviors will be any different for low 
vs. high sharedness.  Thus, while it is expected that the quality of task mental models will 
appear to have a stronger influence under conditions of high sharedness, this relationship 
is expected to be proportional and therefore not necessarily an interaction. 
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Figure 4. Expected proportional relationship between sharedness and quality of task 
mental models. 
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 Perceptions of Sharedness 
 While actual SMMs in teams may facilitate team performance through implicit 
coordination, one question that has not fully been explored is the influence of perceptions 
of SMMs.  Specifically, must team members be aware that they share mental models in 
order to use them?  Klimoski and Mohammed (1994), in their discussion of what it means 
to share a mental model, suggested that an awareness of that sharedness may also be 
contained in the notion of sharedness.  Specifically, It was suggested that there must be 
some awareness among team members regarding how their teammates think and behave 
in order for the team to hold SMMs.  Thus, Klimoski and Mohammed argued that mental 
models are only shared if team members believe they are.  In fact, Klimoski and 
Mohammed stated that “similarity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for saying 
that a shared mental model exists….we feel that some level of awareness is necessary” (p. 
422).  Furthermore, Fiore and Salas (2004) noted in the conclusion to their book on team 
cognition that the two overarching themes in the book were (a) communication and (b) 
awareness.  Thus, the impact of team member awareness or perceptions of sharedness is 
certainly a topic that deserves more attention than it has received.   
This notion of shared understanding or awareness is similar to other constructs, 
such as transactive memory (Wegner, 1986) and perceptual accuracy (Scheff, 1967).  
Transactive memory has been defined as a memory system that is composed of (a) the 
different knowledges possessed by the team members and (b) an awareness or 
understanding of who knows what.  In essence, the concept of transactive memory is 
similar to team-related mental models, as both focus on knowledge of another teammate 
and more sharedness between mental models would suggest that team members are aware 
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 of their teammate’s roles, responsibilities, and possibly the knowledge their teammates 
must possess in order to fulfill their duties.  However, transactive memory differs from 
SMMs in that team members are not expected to have shared or overlapping knowledges 
per se, but to simply have an understanding of how knowledge is distributed throughout 
the team.  Thus, a team member should know who to turn to in the event that help or 
expertise on a subject is required.   Moreland (1999) suggested that accuracy of team 
members’ perceptions of what the other team members know is an important component 
of the transactive memory framework and will impact team processes.   
On the other hand, perceptual accuracy describes the extent to which one person 
can correctly predict another team member’s perceptions (as the same or different from 
one’s own).  This concept was introduced under the theory of co-orientation by Scheff 
(1967).  Co-orientation is the study of the knowledge and assumptions required for social 
interaction.  It is based on the merging of agreement between member’s beliefs and 
attitudes and the accuracy of one’s perceptions about another’s beliefs and attitudes.  
According to Scheff, there are four specific types of co-orientation: consensus (high 
agreement and high accuracy), dissensus (low agreement and high accuracy), pluralistic 
ignorance (high agreement and low accuracy), and false consensus (low agreement and 
low accuracy).  Scheff suggested that the type of co-orientation required was dependent 
on how members were required to coordinate with one another.   
The concept of co-orientation was expanded upon and extended to the field of 
organizational climate by Poole and McPhee (1983). Rentsch and Hall (1994) then 
further expanded the theory to describe “schemas about schemas” (p. 237), which is a 
comparable notion to Klimoski and Mohammed’s (1994) description of team members’ 
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 awareness of SMMs.  Specifically, Rentsch and Hall discussed the similarity between 
two team members, as opposed to Scheff’s (1967) original discussion of the similarity 
between one person and the majority.   
Expanding this notion to SMMs, co-orientation can be used to assess perceptions 
of sharedness between team member mental models.  Table 4 describes each of the four 
types of co-orientation in terms of SMMs.  Reality refers to whether or not there actually 
is sharedness between team member mental models, while perceptions of sharedness 
refers to whether team members believe there is sharedness.  As can be seen from Table 
4, it is quite possible that inaccurate perceptions of sharedness could have detrimental 
effects on team performance.  For instance, if team members incorrectly believe they do 
not have SMMs, they may be less likely to attempt actions they feel their teammates will 
not understand.  Conversely, if team members incorrectly believe that they do have 
SMMs, they may be constantly attempting to coordinate unsuccessfully.  Yet, correct 
perceptions of sharedness may improve team processes even under conditions of low 
agreement by (a) forcing the team members to try to better understand each other’s 
perceptions, or (b) reducing the number of unsuccessful attempts to coordinate. 
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 Table 4 
Co-orientation Applied to Shared Mental Models 
 Perceptions of Low Sharedness Perceptions of High Sharedness 
Reality:  
Low Sharedness 
Dissensus: team members 
correctly believe that they do not 
have shared mental models 
False Consensus: team members 
incorrectly believe that they 
have shared mental models 
Reality: 
High Sharedness 
Pluralistic Ignorance: team 
members incorrectly believe that 
they do not have shared mental 
models  
Consensus: team members 
correctly believe that they have 
shared mental models 
  
 
Development of Perceptions of Shared Mental Models 
So, how do team members develop their perceptions or beliefs of what others 
know and how closely it relates to their own knowledge base?  Nickerson (1999) 
suggested that people use “one’s own knowledge as the primary basis for developing a 
model of what specific others know” (p. 737) and thus “other things being equal, one is 
likely to overestimate the extent to which a random other person’s knowledge 
corresponds to one’s own” (p. 740).  This awareness or perception is then altered based 
on interactions that either confirm or dispute the default model, and that model is updated 
accordingly.  Furthermore, Nickerson noted that “one’s best guess as to how another 
person will react in a specific context is one’s awareness, or belief, of how one would 
react in that context” (p. 746).  Thus, following the logic of Nickerson’s argument, team 
members are likely to believe they have SMMs from the onset and would try to predict 
their team members’ behaviors based on what they themselves would do under the same 
circumstances.  
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 In terms of Table 4 then, Nickerson’s (1999) hypothesis would suggest that team 
members enter a new scenario believing that they have SMMs with their teammates; 
which could result in either a state of consensus (correct perception) or false consensus 
(incorrect perception/overestimation).  If the team is in a state of consensus, then team 
coordination should be facilitated because the team members know they have SMMs and 
can act accordingly.  However, if the team is in a state of false consensus, then team 
coordination should be hindered because behaviors will be based on inaccurate 
assumptions. 
Empirical Evidence of Perceptual Influences 
To my knowledge, there have been no studies that have analyzed the perceptions 
of SMMs as opposed to the actual SMMs.  Nor has co-orientation been applied to SMMs 
in the previous literature.  However, there have been a number of studies that have 
investigated team member perceptions of other team members from various other 
perspectives.  In fact, Nickerson (1999) noted that there is plenty of evidence to suggest 
that a person’s behavior is influenced by his/her perceptions of what other people know.   
A number of studies have found that more accuracy in regard to transactive 
memory is related to improved performance in groups (Austin, 2003; Libby, Trotman, & 
Zimmer, 1987; Littlepage & Silbiger, 1992).  Additionally, Austin found that consensus 
(i.e., team members agree in their perceptions of who knows what) was significantly, and 
positively, related to overall performance as well.  Thus, when team members shared 
accurate perceptions about their team members’ knowledge, the team was able to 
coordinate effectively and attain its performance goals.  In contrast, teams that were 
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 characterized by shared, yet inaccurate perceptions were less likely to coordinate and 
perform effectively. 
Woehr and Rentsch (2003) discussed perceptions related to team members’ 
schemas. Wilson and Rutherford (1989) noted schemas/schemata differ from mental 
models in that they are considered to be stored in memory and activated at necessary 
times, while mental models are thought to arise from schemata and to be dynamically 
reconstructed as they are used.  Woehr and Rentsch discussed team member schema 
similarity in terms of the Social Relations Model (Kenny, 1994), which breaks 
interpersonal communication down into the perceiver and the perceived.  Extrapolating to 
teams, Woehr and Rentsch noted a number of dimensions along which team member 
schema similarity and the Social Relations Model coincide.  Sample dimensions of 
relevance are listed in Table 5.  While these dimension descriptions are more geared 
toward social phenomena rather than cognitive phenomena, such as SMMs, there are 
obvious similarities that can be extracted.  For example, consensus has already been 
described as team members having an accurate understanding of their SMMs.  In turn, 
each of the dimensions listed in Table 5 could be applied to the mental model construct.  
In order to gain a thorough understanding of the team members’ perceptions of one 
another, it might be useful to look at a number of these dimensions when determining 
how team members view each other and the team as a whole. 
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 Table 5 
Social Relations Model Applied to Team Member Shared Perceptions 
Dimension General Question Description 
Consensus Is Team Member 1 viewed similarly by others? 
The degree of congruence 
among team members’ views 
of each individual member. 
Reciprocity 
Do Team Member 1 and Team 
Member 2 view each other 
similarly? 
The degree of congruence 
among team members in their 
tendencies to view each other 
similarly. 
Assumed 
Reciprocity 
Does Team Member 1 think others 
perceive him/her as s/he perceives 
them? 
The degree of congruence in 
team members’ beliefs that 
their teammates perceive them 
as they perceive their 
teammates. 
Meta-Accuracy Does Team Member 1 know how s/he is perceived? 
The degree of congruence 
among team members’ 
accuracy in understanding how 
their teammates view them. 
Assumed 
Similarity 
Does Team Member 1 perceive 
others as s/he perceives 
him/herself? 
The degree of congruence 
among team members’ 
perceptions that their 
teammates perceive them as 
they view themselves. 
Note: Adapted from Woehr & Rentsch (2003) 
 
In terms of empirical data, Woehr and Rentsch (2003) investigated team 
members’ perceptions of themselves and each of their teammates across an entire 
semester.  The results showed that perceiver effects (as opposed to partner or relationship 
effects) had the biggest impact on rating variance.  The authors interpreted this finding as 
“individuals tend not to differentiate among teammates and thus performance appears to 
be ‘in the eye of the beholder’” (Woehr & Rentsch, p. 4).  Furthermore, the results also 
showed that for three of the six performance dimensions evaluated, individuals rated their 
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 teammates as similar to themselves, which reiterated Nickerson’s (1999) hypothesis 
discussed earlier.  The implications of this finding demonstrate the strength and 
importance of individual perceptions and clearly support the notion that those perceptions 
influence how team members will interact with one another. 
Finally, taking a different perspective, Mitchell (1986) looked at measures of 
knowledge of other team member behaviors by investigating internal frames of reference.  
Mitchell’s study was based on Culbert and McDonough’s (1980) theory of alignment, 
which Mitchell described as an internal frame of reference that “create[s] an individual 
‘lens’ through which one views and interprets….[and] affect[s] significantly how people 
perceive events and assign meaning, and how they interact with one another” (p. 17).  
Mitchell provided training to participants on each other’s internal frames of reference, 
had participants answer questions regarding each person’s relationship with each other 
person, and calculated a relationship index between each pair of individuals.  The results 
clearly showed that those who received alignment training demonstrated significant 
improvements in their knowledge about other individuals’ knowledge.  Mitchell noted 
that the alignment training allowed participants to share information about themselves 
that allowed the others to predict and explain their behavior more accurately afterwards.  
Again, this would suggest that team member perceptions will influence how they 
coordinate with one another. 
Summary 
 The research on SMMs continues to evolve.  The question of how individual 
perceptions of sharedness and/or others’ mental models affect behaviors and team 
coordination has received some speculation, but very little direct research.  A number of 
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 researchers have posited that some type of awareness is necessary in order to achieve 
sharedness.  Studies from a number of different approaches have emphasized the 
importance of individual perceptions on team processes.  Further exploration into how 
perceptions of sharedness affect team processes, specifically team coordination, as well 
as how perceptions of SMMs interact with actual SMMs is warranted. 
Implicit Coordination and Perceptions of Sharedness 
 There is evidence to suggest that team member perceptions of other team 
members’ knowledges can significantly influence how team members interact and 
coordinate with one another.  Researchers have consistently suggested that SMMs are 
related to implicit coordination and that without SMMs, implicit coordination would not 
be possible.  This is a logical argument that is being tested in the first set of hypotheses of 
the current study.  But how do perceptions of SMMs fit into the puzzle?  What if team 
members have SMMs but do not believe that they do, such as in pluralistic ignorance?  
Will they not even attempt implicit coordination strategies?  In contrast, what if team 
members believe they have SMMs when they do not, such as in false consensus?  Will 
team members attempt to engage in implicit coordination unsuccessfully if their 
behaviors are guided by false beliefs?  The various approaches to understanding 
individual perceptions suggest that these perceptions are strong indicators of how team 
members are likely to interact with one another.  In fact, it is possible that these 
perceptions may be even more influential in whether team members will engage in 
implicit coordination than the actual sharedness of their mental models.   
As previously mentioned, the belief that the initiating behavior will be interpreted 
correctly is considered to be a facilitating factor that should increase the likelihood of a 
 58
 team member attempting to engage in implicit coordination.  This belief is encompassed 
in the more global perceptions of sharedness, i.e., that the team members have a shared 
understanding and should therefore interpret behaviors in a similar fashion.  Thus, one 
could hypothesize that it is these perceptions of sharedness, rather than the actual level of 
sharedness between mental models, that will increase the likelihood that a team member 
will begin the process of implicit coordination.   Specifically, it is anticipated that team 
members with perceptions of sharedness will engage in more implicit coordination 
attempts than team members who do not believe they have SMMs.  This leads to the final 
hypothesis that asserted that the perceptions of sharedness would be positively related to 
implicit coordination attempts:  
Hypothesis 3: The perceptions of sharedness regarding task mental 
models on the part of the first team member will be a significant predictor 
of implicit coordination attempts by that team member, specifically 
initiating behaviors.  In other words, perceptions of more sharedness will 
be associated with more initiating behaviors.  
 
Figure 5 presents a graphical depiction of the proposed process of implicit coordination 
and the hypothesized relationship between perceptions of sharedness and initiating 
behaviors.  
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Figure 5. Proposed relationship between perceptions of sharedness and implicit 
coordination. 
 
 
 Confirmation of this hypothesis would have strong theoretical implications for the 
team literature.  Previous research on SMMs and team processes and performance has 
always focused solely on the actual level of sharedness between mental models and has 
not addressed whether team members know they have SMMs.  Providing evidence that 
perceptions of sharedness also drive team behaviors could support the notion that we 
have been missing a key ingredient in team performance research. 
Finally, having suggested that it is the perceptions of sharedness, rather than the 
actual sharedness that drive implicit coordination attempts, it is necessary to also examine 
the relationship between perceptions and actual sharedness.  Similar to the case regarding 
the interaction between sharedness and quality, upon reflection, I decided that the 
difference would be proportional and, therefore, not necessarily an interaction.  
Specifically, if perceptions of sharedness are related to the number of initiating behaviors, 
 60
 then the actual sharedness between those task mental models will seem to play a more 
important role when team members have perceptions of high sharedness simply because 
the base rate of initiating behaviors will be higher.  In other words, when team members 
do not have perceptions of sharedness, then it is hypothesized that they will engage in 
less initiating behaviors.  A graphical depiction of this is presented in Figure 6.  Since it 
is hypothesized that implicit coordination will be more likely attempted when team 
members believe that they have SMMs, then the base rate of initiating behaviors will be 
higher and the chance for responding behaviors will also be higher.  Again, there is no 
reason why these proportions should not be similar. 
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Figure 6. Expected proportional relationship between perceptions of sharedness and 
actual sharedness of task mental models. 
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All of the previous research on SMMs has focused on obtaining some actual 
measure of a person’s mental model and then comparing individual models against one 
another.  To my knowledge, no studies have investigated how perceptions of SMMs 
influence team member behaviors and coordination.  The above hypothesis sought to 
determine whether overlooking perceptions of SMMs has been a shortcoming of previous 
research in the area and sought to analyze whether or not perceptions of SMMs are 
necessary for efficient team coordination.  If this hypothesis were confirmed, it would 
provide evidence that team members need to be aware of their SMMs in order to use 
them most effectively and that merely measuring SMMs without taking into account 
perceptions of SMMs may be short sighted.  Significant findings here could help to 
interpret previous findings that did not find a significant relationship between SMMs and 
other team factors, such as team processes; perhaps the teams simply did not know they 
had SMMs and thus were not able to successfully utilize them. 
It should be noted here that this study was mainly concerned with how implicit 
coordination in initiated and which factors are associated with that process (i.e., SMMs 
and/or perceptions of sharedness).  It is understood that the relationship between implicit 
coordination and team performance is likely affected by SMMs as well; however, it is not 
the goal of the current study to investigate which conditions lead to the best team 
performance.  Before we can learn the most appropriate ways to use implicit 
coordination, a firm understanding of the underlying mechanisms is required. 
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 Overall Summary 
 The hypotheses presented in this study were put forth in order to investigate the 
underlying mechanisms of implicit coordination and what role SMMs play in relation to 
implicit coordination.  It has previously been suggested that SMMs are related to implicit 
coordination.  This study furthered that line of research in two specific ways.  First, three 
different aspects of SMMs were addressed: (a) sharedness or overlap, (b) quality, and (c) 
perceptions of sharedness.  Second, implicit coordination was broken down into discrete 
stages that could be analyzed separately and together.  By breaking down both SMMs 
and implicit coordination, the relationship between SMMs and implicit coordination 
could be more thoroughly analyzed.  The hypotheses can be divided into three specific 
categories with respect to team coordination processes: those related to initiating 
behaviors, those related to responding behaviors, and those related to successful 
coordination.  The design of the study was based on the hypotheses that (a) the 
perception of sharedness is the main aspect of SMMs that is related to initiating 
behaviors, and (b) the actual sharedness of mental models is related to responding 
behaviors, and (c) the quality of mental models is related to improved team processes or 
successful coordination.   
 63
 CHAPTER THREE: METHOD 
Participants 
 Participants were 138 students from the University of Central Florida (UCF), 
forming 69 teams of two.  The data for four teams (IDs 11, 14, 31, and 34) were 
discarded because they did not finish the entire session. Additionally, data from two 
teams (IDs 20 and 36) were discarded because the team members did not chat with one 
another at all during the session.  Team 3’s data were discarded because one of the 
teammates made a comment that contaminated one of the manipulations.  Data from one 
team (ID 51) was discarded because one of the teammates was a non-native English 
speaker and had difficulty completing the tasks.  Finally, the data from Team 32 was 
discarded because it was obvious that one of the teammates did not take the task seriously 
or respond appropriately.  After removal of the aforementioned nine teams, data from 120 
participants, comprising 60 teams, were used for analysis.  All further descriptive and 
inferential statistics reported below, including participant demographics, are based only 
on these 120 participants. 
The students included 72 males and 48 females, with a mean age of 20.53 years 
(range 18 to 41).   Participants completed the study in same-gender teams of two.  Thirty-
eight (63.3%) of those teams were comprised of participants who did not know each 
other prior to the session, while the other 22 teams (36.7%) were comprised of friends or 
siblings.  Approximately half (48.3%) of the participants were freshmen, and only 9 
participants (7.5%) had any military experience.  They were all recruited via the 
Psychology and Digital Media Departments at UCF and received extra credit for their 
participation.  All participants were treated ethically according to the guidelines of the 
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 American Psychological Association (APA) and the UCF Institutional Review Board 
(IRB; see Appendix A for IRB Approval Form).  
Experimental Design 
 The study employed a 2 (high vs. low actual sharedness) x 2 (high vs. low 
perceptions of sharedness) between-subjects design.  The third variable, quality, was a 
quasi-experimental variable that was measured, but not manipulated.  While this variable 
was of interest, perceptions of and actual mental model sharedness were the main foci of 
this study.  Table 6 presents the experimental design of the study.   
Table 6 
Experimental Design 
 Low Perceptions (LP) of Sharedness 
High Perceptions (HP) of 
Sharedness 
Low Actual (LA) 
Sharedness 
LA-LP  
(Dissensus) 
LA-HP  
(False Consensus) 
High Actual (HA) 
Sharedness 
HA-LP  
(Pluralistic Ignorance) 
HA-HP  
(Consensus) 
  
 
Experimental Task 
Recognizing the complexities of the military environment, Urban et al. (1995) 
stated that “operational military environments provide ideal settings for the development 
of team performance” (p. 123).  Within the military environment, one particular area in 
need of research is the performance of reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) missions.  
A strong correlation has been found between the success of an R&S mission and 
subsequent operational or battlefield success (Goldsmith & Hodges, 1987).  However, it 
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 is common knowledge that the Army is not extremely efficient in conducting R&S 
missions (McCarthy, 1995), and the inclusion of robotic assets, such as unmanned ground 
vehicles (UGVs) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), is only adding to the complexity 
of these missions.   
R&S is essential to the success of any military mission, and therefore, the 
planning of R&S is recognized as “singularly the most significant event that takes place 
in the lifecycle of a tactical mission” (White, 1997, ¶ 1).  Because the planning of R&S 
missions using robotic assets represents a complex domain in which team members are 
required to interact with each other to complete team goals, this task provided an idea 
vehicle for investigating the current hypotheses.  The task chosen for this study required 
teams to draw the most appropriate and efficient routes for their robotic assets onto a map 
provided to them.  The task was only complete when both teammates agreed on the 
route(s) they had selected.  Precedent for focusing on mission planning comes from 
several previous studies of team coordination that emphasized the planning stages of 
various mission scenarios (cf. Larson, Christensen, Abbott, & Franz, 1996; Jeffrey, 1999; 
Pai, 2006; Stout et al., 1999). 
Equipment 
Computers 
The study utilized two workstations and one experimenter station.  The two 
workstations where the participants completed the study were nearly identical.  Both 
workstations used standard personal computers with ViewSonic E771 17-inch Monitors. 
A standard 3 button mouse was used to draw the routes at each workstation for each 
asset.  Both participants wore generic headphones for the duration of the study.  
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 Headphones were used to dampen any outside noise.  The workstations were separated 
from each other by a partition so that the participants could not see each other during the 
study.  Both the headphones and partition were used to help isolate participants and 
discourage verbal communication. These controls were effective in preventing all teams 
from verbally communicating during the experiment. 
Software 
 The study used Microsoft® Office PowerPoint® 2003 for the training portion and 
Marratech 5.1 virtual meeting software for the performance portion.  Marratech was 
downloaded free from www.marratech.com.  The Marratech software allowed multiple 
computers to network through a direct cable connection. The software allowed remote 
computers to share the same desktop, view the same screen, and exchange information 
through electronic chat, voice, or video.  This study took advantage of the Marratech 
Whiteboard and Chat functions.  The Whiteboard worked similar to common paint 
programs.  An image could be imported onto the Whiteboard and then participants could 
draw lines and arrows, manipulate objects, and point to specific locations on the 
Whiteboard.  All actions of one participant could be seen by the other and vice versa.  
The Chat window worked similar to common instant message programs; participants 
could type a message to their teammate and that message would appear on both 
computers, with the name of the sender and a time stamp.  A sample screen shot is shown 
in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Screen shot from Marratech 5.1 software. 
 
 
Recording Equipment 
 All actions performed on the computers at Workstation A were recorded onto 
DVD-Rs.  As both computers displayed all of the same information, it was not necessary 
to record both computers.  An ATI All-in-Wonder X800 XL 256 MB GDDR3 PCI 
Express Graphics Card was installed on Computer A.  This allowed for the display to be 
sent to the monitor, and to the CyberHome DVR 1600 DVD Recorder.  The sessions 
were monitored at the experimenter station on an Insignia 13-inch television via an S-
Video cable.   
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 Materials 
 All experimental paperwork can be found in the Appendices.  These include: an 
informed consent form (Appendix B), a biographical data form (Appendix C), a self-
monitoring measure (adapted from Snyder &  Gangestad, 1986; Appendix D), an 
extraversion measure (adapted from Costa & McCrae, 1996); Appendix E), a 
reconnaissance planning quiz (Appendix F), a task mental model measure (derived from 
Smith-Jentsch et al.’s [2005] Cue-Strategy Associations Measure; Appendix G),  a 
perceptions of sharedness pre-measure (Appendix H), an appropriateness of implicit 
coordination measure (Appendix I), a perceptions of sharedness post-measure (Appendix 
J), the NASA-TLX instructions and forms (Hart & Staveland [1988]; Appendix K), and a 
debriefing form (Appendix L).   
Training Materials 
 The training materials consisted of PowerPoint slideshow presentations that 
presented the participants with the essential information they needed to complete their 
tasks.  Two different training programs were used to instill high or low sharedness 
between the teammates.  In order to achieve high sharedness, both team members 
received the same training program, specifically, (a) Training Module 1 and Training 
Module 1 or (b) Training Module 2 and Training Module 2.  In contrast, to achieve low 
sharedness, team members received different training programs, specifically, Training 
Module 1 and Training Module 2.   
 The training materials provided the participants with general information about 
military reconnaissance tasks, the importance of environmental factors, how to 
strategically utilize UGVs and UAVs, and other information essential to planning a 
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 military reconnaissance mission.  The modules differed in their emphasis on certain 
strategies of using the UGV and UAV in conjunction, the importance of different factors, 
the importance of utilizing all available assets, and the importance of making quick 
decisions.  The modules also provided the participants with a description of the 
Marratech software and the basic functions that they would be using.  Appendix N 
presents the differences between the two training modules. 
Scenario Materials 
 Three different scenarios were developed and used in this study: the Training 
Scenario, the Samarra Scenario, and the al Kufah Scenario.  Each scenario consisted of a 
map that was imported onto the Marratech Whiteboard and two packets of information.  
Packet A was always given to the participant at Computer A, and Packet B was always 
given to the participant at Computer B.  Packet A always provided information about the 
UAV and the weather, while Packet B always included information about the UGV and 
the terrain.  Additional information about obstacles and mission specifics were included 
in both packets.  Some of the information was identical, while the majority of the 
information was different.  Appendix O presents the materials for all three scenarios. 
Procedure 
 Participants signed up for the study in same-gender teams of two.  The teams 
were matched for gender and then randomly placed in one of six assigned conditions.  
Table 7 shows the six assignments.  There were two assignments each for Consensus and 
Pluralistic Ignorance because there were two possible combinations for High Actual 
Sharedness (i.e., where both teammates received Training Module 1, or both teammates 
received Training Module 2).   
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 Table 7 
Experimental Assignments 
Assignment N Training Module 
Computer A 
Training Module 
Computer B 
Perceptions 
1 Dissensus  32 HQ1 HQ2 Low 
2 False 
Consensus  
32 HQ1 HQ2 High 
3 Pluralistic 
Ignorance  
10 HQ1 HQ1 Low 
4 Consensus  12 HQ1 HQ1 High 
5 Pluralistic 
Ignorance  
18 HQ2 HQ2 Low 
6 Consensus 16 HQ2 HQ2 High 
Note: Divide N by 2 to get number of teams. Assignments 3 and 5 and Assignments 4 and 6 are collapsed 
during analysis to create the 4 experimental conditions. 
 
 Upon entering the experimental environment, participants were asked to take a 
seat at either of the two workstations and turn off their cell phones.  They were then 
asked to read and sign the Informed Consent Form (Appendix B) and to complete the 
Biographical Data Form (Appendix C).  Next, the participants were read an explanation 
of the study.  This explanation differed between the High and Low Perceptions 
conditions.  If participants were in a High Perceptions condition, they were told that both 
team members were receiving the same training as “Reconnaissance Equipment 
Operators.”  If the participants were in a Low Perceptions condition, they were told that 
they would be receiving two different types of training: the participant at Computer A 
would be trained as a “Reconnaissance Equipment Operator”, while the participant at 
Computer B would be trained as a “Surveillance Systems Specialist”.  Appendix M 
provides the dual explanations that were read throughout the experiment, with the 
specific differences highlighted. 
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  Next, participants were asked to put on headphones so that they would be 
discouraged from talking to one another during the remainder of the study.  They then 
began their training.  Depending on the condition they were in, the participants received 
either Training Module 1 or Training Module 2.  Both modules consisted of 78 slides that 
took approximately 15-20 minutes to read through.  After both participants completed the 
training, they were asked to fill out the Reconnaissance Planning Quiz (Appendix F) that 
was designed to reemphasize the key points of the Training Modules.  Next, they were 
asked to complete two personality measures, the Self-Monitoring Measure (Appendix D) 
and the Extraversion Measure (Appendix E).  While the participants were filling out the 
personality measures, the experimenter graded the Reconnaissance Planning Quizzes.  
There were two answer keys, one for each Training Module.  Appendix F shows the 
correct answers for each Training Module.  After completing the personality measures, 
the participants were given feedback on their quiz performance. 
 The participants were then read an explanation of their practice session and given 
15 minutes to engage in a Training Scenario (Appendix O).  Throughout all scenarios, the 
participant on Computer A was responsible for planning a route for the UAV, while the 
participant on Computer B was responsible for planning a route for the UGV.  The 
Training Scenario was identical to the actual performance scenarios, except that the 
participants could not chat with each other and could not see what their teammate was 
doing.  The purpose of the Training Scenario was to allow the participants to become 
familiar with the Marratech software and the types of information they would be 
receiving with each subsequent performance scenario. 
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  After the Training Scenario, the participants were asked to complete the Mental 
Model Measure (Appendix G), the Perceptions of Sharedness Pre-Measure (Appendix 
H), and the Appropriateness Measure (Appendix I).  All teams then completed the two 
performance scenarios (Appendix O), which were counterbalanced across teams.  Before 
each scenario, they were read a brief description about their task.  The scenarios took 
approximately 15-20 minutes each to complete.  After the first scenario, the participants 
were given the NASA-TLX instructions and blank forms to fill out (Appendix K).  They 
then completed the second scenario and filled out the NASA-TLX a second time.  Next, 
the participants were administered the Mental Model Measure (Appendix G) for a second 
time and a Perceptions of Sharedness Post-Measure (Appendix J). 
 The participants were then debriefed on the study, with emphasis on the deception 
used (Appendix L).  They were provided with the opportunity to ask any questions or 
discuss their feeling about the study.  Copies of the Debriefing Form and the Psychology 
Department’s Research Experience form were presented to each participant.  Finally, the 
participants were thanked for their participation and asked not to discuss the study with 
potential participants to avoid contamination of the experimental manipulations. 
Data Coding 
Mental Model Quality 
 In order to assess the quality of each team member’s mental model, unique 
scoring sheets were created for the two different training modules.  As previously 
discussed, the two modules provided opposing information about the types of strategies 
that should be used.  For example, Training Module 1 told participants to always consider 
using both assets first, while Training Module 2 told participants to always consider using 
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 only one asset first.  Thus, scoring sheets were developed that took into account these 
differences.  Participants received points for following the strategies that were 
emphasized in their respective training modules.  The possible points ranged from 0 to 13 
for each of the four scenarios within the mental model measures, resulting in an overall 
total range of 0 to 52 points.  Overall, the average quality score was 33.91 (SD = 7.171).   
To obtain an overall team quality score, the two team members’ scores were 
averaged together.  These team averages were then used to split the teams into a high and 
a low group, based on the median score (35.50).  This resulted in 26 teams with average 
low quality mental models with an average team quality score of 30.42 (SD = 6.146). Of 
the 26 teams with low quality mental models, 46% (12) were composed of team members 
who both had low quality mental models, while the other 54% (14) were composed of 
one team member with a lower quality mental model and one with a higher quality 
mental model. In contrast, there were 34 teams with average high quality mental models 
(M = 36.18, SD = 5.823).  Of the 34 teams with average high quality mental models, only 
32% (11) were composed of team members who both had high quality mental models, 
while the other 68% were composed of one team member with a lower quality mental 
model and one with a higher quality mental model.  Thus, only 38% of the teams were 
completely high quality or low quality, while the remaining 62% were actually mixed-
quality prior to taking the team average. 
Initiating Behaviors 
Communications between teammates were analyzed by reviewing the chat file 
transcripts for each scenario.  First, the overall number of messages and words from each 
scenario were tallied.  Next, a list of all possible pieces of information that could be 
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 passed from one team member to the other was created.  In the al Kufah Scenario, there 
were 41 possible pieces of information that Team Member A could have discussed with 
Team Member B and 42 possible pieces of information that Team Member B could have 
discussed with Team Member A.  Of those, approximately 39% were the same pieces of 
information.    In the Samarra Scenario, there were 38 possible pieces of information that 
Team Member A could have discussed with Team Member B and 36 possible pieces of 
information that Team Member B could have discussed with Team Member A.  Of those, 
approximately 32% were the same pieces of information.   
Three independent raters viewed each chat file and coded four types of 
information exchanges: (a) the information that was requested by Team Member A, (b) 
the information provided to Team Member A without a request, (c) the information that 
was requested by Team Member B, and (d) the information provided to Team Member B 
without a request.  A total tally for each type of information exchange was calculated for 
each scenario.  The total tallies from each of the independent raters were then correlated 
to determine inter-rater reliability.  The results showed the correlations between the three 
raters were r12 = .914, r13 = .871, and r23 = .848, which were all significant at the .01 
level.   
As one of the goals of this study was to look at specific sequences of events, it 
was necessary to create one standard list of the information exchanges in order to then 
investigate the next step in the chain of events.  Thus, first, to determine where there were 
major differences between raters, standard deviations were calculated.  Any specific case 
that had a standard deviation of 2.00 or above was then reevaluated until a consensus was 
reached about the appropriate rating for the specific case.  There were 19 specific cases 
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 that required re-evaluation.  Seven of these were requests, so they were set aside.  For the 
remaining 12 cases, each file was reviewed and a final decision was reached.  For all the 
other cases whose standard deviations were less than 2.00, the maximum tally of the three 
raters was used.  This was done to optimize the number of opportunities for the sequence 
of implicit coordination to occur.  For ties, the items were checked for reliability across 
raters.  In the end, the correlations between the three raters were r12 = .927, r13 = .907, 
and r23 = .894, which were all significant at the .01 level.   
Thus, the information exchanges where information was provided without a 
request became the initiating behaviors.  A total was taken for each team member within 
each scenario so that a total could be calculated for each individual and for the overall 
team.   
Figure 8 is a screen shot that shows some representative initiating behaviors.  
Specifically, Team Member B, who was in charge of the UGV, provided Team Member 
A, who was in charge of the UAV, with three critical pieces of information: (a) Initiating 
Behavior 1 (IB 1) – “You have to go to Neck”, (b) Initiating Behavior 2 (IB2) – “Torso is 
a place that I cannot go”, and (c) Initiating Behavior 3 (IB 3) – “Hand just needs a quick 
check to see if there are any vehicles there so that means it would be better for you to go 
there and just check it out real quick”.  These three behaviors are highlighted in the Chat 
File in yellow.  These were typical information exchanges that were counted as initiating 
behaviors.  As can be seen from the Chat File, no request for any of this information was 
made on the part of Team Member A.   
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IB 1 
IB 2 
RB 1
IB 3 
RB 2
Figure 8. Sample screen shot from Team 15, al Kufah Scenario.   
Note: The Chat shows three initiating behaviors by Team Member B and their corresponding 
verbal responding behaviors by Team Member A. RB 1 is a verbal Acknowledgment Responding 
Behavior.  RB 2 is a Synthesis Responding Behavior.  The Map shows Team Member A’s route 
drawn in magenta to Hand, Neck, and Torso in response to Team Member A’s initiating 
behaviors.  RB 3, RB 4, and RB 5 are all Action Responding Behaviors that were given a 5 rating. 
  
 
Responding Behaviors 
 After the standard set of initiating behaviors was agreed upon, the chat files and 
video recordings for each team were reviewed to look for responding behaviors.  
Responding behaviors fell into three categories: (a) an acknowledgement, such as “O.K.” 
or, “I did not have that info”, (b) synthesis, in which the second team member integrated 
the information with the information he or she had already been given, and (c) action, in 
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 which the route planning decisions reflected an application of the information provided in 
the initiating behavior.   
First, two raters independently rated the chat file transcipts for each team for 
instances of acknowledgement and synthesis responding behaviors.  The two raters then 
watched the DVDs for each team together and coded whether or not the corresponding 
actions were present for those behavioral sequences.  The possible action responding 
behaviors included: (a) drawing an arrow, (b) deleting an arrow, (c) pointing to a 
location, (d) changing the size or direction of an arrow, and/or (e) moving an arrow.  
Each action responding behavior was rated on a 1-5 scale to indicate the degree of 
confidence the action was indeed associated with the initiating behavior.  Prior to rating 
the action responding behaviors, the raters discussed that confidence was represented by 
several factors including: (a) amount of time passed between initiating behavior and 
given action, (b) content of conversation between the initiating behavior and given action, 
and (c) other possible reasons for the given action.  These factors were not individually 
analyzed because it was deemed that they could not be uniquely separated from the core 
construct.   
This overall process resulted in a measure of each type of responding behavior for 
each team in each scenario.  The following types of responding behaviors were identified:  
(a) frequency of acknowledgements, (b) frequency of synthesis communications, (c) 
overall verbal responses (total acknowledgements plus synthesis), (d) frequency of all 
actions, (e) frequency of all actions rated 3 or higher, (f) frequency of all actions rated 4 
or higher, and (g) frequency of all responding behaviors (total verbal plus all actions).   
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 Referring back to Figure 8, the three different types of responding behaviors are 
also exhibited.  Specifically, after Team Member B provided Team Member A with IB 1 
and IB 2, Team Member B responded with an Acknowledgement Responding Behavior 
(RB 1) – “OK I have no specific instruction.”  After IB 3, Team Member B responded 
with a Synthesis Responding Behavior (RB 2) – “So I need to go to Hand, Neck, and 
Torso?”  These responding behaviors are highlighted in the Chat File in blue.  These were 
typical information exchanges that were counted as verbal responding behaviors.  
Additionally, there are three action responding behaviors visible in the figure.  Based on 
the three initiating behaviors, Team Member A drew a route to Hand (RB 3), Neck (RB 
4), and Torso (RB 5).  The route was drawn within 5 minutes of the information 
exchange, and no other significant information was exchanged in between the initiating 
behaviors and the actions.  Thus, each of the three actions was given a rating of 5 because 
it was evident to the reviewers that the actions were a direct result of Team Member B’s 
initiating behaviors.  These were representative of the types of actions that were observed 
throughout the coding process. 
Team Processes 
Finally, team process measures were created in order to determine overall team 
process scores.  To reiterate, there were 74 possible pieces of information that could have 
been discussed in the Samarra Scenario and 83 possible pieces of information that could 
have been discussed in the al Kufah Scenario.  Each of these pieces of information was 
rated on a 1-3 scale of how important the information was in terms of planning the routes.  
Specifically, those pieces of information that were crucial to route planning were given a 
3 and those that should have no effect on route planning were given a 1.  In the Samarra 
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 Scenario, the distribution of information was: twenty-four (28.9%) pieces of information 
were given the highest rating of 3, twenty-one (25.3%) pieces of information were given 
the middle rating of 2, and twenty-nine (34.9%) pieces of information were given the 
lowest rating of 1.  In the al Kufah Scenario, the distribution of information was: twenty-
five (44.6%) pieces of information were given the highest rating of 3, thirty-three 
(25.3%) pieces of information were given the middle rating of 2, and twenty-five (33.8%) 
pieces of information were given the lowest rating of 1.  To derive a team process score, 
the ratings for all pieces of information discussed, both requested information and 
initiating behaviors, were totaled.  Thus, the team process score was an overall score of 
the relevancy of information that was discussed throughout each scenario.  In the al 
Kufah Scenario, these ratings ranged from 7 to 56 (M = 26.68, SD = 11.454).  In the 
Samarra Scenario, these ratings ranged from 0 to 48 (M = 23.73, SD = 10.186).   
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 CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
Organization 
This section provides a general overview of the organization of the results section. 
All analyses were conducted on SPSS 11.5 for Windows statistical software.  Unless 
otherwise noted, an alpha level of .05 was used.  First, a comparison of the two scenarios 
was conducted to determine whether there were any significant differences between them 
with respect to workload and instances of implicit coordination.  Next, two sub-sections 
are presented that provide information on (a) data cleaning and (b) random assignment 
and manipulation checks. 
   After these general analyses, tests of hypotheses are described.  The tests of the 
three hypotheses are presented in the order of the proposed steps of implicit coordination 
(initiating behaviors → responding behaviors → improved team processes).  Thus, first 
the analysis related to initiating behaviors and the impact of perceptions of sharedness 
(Hypothesis 3) is presented.  Next, the analyses related to responding behaviors and the 
impact of actual mental model sharedness (Hypothesis 1) are presented.  Finally, the 
analysis related to team processes and the impact of mental model quality (Hypothesis 2) 
is presented. Additionally, supplemental analyses investigated the effect of all 
independent variables on all dependent variables to assess the expected proportional 
relationships (as seen in Figures 4 and 6).  To begin, Table 8 presents the means, standard 
deviations, and inter-correlations between the study variables. 
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 Table 8 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Inter-correlations between Study Variables 
 M              SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Gender               - - -
2. Friends               
             
         
          
           
               
              
              
               
               
               
          
         
              
               
                
              
               
               
- - .01 -
3. Military Exp 0.08 0.26 -.17 -.15 -
4. RPGVS Exp  3.48 1.42 -.46** -.03 .15 -         
5. RPAVS Expt 0.40 0.11 .37** -.11 -.21* -.39** -
6. Video Game Expt 1.53 0.47 .56** .08 -.10 -.41** .30** -
7. PC Expt 0.19 0.21 .13 .15 -.05 -.34** .11 .45** -
8. Chat / IM Expt 0.14 0.20 .03 -.02 -.09 -.16 .12 .36** .55** -
9. Extraversion 62.87 9.88 -.21* -.06 .08 -.04 -.13 -.26** -.02 -.11 -
10. Self-monitoringt 3.58 0.98 -.27** .15 .10 .14 -.13 -.09 -.06 .16 -.20* -
11. Perceptions Manip - - .07 .00 .03 -.09 .05 .13 .01 -.03 -.11 .05 -
12. Actual Manip - - -.05 .09 .01 .13 -.11 -.01 -.01 -.08 -.04 .06 .00 -
13. Perceptions Pre-testt 3.65 0.84 .10 -.21* .14 -.08 .19* .15 .12 .20* -.02 .08 -.14 .02
14. Actual Sharedness 43.63 10.71 .03 .06 -.08 -.04 .06 .10 .08 -.01 -.10 -.08 .08 .58**
15. Quality  33.91 7.17 .02 -.12 -.11 .21* .07 -.14 -.18 -.12 .00 -.20* -.09 .09
16. Workload 56.17 16.35 .01 .18* -.13 .10 .10 .17 .07 -.06 -.21* .10 -.04 .08
17. # Messages  28 16.36 -.11 .34** -.02 .06 -.12 .03 .03 -.08 -.03 .10 -.01 .10 
18. # Words  201 116 -.08 .09 .02 -.06 -.13 .00 -.07 -.10 .01 .06 .00 .10 
19. Initiating Behaviorst 0.70 0.21 -.03 -.05 .17 .01 -.10 -.06 -.05 -.01 -.01 .03 -.03 -.01
20. Acknowledge RBst 0.19 0.20 .14 .02 .01 -.04 .10 .13 -.10 -.07 -.02 -.06 .08 .20*
21. Synthesis RBs t 1.12 0.65 -.11 -.02 .02 .04 -.07 -.06 -.03 .01 .04 .15 .00 .02
22. All Actionst 0.71 0.75 -.08 .06 -.05 .03 .02 .03 -.03 -.02 -.13 .02 .04 .02
23. Team Quality 34.29 4.72 .06 -.15 -.09 .14 .06 -.14 -.19 -.15 .09 -.15 -.16 .12
24. Team Processes 26.68 11.45 -.02 -.14 .07 .02 .03 .03 .11 .32* -.25 .10 -.06 -.02 
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                M SD 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
13. Perception Pre-testt              3.65 0.84 (.90)
14. Actual Sharedness
  
             
             
            
              
               
               
                
              
43.63 10.71 .00 (.85)
15. Quality 33.91 7.17 .01 .09 -
16. Workload 56.17 16.35 -.01 .24** .06 -
17. Messages  
 
27.90 16.36 .10 .07 .08 .27** -        
18. Words 200.8 116 .17 .04 .08 .20* .79** -
19. Initiating Behaviorst 0.70 0.21 .10 -.09 .16 .12 .42** .50** -
20. Acknowledge RBt 0.19 0.20 .08 .04 .10 .09 .15 .11 .32** -
21. Synthesis RBt
  
1.12 0.65 .05 -.03 .07 .15 .35** .40** .64** .10 -
22. All Actionst 0.71 0.75 -.04 -.01 .02 .03 -.03 -.06 -.18* -.11 -.32** -
23. Team Quality 34.29 4.72 .01 .08 .59** .17 .19 .28* .39** .15 .22 .10 -  
24. Team Processes 26.68 11.45 .19 -.10 .32* .05 .47** .57** .74** .22 .60** .11 .29* - 
 
Note: * = significant at p < .05, ** = significant at p < .01. t = transformed variables used.  N = 120 for all variables except team level variables (N = 60).  RB 
= responding behavior. All variables were measured on the individual level unless specified otherwise. Actual Sharedness is based on absolute 
difference scores and therefore a higher score means less sharedness. 
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 Scenario Comparison 
 Prior to hypothesis testing, analyses of the behaviors in and the perceptions of the 
Samarra Scenario and the al Kufah Scenario were conducted.  First, a 2 (scenario order) x 
2 (scenario) x 7 (NASA-TLX subscales) mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was performed to determine whether there were significant differences in perceived 
workload between the two scenarios and whether there were any order effects.  The 
between-subjects factor was order of scenarios, while the within-subjects factors were the 
actual scenario and the NASA-TLX subscales.  The results showed that the test for 
between-subjects effects was not significant, F (1,118) = 0.613, p = .435, but there was a 
significant within-subjects main effect for the scenario (F [1,118] = 67.559, p < .0001, 
partial η2 = .364).  Specifically, participants perceived the al Kufah Scenario to be 
characterized by significantly higher workload than the Samarra Scenario (Mal Kufah = 
49.76, SDal Kufah = 1.356, MSamarra = 38.899, SDSamarra = 1.328), regardless of the order of 
scenarios.   
In addition, a paired-samples t-test showed that there were significantly more 
initiating behaviors in the al Kufah Scenario than the Samarra Scenario, t(119) = -3.042, 
p = .003 (Mal Kufah = 4.53, SDal Kufah = 2.660, MSamarra = 3.72, SDSamarra = 2.464).  Team 
members also sent significantly more messages, t(119) = -6.285, p < .0001 (Mal Kufah = 
27.90, SDal Kufah = 16.360, MSamarra = 19.87, SDSamarra = 13.005),  with more words, t(119) 
= -6.067, p < .0001 (Mal Kufah = 200.81, SDal Kufah = 115.868, MSamarra = 138.99, SDSamarra = 
88.496) in the al Kufah Scenario than in Samarra Scenario.   
Thus, participants not only found the al Kufah Scenario to be more difficult, but 
they also communicated more and had more instances of initiating behaviors.  Even after 
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 considering the total number of available pieces of information (i.e., 83 in the al Kufah 
Scenario and 74 in the Samarra Scenario), the former was characterized by a greater 
proportion of implicit coordination (5.5% vs. 5.0%).  This, in itself, supported the notion 
that teams used more implicit coordination when workload was higher.     
In order to maximize the possible effect sizes for the hypothesized relationships, 
the al Kufah Scenario was selected as the focus for analysis.  Because the Samarra 
Scenario had significantly less communications and perceived workload, I posited that its 
inclusion might water down the results and detract from the findings.  Therefore, for the 
remainder of the results section, unless otherwise specified, all analysis will focus on 
behaviors in al Kufah Scenario.  
Data Cleaning 
 First, the data were screened for normality.  There were a number of variables that 
were significantly skewed and transformations were made based on the recommendations 
by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001).  If data analysis results did not differ between the raw 
data and the transformed data, then the raw data were used.   
Biographical Data 
Two of the biographical data variables, experience with video games and the Self-
Monitoring Measure, were moderately negatively skewed and were transformed using the 
square root (reflected).   Two of the biographical data variables, experience with PCs and 
chat/instant messaging programs, were substantially negatively skewed and were 
transformed using the logarithm (reflected).  Finally, experience with radio or remote-
controlled air vehicles was severely positively skewed and was transformed using the 
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 inverse.  After transformation, these variables were no longer significantly deviating from 
normality. 
Study Variables 
 The measured perceptions of sharedness variable (Perceptions Pre-Measure Total 
Score) was moderately negatively skewed and was transformed using the square root 
(reflected).  Finally, a number of the dependent variables were positively skewed.  
Specifically, number of initiating behaviors, number of acknowledgement responding 
behaviors, and total verbal responding behaviors were all substantially positively skewed 
and transformed using the logarithm.  The number of synthesis responding behaviors, 
total action responding behaviors, total 4+ rated action responding behaviors, and total 3+ 
action responding behaviors were all moderately positively skewed and were transformed 
using the square root.  After transformation, these variables were no longer significantly 
deviating from normality. 
Random Assignment and Manipulation Checks 
 To confirm the random assignment of teams to the different experimental 
conditions, a random assignment check was performed by running a one-way (assigned 
experimental condition: dissensus, false consensus, pluralistic ignorance, consensus), 
between-subjects multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) on individual difference 
data that should not have been influenced by that assignment.  These individual 
difference variables were (a) age, (b) Self-Monitoring score, (c) Extraversion score, (d) 
experience with video games, and (e) experience with instant messaging chat programs.  
The results showed that the random assignment of teams to the different experimental 
conditions was successful in that there were no significant effects on any of the individual 
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 difference variables.  Table 9 presents the means and standard deviations of the random 
assignment check. 
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 Table 9 
Means and Standard Deviations for Individual Difference Variables by Assigned Condition 
  High Perceptions of 
Sharedness 
Low Perceptions of 
Sharedness 
MANOVA Results  
Overall Same 
Training (N = 122) 
(Consensus) 
Different 
Training 
(False 
Consensus) 
Same 
Training 
(Pluralistic 
Ignorance) 
Different 
Training 
(Dissensus) 
Variables M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) F (3, 116) p 
Age (years) 20.53 
(3.737) 
19.96 
(1.732) 
20.78 
(4.917) 
20.64 
(4.130) 
20.66 
(3.404) 
0.278 .841
Self-Monitoring Scoret    
  
42.23
(6.999) 
43.00 
(7.092) 
40.66 
(8.253) 
42.36 
(6.372) 
43.00 
(6.085) 
0.591 .622
Extraversion Score 62.87 
(9.878) 
63.75 
(11.131) 
60.03 
(11.125) 
62.75 
(8.329) 
65.03 
(8.283) 
1.485 .222
Experience with video 
gamest 
4.44 (1.494) 4.36 (1.521) 4.19 (1.424) 4.50 (1.552) 4.72 (1.508) 0.874 .457 
Experience with chat or 
instant messaging 
programst 
5.43 (0.886) 5.39 (0.832) 5.50 (0.950) 5.32 (1.090) 5.50 (0.672) 0.288 .834 
   
  
Note: t = transformed scores used. No significant differences found. 
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Psychometric Properties of Manipulation Check Measures 
Perceptions of Sharedness 
The perceptions of sharedness were manipulated by explaining to teams that they 
were receiving similar or different training.  A Perceptions of Sharedness Pre-Measure 
was used to assess the team members’ actual perceptions of sharedness prior to 
performance, and a Perceptions of Sharedness Post-Measure was used to assess the team 
members’ actual perceptions of sharedness after performance.  Table 10 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the Perceptions of Sharedness Pre-Measure items.  As can be seen 
from Table 10, participants tended to lean toward the higher end of the scale more than 
the lower end.  Specifically, the Mode was never lower than 4, and for four of the seven 
items, none of the participants selected the lowest rating of 1.   
Table 10 
Descriptive Statistics for Perceptions of Sharedness Pre-Measure Items 
 M SD Mode Min Max 
1. You and your teammate have a shared 
understanding of the task. 
4.53 1.092 5 1 6 
2. Your teammate will be able to anticipate your 
behaviors. 
3.48 1.174 4 1 6 
3. You will be able to anticipate your teammate’s 
behaviors. 
3.52 1.223 4 1 6 
4. Your teammate has a good understanding of 
your role in the team. 
4.41 1.104 5 2 6 
5. You have a good understanding of your 
teammate’s role in the team. 
4.52 1.108 5 2 6 
6. Your teammate will understand what you are 
doing. 
4.15 .993 4 2 6 
7. You will understand what your teammate is 
doing. 
4.16 .935 4 2 6 
Overall pre-teamwork total 28.98 6.133 33 11 42 
Note: Items 1-7 rated on a scale of 1= Not at All to 6 = Completely.  Overall pre-teamwork total is simply 
the sum of the first seven items for each person. 
 
 Even though the Perceptions of Sharedness Pre-Measure showed that teams were 
already leaning toward higher perceptions of sharedness, a comparison of the Pre- and 
Post-Measures was conducted to determine if those perceptions shifted in a systematic 
way during performance.  A 4 (assigned experimental condition: dissensus, false 
consensus, pluralistic ignorance, consensus) x 2 (administration: pre-measure, post-
measure) x 7 (individual items on Perceptions of Sharedness Pre-Measure) mixed-model 
ANOVA was conducted with assigned experimental condition as the between-subjects 
variable and administration and questions as the within-subjects variables.  There was no 
significant effect for condition, F(1, 116) = 0.668, p = .574.  There were, however, 
significant main effects for both administration (F[1, 116] = 157.726, p < .0001, partial η2 
= .576) and question (Greenhouse-Geisser F[3.287, 381.330] = 70.824, p < .0001, partial 
η2 = .379), and a significant interaction between the two (Greenhouse-Geisser F[4.038, 
468.448] = 3.944, p = .004, partial η2 = .033). Figure 9 presents a graphical depiction of 
the two-way interaction.  As can be seen in Figure 9, participants reported higher scores 
on all seven of the Perceptions Post-Measure items as opposed to the Perceptions Pre-
Measure. 
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Figure 9. Two-way interaction between administration and question on perceptions of 
sharedness measures. 
 
 
 
Actual Mental Model Sharedness 
Similar to the perceptions of sharedness manipulation, while the actual mental 
model sharedness was manipulated by giving teammates the same or different training, a 
Mental Model Pre-Measure was used to assess the team members’ actual sharedness 
prior to performance and a Mental Model Post-Measure was used to assess the team 
members’ actual sharedness after performance.  A comparison of the Pre- and Post-
Measures was conducted to determine if actual sharedness among team members’ mental 
models shifted during performance.  A 4 (assigned experimental condition: dissensus, 
false consensus, pluralistic ignorance, consensus) x 2 (administration: pretest, posttest) x 
4 (scenario) x 6 (strategy) mixed-model ANOVA was conducted with assigned 
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 experimental condition as the between-subjects variable and administration, scenario, and 
strategy as the within-subjects variables.  There was no significant effect for condition, 
F(1, 116) = 1.106, p = .350.  There was also no significant effect for administration, F(1, 
116) = 0.294, p = .589, suggesting that participants’ mental models about the most 
effective strategies to use did not shift during performance. 
 Although the main focus of this manipulation was the difference between team 
members, it was first necessary to assess whether the two training modules produced 
different mental models.  A 2 (training) x 4 (scenario) x 6 (strategy) mixed-model 
ANOVA was conducted with training module as the between-subjects variable and 
scenario and strategy as the within-subjects variables.  The results showed that the test for 
between-subjects effects was significant, F (1, 118) = 202.363, p < .0001, partial η2 = 
.632.  Thus, it appears that the mental model measure was indeed sensitive enough to 
capture differences in mental models.   
Mental Model Quality 
  Although mental model quality was a quasi-independent variable because it was 
only measured and not manipulated, it was still important to determine whether there 
were differences in quality between participants who received Training Module 1 and 
participants who received Training Module 2.  An independent samples t-test showed that 
there were no significant differences in quality based on the training module received, 
t(118) = .994, p = .347.  Thus, there was no evidence that either training module 
produced superior mental models.  
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 Manipulation Checks 
Perceptions of Sharedness 
  Prior to testing the hypotheses, a manipulation check was performed on the 
perceptions of sharedness manipulation.  A one-way (manipulated perceptions: low, high) 
between-subjects analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was performed on the (square root) 
Perceptions Pre-Measure Total using friends/not friends and experience with video games 
as a covariate.  The friends/not friends variable was used because it was expected that 
those teams who had knowledge of each other prior to the study would have higher 
perceptions of sharedness.  The experience with video games variable was used because 
participants completed the Perceptions of Sharedness Pre-Measure immediately after they 
completed their training session in which they interacted with the Marratech 5.1 software.   
 After adjustment by the covariates, the perceptions of sharedness manipulation 
had a significant effect on the (square root) Perceptions Pre-Measure Total, t(116) = 
1.846, p = .034 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .029.  This effect was in the expected direction, 
with the higher perceptions group scoring lower on the transformed Perceptions Pre-
Measure Total, which are a reflection of the raw data.  Thus, the instructions about 
whether teammates received the same or different training significantly influenced 
participants’ measured perceptions of sharedness when the effects of friends/not friends 
and video game experience were controlled for. 
Actual Mental Model Sharedness 
 Prior to testing the hypotheses, a manipulation check was also performed on the 
actual sharedness manipulation.  As it was not expected that any other factors would 
influence this manipulation, no covariates were used.  An independent samples t-test 
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 investigated the impact of the manipulated level of sharedness (high vs. low) on the 
absolute difference scores between teammates on the Mental Model Pre-Measure.  The 
results were significant, t(58) = -5.446, p < .0001 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .338.  The 
results were in the expected direction, with teams who received the same training (i.e., 
higher actual sharedness) exhibiting lower difference scores (M = 37.00, SD = 8.990) 
than those who received different training (M = 49.44, SD = 8.680).  Thus, receiving the 
same or different training significantly influenced participants’ actual mental model 
sharedness. 
Tests of Hypotheses 
Analysis for Hypothesis 3 
 To recap, Hypothesis 3 stated that perceptions of higher sharedness would lead to 
more initiating behaviors.  To test this hypothesis, a one-way (manipulated perceptions: 
low, high) between-subjects univariate ANCOVA was performed on the (log) initiating 
behaviors using role in team (assigned computer) as a covariate.  After adjustment by the 
covariate, the manipulated perceptions of sharedness did not significantly impact the 
(log) initiating behaviors, t(117) = 0.312, p = .38 (one-tailed).  These results did not 
support Hypothesis 3.  No evidence was found that perceptions of sharedness led to more 
initiating behaviors.  
Analysis for Hypothesis 1 
Verbal Responding Behaviors 
Hypothesis 1 stated that higher levels of actual mental model sharedness would 
lead to more responding behaviors.  First, the effect of team members’ actual mental 
model sharedness on verbal responding behaviors was evaluated. A one-way 
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 (manipulated actual mental model sharedness: low, high) between-subjects multivariate 
analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was performed on the transformed verbal 
responding behaviors (log acknowledgement responding behaviors, square root synthesis 
responding behaviors, and log total verbal responding behaviors), using (log) initiating 
behaviors as a covariate.  After adjustment by the covariate, the manipulated mental 
model sharedness did not significantly impact (square root) synthesis responding 
behaviors (t[117] = -0.420, p = .34 [one-tailed]); however, manipulated mental model 
sharedness did significantly influence (log) acknowledgement responding behaviors 
(t[117] = -2.316, p = .011 [one-tailed], partial η2 = .044), albeit in the opposite direction 
than hypothesized.  These results did not support Hypothesis 1.  No evidence was found 
that higher actual mental model sharedness led to more verbal responding behaviors. 
Action Responding Behaviors 
 Next, the effect of team members’ actual mental model sharedness on action 
responding behaviors was evaluated. A one-way (manipulated actual mental model 
sharedness: low, high) between-subjects MANCOVA was performed on the transformed 
action responding behaviors (square root of actions rated 4 or more, square root of 
actions rated 3 or more, and square root of all rated actions), using (log) initiating 
behaviors as a covariate.  The results are presented in Table 11.  After adjustment by the 
covariate, the manipulated mental model sharedness did not significantly impact any of 
the action responding behaviors.  These results failed to provide support for Hypothesis 
1.  No evidence was found that higher actual mental model sharedness led to more action 
responding behaviors. 
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 Table 10 
MANCOVA Table for Between-Subjects Effects of Actual Mental Model Sharedness for 
Action Responding Behaviors 
Factor SS df Mean 
Square 
F p 
Square root of 4+ Rated 
Action Responding Behaviors 
0.074 1 0.065 0.188 .666
Error 46.091 117 0.394  
Square root of 3+ Rated 
Action Responding Behaviors 
0.245 1 0.224 0.510 .476
Error 56.062 117 0.479  
Square root of All Rated 
Action Responding Behaviors 
0.020 1 0.020 0.037 .849
Error 64.658 117 0.553   
 
 
Analysis for Hypothesis 2 
 Hypothesis 2 stated that the quality of team’s mental models would be a 
significant predictor of weighted team processes, which are the outcome of successful 
implicit coordination.  This analysis was conducted at team level because team processes 
are a team level variable and an individual analysis would not be logical.  An independent 
samples t-test showed that average team quality significantly affected the team processes, 
t(58) = -2.779, p = .004 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .118.  The effect was in the predicted 
direction, with teams with, on average, higher quality mental models exhibiting better 
team processes (M = 30.09, SD = 11.427) than teams with lower quality mental models 
(M = 22.23, SD = 10.045).  These results supported Hypothesis 2 which had stated that 
higher quality mental models lead to better team processes. 
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 Summary of Hypothesis Testing 
 Table 11 presents a summary of the hypothesis testing, including the types of 
analysis used and the findings from each analysis. 
Table 11 
Summary of Hypothesis Testing 
H# H1 Test of 
Hypothesis 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Finding Result 
3 MHP > M 
LP 
ANCOVA, 
covariate: role 
in team 
Logarithm of 
initiating 
behaviors 
 t(117) = 0.312,  
p = .38 (one-
tailed) 
Not 
Supported 
 
1 MHA > 
MLA 
MANCOVA, 
covariate: 
initiating 
behaviors 
Logarithm of 
acknowledgement 
responding 
behaviors; 
Square root of 
synthesis 
responding 
behaviors; 
Square root of all 
action responding 
behaviors 
t(117) = -2.316,  
p = .011 (one-
tailed)**; 
 
t(117) = -0.420,  
p = .34 (one-
tailed); 
 
F(1, 117) = 0.037,  
p = .848 
Not 
supported 
 
2* MHQ > M 
LQ 
Independent 
samples t-test 
Weighted team 
processes 
t(57) = -2.779,  
p = .004 (one-
tailed),  
partial η2 = .118  
Supported 
Note: *Hypothesis 2 is analyzed on the team level. ** Effect in opposite direction than predicted. 
 
 
 
Supplemental Analyses 
 The expected proportional relationships between perceptions of sharedness and 
actual sharedness, and actual sharedness and mental model quality, were investigated via 
a series of 2 (perceptions) x 2 (actual sharedness) x 2 (quality) analyses on each of the 
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 stages of implicit coordination.  Continuing with the same organization scheme, these 
results are presented in the order of the proposed implicit coordination stages.   
Initiating Behaviors 
 Although the hypothesis that perceptions of sharedness facilitated the process of 
implicit coordination was not supported, additional analyses were conducted to determine 
whether actual mental model sharedness or quality of mental models affected initiating 
behaviors.  A 2 (manipulated perceptions: low, high) x 2 (manipulated actual sharedness: 
low, high) x 2 (measured quality: low, high) between-subjects ANCOVA was performed 
on the (log) initiating behaviors using role in team (assigned computer) as a covariate.  
After adjusting for the covariate, only individual mental model quality had a significant 
effect on (log) initiating behaviors, F(1, 111) = 4.551, p = .035, partial η2 = .039.  
Individuals with higher quality mental models had significantly more (log) initiating 
behaviors than individuals with lower quality mental models (MHigh = .7283, SDHigh = 
.19258, MLow = .6617, SDLow = .21954).   
Responding Behaviors 
 Although the hypothesis that actual mental model sharedness would drive 
responding behaviors was not supported, additional analyses were conducted to 
determine whether manipulated perceptions of sharedness or quality of mental models 
affected responding behaviors.  A 2 (manipulated perceptions: low, high) x 2 
(manipulated actual sharedness: low, high) x 2 (measured quality: low, high) between-
subjects MANCOVA was performed on the transformed verbal responding behaviors 
using (log) initiating behaviors as covariates.  The results showed that there were no 
significant main effects for perceptions of sharedness or mental model quality; however, 
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 there was a significant two-way interaction between perceptions of sharedness and actual 
mental model sharedness, F(1, 110) = 8.943, p = .003, partial η2 = .075.   As can be seen 
from Figure 10, participants provided more synthesis responding behaviors when they 
were in a manipulated mismatched condition, that is participants who received the same 
training but were told they got different (pluralistic ignorance) or participants who 
received different training but were told they got the same training (false consensus). In 
other words, participants whose perceptions did not match their reality tended to “think 
aloud”, discuss their options with their teammates, or obtain permission from their 
teammates, as opposed to simply taking the information and applying it directly to their 
route planning.  This was not the expected proportional relationship that was displayed in 
Figure 6, in which participants with both high perceptions and high actual sharedness 
(consensus) were expected to have the highest number of responding behaviors, while 
participants with both low perceptions and low actual sharedness (dissensus) were 
expected to have the lowest number of responding behaviors.   
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Figure 10. Two-way interaction between manipulated perceptions of sharedness and 
manipulated actual mental model sharedness on (square root) synthesis responding 
behaviors. 
 
 
 Additional analyses showed no evidence of the impact of perceptions of 
sharedness, actual mental model sharedness, or mental model quality on any action 
responding behaviors. 
Team Processes 
Finally, analyses were conducted to determine whether manipulated perceptions 
of sharedness or manipulated actual mental sharedness affected responding behaviors.  A 
2 (manipulated perceptions: low, high) x 2 (manipulated actual sharedness: low, high) x 2 
(measured average quality: low, high) between-subjects ANOVA was performed on the 
weighted team processes.  The results showed that there were no significant main effects 
for perceptions of sharedness or actual mental model sharedness; however, there was a 
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 significant two-way interaction between the two, F(1, 52) = 4.044, p = .050, partial η2 = 
.072.   This effect exhibited almost the same pattern as was found for the synthesis 
responding behaviors.  As can be seen from Figure 11, teams had higher weighted team 
process scores when they were in a manipulated mismatched condition, that is 
participants who received the same training but were told they got different (pluralistic 
ignorance) or participants who received different training but were told they got the same 
training (false consensus).  In other words, teams whose perceptions did not match their 
reality tended to exchange more information, and/or more important pieces of 
information than teams whose perceptions matched their realities.  This interaction was 
not the expected proportional relationship shown in Figure 4.   It was expected that actual 
sharedness and mental model quality would affect team processes, not actual sharedness 
and perceptions of sharedness.  
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 CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 
The research reported here investigated the process of implicit coordination, and 
the effects of perceptions of sharedness, actual mental model sharedness, and quality of 
mental models on the different proposed stages of that process.  Specifically, it was 
hypothesized that (a) perceptions of sharedness would facilitate initiating behaviors, (b) 
actual mental model sharedness would drive the corresponding responding behaviors, and 
(c) mental model quality would influence team processes.  The results of this study 
provided only partial support for the impact of mental models on the process of implicit 
coordination in teams.  The specific findings are discussed in the following sections. 
Evidence for Implicit Coordination 
 First, this study did provide additional support for the existence of implicit 
coordination.  To reiterate, implicit coordination has been found to occur when teams are 
experiencing higher levels of workload (Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989).  In this study, 
participants reported significantly higher levels of workload for the al Kufah Scenario, 
regardless of the order of scenarios.  A comparison of the frequency of initiating 
behaviors showed that there were significantly more initiating behaviors in the al Kufah 
Scenario than in the Samarra Scenario.  Thus, teams were engaging in more attempts at 
implicit coordination under conditions of greater perceived workload.  This supports the 
underlying notion that high perceived workload facilitates implicit coordination.  At the 
same time, given the range of possible workload scores, there are definitely tasks that 
could result in higher workload scores.  Hence, even higher workload could results in 
more evidence for implicit coordination. 
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 Perceptions of Sharedness 
 Many of the researchers who previously referred to or found evidence for implicit 
coordination have suggested that the phenomenon is driven by team members having 
SMMs.  This dissertation sought to determine whether team members must have SMMs 
or simply believe that they do.  In this study, perceptions of sharedness were manipulated 
by telling teammates that they would receive the same or different training.  It was 
expected that those who were told they were receiving the same training would have 
perceptions of higher sharedness than those who were told they would be receiving 
different training.  Although this was found, participants tended to have high perceptions 
of sharedness even if they were in the condition in which they were told they received 
different training.  As the participants had minimal interaction with one another prior to 
filling out the Perceptions of Sharedness Pre-Measure, this might have been a 
manifestation of Nickerson’s (1999) hypothesis that, when people have limited 
information about another person, they tend to use themselves as default models for their 
teammates and, consequently, overestimate the extent to which they have SMMs.   
 Additionally, it was found that whether or not the teammates were friends, and 
their individual reported experience with video games, also affected the reported 
perceptions of sharedness.  Although the effect of prior knowledge of each other was a 
predictable relationship, the effect of video game experience was not.  While participants 
reported their video game experience at the beginning of the study, they filled out the 
Perceptions of Sharedness Pre-Measure directly after completing the 15-minute Training 
Scenario.  Thus, it may have been that when participants filled out the Perceptions of 
Sharedness Pre-Measure, they were focused more on their own self-efficacy in terms of 
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 video games than on the instructions that they received the same or different training.  
This suggests that teammates may have focused on the “Assumed Similarity” dimension 
of the Social Relations Model (Kenny, 1994), in which team members perceived their 
teammates as they perceived themselves, rather than vice versa.  This also falls in line 
with Woehr and Rentsch’s (2003) findings that perceiver effects had a bigger effect than 
partner effects.  In other words, perceptions about oneself had more of an impact than 
perceptions about one’s teammate.  In the end, however, the manipulation did 
significantly impact measured perceptions of sharedness, when the effects of these two 
covariates were adjusted for. 
 I hypothesized that higher perceptions of sharedness would be associated with 
more initiating behaviors, or attempts at implicit coordination, because participants who 
believed they had a shared understanding would believe their teammates would know 
what to do with the information they were providing.  The results of this study found no 
evidence to support the predicted relationship.  Due to the significantly negatively 
skewed distribution of the measured perceptions of sharedness, it might have been that 
perceptions were simply not low enough for the low group to show differences from the 
high group.  Indeed, it is possible that the effect of perceptions of sharedness on implicit 
coordination is only evident when people have very low perceptions of sharedness.  In 
other words, there might have been a range restriction in terms of the participants’ actual 
perceptions of sharedness. 
 The above findings might also have been a manifestation of the amount of time in 
which teams completed the task.  That is, while there was no time limit, teams normally 
only took approximately fifteen minutes per scenario.  This likely led to the significantly 
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 positively skewed distribution of the number of initiating behaviors.  The average number 
of initiating behaviors per person per scenario was less than five.  The question of 
whether longer interactions with one another would result in a more pronounced effect of 
perceptions of sharedness is at best questionable.  As perceptions are molded with 
interaction, it is likely that the participants would have simply had even higher 
perceptions of sharedness by the completion of the task.  
  Actual Mental Model Sharedness 
 In addition to assessing the perceptions of sharedness, it was also important to 
determine the impact that the actual level of sharedness had on coordination between 
team members.  The manipulation check for actual mental model sharedness was highly 
significant.  Those participants who received different training had different mental 
models in terms of the appropriate strategies to use to complete the task under varying 
conditions.  Additionally, those teammates who received different training had 
significantly more differences between their mental models than those teammates who 
received the same training.  Further, as a function of the positively skewed distribution of 
initiating behaviors, the distribution of responding behaviors was also positively skewed.  
There were an average of less than 3 verbal responding behaviors and less than 2 action 
responding behaviors per scenario.  To test Hypothesis 2, that more sharedness would be 
associated with more responding behaviors, two separate analyses were run for verbal 
and action responding behaviors.   
Verbal Responding Behaviors 
 For verbal responding behaviors, only verbal acknowledgements were 
significantly affected by actual mental model sharedness; however, this effect was 
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 contrary to the predicted direction.  Specifically, it was lower actual mental model 
sharedness that led to more acknowledgement responding behaviors than higher 
sharedness.  One possible reason for these at first contradictory findings may have been 
that acknowledgement responding behaviors may not actually be an indication that the 
information is being used, or used effectively.  An “O.K.” signifies that someone has 
received the message, but does not indicate that the person understands the information, 
believes the information is relevant, or plans on using the information.  
Acknowledgement responding behaviors are the lowest form of observable responding 
behaviors, and they may in fact be the nice person’s non-response.  Thus, the finding that 
less actual sharedness led to more acknowledgements was not terribly surprising.  
Additionally, it should be noted that the effect size for this relationship was only 1%, 
suggesting that there are certainly other factors that played a role in how teammates 
coordinated with and responded to each other. 
On the other hand, there was no significant effect for actual mental model 
sharedness on synthesis responding behaviors.  Thus, in contrast to what was expected, 
high actual sharedness was not associated with more synthesis responding behaviors.  
One possible reason for this finding was the significantly positively skewed distribution 
of recorded synthesis responding behaviors.  As has already been noted, there were less 
than 3 verbal responding behaviors per person per scenario.  Of these, there were more 
acknowledgements than synthesis responding behaviors.  Therefore, the lack of an effect 
here might again have been due to range restriction in that there was simply not enough 
variability in synthesis responding behaviors to uncover its true relationship with actual 
mental model sharedness.   
 107
 Another possible reason is that rather than verbally use the information, 
teammates might have been processing the information in their minds in order to use 
later.  Obviously, only observable responding behaviors could be analyzed.  The 
possibility that the information was received and processed without any further 
discussion cannot be overlooked.  Indeed, participants might have used the information in 
subsequent actions without any verbal indication whatsoever.  Therefore, it was 
necessary to examine the effects of actual mental model sharedness on action responding 
behaviors as well.   
Action Responding Behaviors 
 Similar to the findings for synthesis responding behaviors, no significant findings 
supported the hypothesis that actual mental model sharedness made an impact on action 
responding behaviors either.  So, even if participants were not discussing the information 
but simply using it later, there was still no evidence of an effect of actual mental model 
sharedness on responses to initiating behaviors.  Action responding behaviors also 
suffered from the range restriction issues of the verbal responding behaviors; however, 
they had an added complication.  As has already been noted, the average number of 
observable action behaviors was less than 2 per person.  Coding action responding 
behaviors was a difficult task because, while verbal responses always immediately 
followed the initiating behaviors, actions did not.  It is entirely possible that there were 
action behaviors that could have been included in the overall count, but the participant 
made no indication that the action was associated in any way with the information 
initially provided.   Either way, there was no evidence that supported Hypothesis 1. 
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 Supplemental Findings on Initiating Behaviors 
Though not significant, one interesting finding related to actual mental model 
sharedness was the lack of an effect on initiating behaviors, or the beginning step in 
implicit coordination.  While this study hypothesized that perceptions of sharedness 
would facilitate implicit coordination, numerous others (cf., Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989; 
Serfaty, Entin, & Volpe, 1993) have posited that it is the actual sharedness between team 
members’ mental models that facilitates implicit coordination.  However, to date, no 
published evidence has supported the notion that actual mental model sharedness is the 
driving force.  The two previous studies that measured SMMs and behaviors indicative of 
implicit coordination did not find a link between SMMs and implicit coordination (Stout 
et al., 1999; Waller et al., 2004).   This study did not find a direct link between actual 
mental model sharedness and the initiation of implicit coordination either. 
Mental Model Quality 
 In addition to studying how perceptions of sharedness and actual mental model 
sharedness affected implicit coordination, the effect of mental model quality on implicit 
coordination was also assessed.  Mental model quality was measured by comparing 
individual’s mental models against expert mental models for the target task.  Even with 
half of the teams composed of mixed quality mental models, the average team mental 
model quality score still significantly affected team processes, in the predicted direction.  
Teams with high quality mental models exhibited significantly better team processes than 
those with low quality mental models.  Thus, Hypothesis 2 was supported.  It should be 
noted, however, that the effect size for this relationship was only 11%, again suggesting 
that there are certainly other factors affecting this process. 
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 Even so, this finding is important for a number of reasons.  First, the analysis was 
conducted at the team level; and, therefore, only average quality scores were used.  An 
investigation into how an individual’s mental model quality affects his/her actions would 
likely lead to even greater effect sizes.  Yet, even those averaged scores still impacted 
team processes.  Furthermore, it should be noted that half of the teams actually consisted 
of team members who had received different training and, consequently, had different 
mental models.  That means that even team members who had high quality, but different 
mental models had better team processes than team members who both had low quality 
mental models.  This finding is contrary to Mathieu et al.’s (2005) findings that those 
teams with high quality but different mental models had the lowest team process scores.  
These discrepant findings may be a function of how team processes were measured.  In 
the current study, team processes were only assessed at the communication level.  
Mathieu et al. also included five other dimensions of teamwork: leadership, assertiveness, 
decision making, adaptability, and situation awareness.  It would be interesting to further 
investigate the differential effects of mental model quality and SMMs on the various 
aspects of team processes to determine which specific aspects are hindered or helped by 
the different combinations. 
Moreover, as noted in the literature review, very little previous research has 
assessed the relationship between mental model quality and team processes, and none 
found a significant relationship between the two without factoring in mental model 
sharedness (Heffner, 1997; Mathieu et al., 2005).  Two recently published articles, 
however, both found a direct relationship between mental model accuracy and team 
performance, without the inclusion of sharedness (Edwards, Day, Arthur, & Bell, 2006; 
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 Lim & Klein, 2006).  In fact, Edwards et al. found that mental model accuracy was a 
stronger predictor of team performance when the focus was solely on task mental models, 
as in this study.  Thus, the results of this study fall in line with the most currently 
published findings on SMMs and mental model accuracy.   
Additionally, the findings of this study certainly support the authors who have 
argued that correctness of mental models is important for team processes (cf. Rouse et al., 
1992; Smith-Jentsch, Kraiger, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1998).   These results also 
support the notion that, for tasks or situations in which it is possible to accomplish goals 
in more than one manner, it is important to consider multiple correct or ideal mental 
models.  Using one correct or expert model and assessing “accuracy” may be short-
sighted and might result in unintentionally overlooking true relationships between 
variables.  Using only one expert model also eliminates the ability to consider unique and 
interactive effects of sharedness and quality, which can be “conceptually and empirically 
separable” (Mathieu et al., 2005, p. 52).  Therefore, future researchers should be wary of 
not including some quality index in their analyses of mental models or SMMs.  
Supplemental Findings on Initiating Behaviors 
 Additional analyses also found an unexpected relationship between mental model 
quality and initiating behaviors.  While neither perceptions of sharedness nor actual 
mental model sharedness significantly impacted the frequency of initiating behaviors, 
mental model quality did.  Specifically, those individuals with higher quality mental 
models voluntarily gave significantly more information to the teammates than those with 
lower quality mental models.  This finding is interesting because (a) it is part of a small, 
but growing, number of studies that have found that quality or accuracy is important for 
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 team processes and/or performance (Edwards et al., 2006; Lim & Klein, 2006), and (b) it 
is actually contrary to the prior assumption that SMMs lead to implicit coordination.  In 
this study, having a good understanding of the task was the prompting factor for implicit 
coordination, not having a shared understanding of the task.   
Interactive Effects of Perceptions and Actual Sharedness 
 Perhaps the most interesting finding of this study was the interactive effect of 
perceptions of sharedness and actual mental model sharedness that emerged during data 
analysis.  A similar pattern was found for all three stages of implicit coordination (though 
not significant for initiating behaviors).  Specifically, in this study, teams who were in 
mismatched conditions (pluralistic ignorance: teammates were told they received the 
same training but in reality got different training; false consensus: teammates were told 
they received different training but in reality got the same training) had significantly 
more synthesis responding behaviors and significantly higher team process scores than 
those teams whose perceptions matched their realities.  As previously mentioned, this 
means that participants whose perceptions did not match their reality tended to discuss 
their intentions and actions much more than participants whose perceptions matched their 
realities. Additionally, teams whose perceptions did not match their realities tended to 
exchange more information overall.  These findings were in contrast to the expected 
proportional relationships presented in Figures 4 and 6.  Not only were the relationships 
different, but for team processes, it was expected that actual mental model sharedness 
would interact with quality, not perceptions.   
One plausible explanation for this relationship is that teammates realized there 
was some disconnect in their understanding of their partner and/or the task and that they 
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 increased information exchanges in an attempt to overcome or understand that 
disconnect.  In terms of those with low perceptions and high actual sharedness, this might 
have been a snowball effect.  In other words, teams might have realized they had one 
thing in common and then just continued passing information to see what else they had in 
common.  For those with high perceptions and low actual sharedness, the increase in 
information exchanges might have stemmed from the discovery of knowledge gaps and 
an effort to fill those in.  As previous research has found that lower performing teams 
engage in more communication than higher performing teams (cf., Orasanu, 1990; Urban 
et al., 1995), it would be interesting to determine if those effects were due to perceptions 
and reality being incompatible. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Communications 
 One of the main limitations of this study was the way in which the behaviors 
encompassed in the implicit coordination process were conceptualized and 
operationalized.  Specifically, as already mentioned, the number of expected target 
behaviors was small, resulting in possible range restriction issues.  While the core task in 
this study was based on communications between the teammates, only those exchanges 
of critical pieces of information were considered part of the implicit coordination process.  
Therefore, even though teams engaged in approximately fifteen-minute-long chat 
sessions, the coded initiating and responding behaviors were constrained to only specific 
pieces of information.  This could be rectified in the future by using tasks that require 
more time and more interaction between teammates. 
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 Perhaps more importantly, this study focused on information that could be 
verbally (or textually) transmitted from one team member to another.  In this study, the 
only type of resource that was passed between team members was information itself.  
That is, all instances of implicit coordination were coded by looking at verbal 
communications.  At first, this may seem counter-intuitive.  People often associate 
implicit coordination with a reduction in communications; therefore, measuring implicit 
coordination with communications may not fall in line with others’ understanding of the 
phenomenon.  However, as noted in the introduction, the construct of implicit 
coordination has previously been ill-defined, and for the purposes of this study, verbal 
communications in the absence of explicit requests were included in the definition of 
implicit coordination.  Implicit coordination is thought to occur when information and/or 
resources are passed without explicit requests.  Thus, verbal information exchanges do 
fall under the rubric of implicit coordination, at least until a more formal definition is 
adopted by the community.  
The results of this study suggest it is possible that either (a) verbal 
communications may not be included in the implicit coordination process, or (b) implicit 
coordination may not be a useful strategy when information exchange is part of the 
primary task.  Indeed, if verbal information exchanges are not truly part of implicit 
coordination, then the findings of this study may, in fact, be in line with previous 
assumptions about implicit coordination.  That is, it would not necessarily be expected 
that SMMs are directly related to explicit coordination sequences.  In order to gain more 
insight into the process of implicit coordination, and to augment the findings of this 
study, future research should analyze the process of implicit coordination when team 
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 members can physically pass resources to one another to determine if the same 
relationships still hold true.  Additionally, future work should consider situations in 
which information exchange is not a primary task. 
Workload 
A second limitation to this study was that the task might have not been difficult 
enough to elicit the levels of perceived workload that facilitate the process of implicit 
coordination.  While the al Kufah Scenario was characterized by more reported workload, 
the average overall workload was less than 60 (out of 100).  Previous researchers have 
suggested that implicit coordination only occurs under extremely high levels of workload.  
The workload scores in this study would not be considered extremely high; and therefore 
the process of implicit coordination may not have occurred in this study as it might for 
tasks characterized by higher perceived workload. 
One possible way to overcome this limitation and the previously discussed 
limitation on communications at the same time is to select a dual-task environment for 
future research.  First, dual-task environments are known to produce higher levels of 
workload and are also often more representative of real-world tasks.  In dual-task 
environments, team members often have their own primary tasks and then share a 
secondary task.  Second, because the joint task is the secondary task, then communication 
between the teammates cannot be the core task.  Thus, the dual-task environment should 
elicit high enough levels of workload and lessen the reliance on information exchanges as 
the only behavior available for analysis.   
Moreover, it would also be interesting to investigate the impact of brief periods of 
high workload on implicit coordination in order to observe systematic changes over time.  
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 As implicit coordination is thought to be an adaptive strategy that is beneficial under 
conditions of high workload, a greater understanding of the phenomenon could be gained 
by research focusing on (a) when/if teams shift to implicit coordination and (b) when/if 
teams shift back to explicit coordination.   
Performance 
 A third limitation of this study was that the focus was on the process of implicit 
coordination and the accompanying team processes, not on the resulting team 
performance.  For the purposes of investigating the process of implicit coordination, a 
team performance score was not necessary because the sequence of behaviors should 
have been the same whether or not the process was effective.  However, the idea that this 
strategy is only beneficial under conditions of high workload and for high performing 
teams should not be overlooked.  If it is true that the process is most pronounced and 
most useful for high performing teams in high workload situations, then it may be that 
there are indeed relationships that would be found when factoring in team performance 
scores.  However, if SMMs are associated with team performance, then focusing only on 
high performing teams in high workload situations may result in having many more 
teams with high sharedness than low sharedness, leading to difficulty in disentangling the 
relationships between the three variables.  Future researchers in this area should be 
cognizant of the possible relationship between implicit coordination and team 
performance, even if the focus is on the specific sequence of behaviors encompassed in 
implicit coordination. 
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 Implications and Conclusions 
Although this study found only partial support for the hypotheses that perceptions 
of sharedness, actual mental model sharedness, and mental model quality affect implicit 
coordination, there are still a number of implications that can be derived from the 
findings.   
Operationalization of Implicit Coordination 
 First and foremost, this study sheds light on the difficulties of operationalizing the 
construct of implicit coordination.  In this study, I attempted to more fully operationalize 
the construct by reviewing previous definitions and research and then combining the 
findings to create a definition of successful implicit coordination and to identify the 
sequence of behaviors that make up this process.  The definition in this study focused on 
behaviors that were not preceded by a request, which included explicit communications 
not preceded by a request.  Other researchers may oppose this idea and disregard explicit 
communications altogether, whether they were previously requested (explicit) or not 
(implicit).  If explicit communications are not included, then researchers need to more 
clearly define implicit coordination as coordination behaviors that are (a) not preceded by 
a request and (b) not composed of any explicit communications. As there have been few 
previous attempts to operationalize this construct, even with the findings of the current 
study, there is still work needed to determine which behaviors are included in the process 
and which are not.   
 In addition to specifying which behaviors may be included in implicit 
coordination, it is also necessary to further assess the sequence of behaviors.  In this 
study, the initiation of implicit coordination was the transfer of information from one 
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 team member to another.  However, as I laid out in the Introduction, possible facilitating 
factors of implicit coordination included (a) motivation, (b), perceptions of a useful 
course of action, and (c) perceptions of sharedness.  Perhaps it is the case that the 
initiation happens before the proposed stages presented in this study.  In fact, it is 
possible that the initiating behaviors coded here were actually responding behaviors to 
some other behavior that prompted the exchange of information.  It may very well be that 
the relationship between SMMs and implicit coordination would be unmasked if the 
beginning stage of implicit coordination actually preceded the exchange of information.  
Thus, this study demonstrates the complexity of the construct implicit coordination and 
highlights the need for future researchers to more clearly define what they include as 
implicit coordination behaviors. 
Importance of Mental Model Quality 
 This study was the first study designed specifically to investigate the relationship 
between SMMs and implicit coordination.  Surprisingly, the results of this study 
suggested that an individual’s mental model quality was more important for facilitating 
implicit coordination than the level of sharedness between team members, at least in tasks 
where team performance relies solely on the transfer of information.  In fact, this study 
does not support the position that implicit coordination is the result of SMMs that allow 
teammates to anticipate each other’s behaviors.  Conversely, the findings suggest that the 
behaviors are driven by an individual’s understanding of the task and the appropriate 
strategies to complete said task.  In that sense, while it takes more than one person to 
complete the proposed stages of implicit coordination, the actual driving force might be 
at the individual level.  In this study, individual mental model quality predicted initiating 
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 behaviors and average team mental model quality predicted team processes.   Thus, this 
study provided evidence for the importance of mental model quality, and future research 
is needed to further explore its effects on team coordination.  
Perceptions vs. Actual Sharedness 
 This study also provides partial support for the hypothesis that for team members 
to have SMMs, they must be aware of their sharedness (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994).  
Specifically, the findings suggest that awareness or perceptions of sharedness 
significantly interacted with actual levels of sharedness.  The results of this study showed 
that teams whose perceptions did not match reality in terms of sharedness exhibited 
different behavioral patterns than those teams whose perceptions matched their reality.  
Specifically, teams in the mismatched conditions seemed to communicate more, possibly 
because they recognized the mismatch and were attempting to compensate or uncover 
their discrepancies.  These results, therefore, highlight the importance of team members’ 
perceptions about themselves and their teammates, and future studies on SMMs should 
not overlook the possible interactive effects of perceptions and actual sharedness.  
Successful vs. Unsuccessful Implicit Coordination 
 This study has also provided evidence for multiple stages of implicit coordination 
and for the existence of unsuccessful attempts at implicit coordination.  First, I was able 
to successfully analyze the unique steps in the sequence of behaviors involved in implicit 
coordination.  For each sequence of behaviors, therefore, it was possible to observe the 
beginning and ending behaviors.  Consequently, the results of this study showed that not 
every initiating behavior was followed by a responding behavior or an improvement in 
team processes.  This is important because it suggests that one cannot assume that the 
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 increase in unsolicited transfers (initiating behaviors) is always successful, i.e., a good 
and/or useful.  If one team member is simply doing a data dump, or passing as much 
information as possible, it is likely that this would not be a beneficial strategy.  
Furthermore, if there is a decrease in requests from a team member, it may simply be that 
that team member does not need additional information.  So, while implicit coordination 
has always been touted as a good thing, the presence of initiating behaviors without 
responding behaviors suggests that additional research is necessary to determine the 
factors that influence successful vs. unsuccessful implicit coordination.   
Application to Unmanned Vehicles 
 Finally, this study also has implications for UAV and UGV operators working 
together in complex military environments.  Quality, and not sharedness, was found to be 
a significant predictor of initiating behaviors and team processes.  This finding suggests 
that UAV and UGV operators, who have a firm grasp of their own tasks, including their 
own capabilities and limitations, should be able to work together efficiently, even if they 
have never operated the other type of unmanned vehicle.  Furthermore, the findings on 
the interaction between perceptions of sharedness and actual mental model sharedness 
suggest that those teams whose perceptions match their realities will not need to 
communicate as much, which can be extremely important in time-sensitive missions with 
heightened security issues.  Therefore, if teammates are briefed on each others’ 
capabilities beforehand, in terms of their experience with operating UGVs, UAVs, and in 
mixed-vehicle teams, the likelihood that they will be in a mismatched condition will be 
greatly reduced.  As technological advances are made, teams of UAV and UGV operators 
will become much more prevalent.  Keeping in mind that there are multiple aspects of 
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 mental models that play a role in team coordination can help in training these teams to 
perform at optimal levels.    
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 Student Informed Consent Form 
Name:         PID No.:________  
I am 18 years of age or older and agree to participate in the study “Military Reconnaissance Mission 
Planning,” conducted by principal investigator; Raegan Hoeft, under the guidance of Florian Jentsch. 
In this research, I will participate in a study targeted at measuring coordination and 
communication during a military reconnaissance planning task. The experiment will consist of 
one session with two parts. Since communication will be measured, I understand, and consent, that I 
will be video and/or audio taped during the study. The first part will consist of paperwork 
including biographical data and some teamwork surveys. The second part will focus on training 
and two trials planning a military reconnaissance task for about 30 minutes each with a 
workload and team coordination survey following the trials, which should take approximately 5 
minutes. Performance on these tasks will remain completely confidential (see below). Including 
training, performance during the sessions, paperwork, and debriefing, this experiment will last 
approximately 2 hours. Upon completion of the study, credit for participation in an experiment 
will be given in accordance with the procedures established within the Department of 
Psychology.  
Risks and Benefits 
Participation in the current study includes minimal risks commonly associated with the use of 
computer display terminals. All performance and personal data will be kept confidential.  
If you believe you have been injured during participation in this research project, you may file a claim 
with UCF Environmental Health & Safety, Risk and Insurance Office, P.O. Box 163500, Orlando, FL 
32816-3500 (407) 823-6300. The University of Central Florida is an agency of the State of Florida for 
purposes of sovereign immunity and the university's and the state's liability for personal injury or 
property damage is extremely limited under Florida law. Accordingly, the university's and the state's 
ability to compensate you for any personal injury or property damage suffered during this research 
project is very limited. 
Information regarding your rights as a research volunteer may be obtained from: 
UCFIRB Office 
University of Central Florida (UCF) Office of Research 
Orlando Tech Center 
12443 Research Parkway, Suite 302 
Orlando, Florida 32826 
Telephone: (407) 823-2901  
Confidentiality of Personal Data: 
All data I will contribute to this study will be held in strict confidentiality by the researchers. That is, 
my individual data will not be revealed to anyone other than the researchers and their immediate 
assistants.   
To insure confidentiality, the following steps will be taken: (a) only researchers will have access to the 
data in paper or electronic form.  Data will be stored in locked facilities; (b) the actual forms will not 
contain names or other personal information. Instead, a number assigned by and only known to the 
experimenters will match the forms to each participant; (c) only group means scores and standard 
deviations, but not individual scores, will be published or reported. 
 
MY PARTICIPATION IN THIS RESEARCH IS COMPLETELY VOLUNTARY. I CAN 
WITHDRAW MY PARTICIPATION AT ANY TIME WITHOUT PENALTY - THIS INCLUDES 
REMOVAL/DELETION OF ANY DATA I MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED.  SHOULD I DECIDE 
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 NOT TO COMPLETE THE STUDY, HOWEVER, I WILL BE ELIGIBLE ONLY FOR THE 
COURSE CREDIT FOR THAT PART OF THE STUDY WHICH I HAVE COMPLETED. 
 
This research is conducted by Raegan Hoeft, the principal investigator. I have been given the 
opportunity to ask the research assistants any questions I may have. For further questions regarding 
this research, contact Raegan Hoeft: 
Raegan Hoeft Phone:  (407) 921-3554 
Team Performance Lab  
University of Central Florida   
  
Orlando, FL 32816-1390 
 
Signature:        Date:  ___
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 Biographical Data Form 
 
Please complete the following questions.  Any information you provide is voluntary and 
will be kept strictly confidential.  A participant number will be assigned to your 
responses and in no way will your name be associated with the data.  The information 
you provide will be used only for the purposes of this study.  If you have any questions, 
please ask. 
1. Age: ____ 
2. Gender: ____ M ____ F 
3. Handedness:  ____ Right-handed     ____ Left-handed     ___ Ambidextrous 
4. Year in school:  ____ Freshman  ____ Sophomore  ____ Junior  ____ Senior  
____ Graduate 
5. Major:  ______________________ 
6. Military experience (including ROTC), area and length of time:____________ 
Active duty _______ National Guard _______ Reserve _______ 
7. Native language (if not English):  _________________ 
8. Do you wear prescription glasses or corrective contact lenses? ___ Yes    ___ No 
If yes, are you wearing them now? ___ Yes    ___ No 
9. Do you have any previous flying or sailing experience? ___ Yes    ___ No 
10. Using the scale below, please indicate how you would rate your experience with 
seeing or working with any type of radio or remote controlled ground vehicles 
(cars, trucks, toys, etc.): 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL 
FAMILIAR 
    VERY 
FAMILIAR 
 
11. Using the scale below, please indicate how you would rate your experience with 
seeing or working with any type of radio or remote controlled air vehicles (airplanes, 
helicopters, blimps, etc.): 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL 
FAMILIAR 
    VERY 
FAMILIAR 
 
12. Using the scale below, please indicate how you would rate your experience with 
seeing or working with any type of video games: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL 
FAMILIAR 
    VERY 
FAMILIAR 
 
13. Using the scale below, please indicate how you would rate your experience with 
seeing or working with any type of personal computers (PCs): 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL 
FAMILIAR 
    VERY 
FAMILIAR 
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 14. Using the scale below, please indicate how you would rate your experience with 
seeing or working with any type of instant messenger or chat program: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL 
FAMILIAR 
    VERY 
FAMILIAR 
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 Personality Measure 1 
Please complete the following questions by circling your answer.  Any information you provide is 
voluntary and will be kept strictly confidential.  A participant number will be assigned to your 
responses and in no way will your name be associated with the data.  The information you 
provide will be used only for the purposes of this study.  If you have any questions, please ask. 
 
Using the scales below, please circle your answer: 
 
1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of others. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
    STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
2. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
    STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
3. I can only argue for ideas that I already believe. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
    STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
4. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
    STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
    STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
6. I would probably make a good actor. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
    STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
7. In a group of people, I am rarely the center of attention. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
    STRONGLY 
AGREE 
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8. In different situations and with different people, I often act like a very different person. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
    STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
    STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
10. I am not always the person I appear to be. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
    STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
11. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or win their 
favor. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
    STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
12. I have considered being an entertainer. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
    STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
13. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
    STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
14. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
    STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
15. At a party, I let others keep the jokes and stories going. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
    STRONGLY 
AGREE 
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 16. I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
    STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
17. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for the right end). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
    STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
18. I may deceive people by being friendly even when I really dislike them. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
    STRONGLY 
AGREE 
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 Personality Measure 2 
 
Please complete the following questions by circling your answer.  Any information you provide is 
voluntary and will be kept strictly confidential.  A participant number will be assigned to your 
responses and in no way will your name be associated with the data.  The information you 
provide will be used only for the purposes of this study.  If you have any questions, please ask. 
 
Using the scales below, please circle your response: 
 
1. I like to have a lot of people around me. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
   STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
2. I laugh easily. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
   STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
3. I don’t consider myself especially “light-hearted”. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
   STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
4. I really enjoy talking to people. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
   STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
5. I like to be where the action is. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
   STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
6. I usually prefer to do things alone. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
   STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
7. I often feel as if I am bursting with energy. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
   STRONGLY 
AGREE 
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8. I am a cheerful, high-spirited person. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
   STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
9. I am not a cheerful optimist. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
   STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
10. My life is fast-paced. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
   STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
11. I am a very active person. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
   STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
12. I often enjoy playing with theories or abstract ideas. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
   STRONGLY 
AGREE 
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 Reconnaissance Planning Quiz 
 
1. Is it more important to be quick or accurate? 
a. Quick     (Correct for Training Module 1) 
b. Accurate    (Correct for Training Module 2) 
 
2. Should you try to protect your assets or use all your available assets?  
a. Protect your assets   (Correct for Training Module 2) 
b. Use all available assets  (Correct for Training Module 1) 
 
3. Is it more appropriate to attempt an Augmenting Strategy or a Cueing Strategy 
first?  
a. Augmenting Strategy   (Correct for Training Module 1) 
b. Cueing Strategy   (Correct for Training Module 2) 
 
4. Is it more appropriate to attempt a One Asset Only Strategy or a Redundancy 
Strategy first?  
a. One Asset Only Strategy  (Correct for Training Module 2) 
b. Redundancy Strategy   (Correct for Training Module 1) 
 
5. Which is more likely to affect your assets?  
a. Terrain    (Correct for Training Module 2) 
b. Weather    (Correct for Training Module 1) 
 
6. Should you contact your superiors if you are missing information or have 
questions?  
a. No     (Correct for Training Module 1) 
b. Yes     (Correct for Training Module 2) 
 
7. Are your assets cheap and easy to replace or expensive and difficult to replace?  
a. Cheap and easy to replace  (Correct for Training Module 1) 
b. Expensive and difficult to replace (Correct for Training Module 2) 
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 Cue-Strategy Association Measure 
 
Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for the following 
situation.   
 
Scenario 1:     Intent: Find a safe route for command to send a relief truck       
through 
Time:  No immediate time pressure  
Enemy: Mildly hostile  
Weather:  Clear, sunny day 
  Terrain:  No discernable obstacles 
  Information: Complete and up to date 
 
1. Using an augmenting strategy where the UAV and UGV are sent along different 
routes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
2. Contact command for further orders before deciding how to proceed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
3. Use a redundancy strategy where both the UAV and UGV are sent along the same 
routes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
4. Send only a UAV 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
5. Send only a UGV 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
6. Use a cueing strategy where the UAV goes to the Objective and reports back 
whether the UGV is needed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
 141
 Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for the following 
situation.   
 
Scenario 2: Intent:  Find out where the enemy is and what the threat level is  
Time:  No immediate time pressure  
Enemy: Unknown threat level, specific Objectives unknown  
Weather:  Stormy night, rainy with strong winds 
  Terrain:  Jungle with thick vegetation 
  Information: Incomplete and outdated information 
 
1. Using an augmenting strategy where the UAV and UGV are sent along different 
routes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
2. Contact command for further orders before deciding how to proceed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
3. Use a redundancy strategy where both the UAV and UGV are sent along the same 
routes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
4. Send only a UAV 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
5. Send only a UGV 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
6. Use a cueing strategy where the UAV goes to the Objective and reports back 
whether the UGV is needed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
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 Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for the following 
situation.   
 
 
Scenario 3:       Intent: Find out where exactly where enemy is within confined   
area  
Time:  1 hour window to get in and out, must plan quickly  
Enemy: Hostile enemy, Objectives unknown  
Weather:  75% chance of sandstorm in next two hours 
  Terrain:  Desert filled with landmines 
  Information: As up to date as possible 
 
1. Using an augmenting strategy where the UAV and UGV are sent along different 
routes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
2. Contact command for further orders before deciding how to proceed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
3. Use a redundancy strategy where both the UAV and UGV are sent along the same 
routes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
4. Send only a UAV 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
5. Send only a UGV 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
6. Use a cueing strategy where the UAV goes to the Objective and reports back 
whether the UGV is needed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
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 Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for the following 
situation.   
 
 
Scenario 4:      Intent: Unclear whether need specific or generic enemy location 
info  
Time:  No immediate time pressure  
Enemy: Hostile enemy spread out over a large area  
Weather:  No significant information available 
  Terrain:  No significant information available 
  Information: Incomplete 
 
1. Using an augmenting strategy where the UAV and UGV are sent along different 
routes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
2. Contact command for further orders before deciding how to proceed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
3. Use a redundancy strategy where both the UAV and UGV are sent along the same 
routes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
4. Send only a UAV 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
5. Send only a UGV 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
6. Use a cueing strategy where the UAV goes to the Objective and reports back 
whether the UGV is needed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
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 Pre- Teamwork Measure 
 
Please complete the following questions by circling your answer.  Any information you 
provide is voluntary and will be kept strictly confidential.  A participant number will be 
assigned to your responses and in no way will your name be associated with the data.  
The information you provide will be used only for the purposes of this study.  If you have 
any questions, please ask. 
 
Using the scales below, please indicate the extent to which you believe: 
 
1. that you and your teammate have a shared understanding of your task: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL  
SHARED 
    COMPLETELY 
SHARED 
 
2. your teammate will be able to anticipate your behaviors: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL  
ANTICIPATE 
    COMPLETELY 
ANTICIPATE 
 
3. you will be able to anticipate your teammate’s behaviors: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL  
ANTICIPATE 
    COMPLETELY 
ANTICIPATE 
 
4. your teammate has a good understanding of your role in the team: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL  
UNDERSTAND 
    COMPLETELY 
UNDERSTAND 
 
5. you have a good understanding of your teammate’s role in the team: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL  
UNDERSTAND 
    COMPLETELY 
UNDERSTAND 
 
6. your teammate will understand what you are doing: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NEVER  
UNDERSTAND 
    ALWAYS 
UNDERSTAND 
 
7. you will understand what your teammate is doing: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NEVER  
UNDERSTAND 
    ALWAYS 
UNDERSTAND 
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 Appropriateness Measure 
 
Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for the following 
situation. 
 
Scenario #1 
 
You and your teammate have been planning R&S missions together for a long time; you 
were both trained at the same facility and have been in the same unit ever since.  You 
believe you both have a firm grasp on what the appropriate way to plan is.  You are faced 
with a time critical situation in which you need to plan a mission as quickly as possible so 
that the commander can be updated on the current status of the enemy.  You find that you 
are the one who has been given the information regarding the commander’s intent.  
REMEMBER – time is of the essence! 
 
1. Immediately share the commander’s intent information with your teammate 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
2. Tell your teammate that you have the information, but only share the specifics if 
asked 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
3. Remember that you have the information, but relay it only if your teammate asks 
for it 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
4. Make a decision about the commander’s intent based on the information given to 
you 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
5. Ask your teammate if he or she has any other information about the commander’s 
intent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
6. Verify your interpretation with your teammate before reaching a conclusion 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
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 Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for the following 
situation. 
 
Scenario #2 
 
You and your teammate have just been given your first R&S missions to plan.  Your 
teammate has just been transferred from another unit; however you know that he or she 
was trained at the same facility as you were. You are faced with a time critical situation 
in which you need to plan a mission as quickly as possible so that the commander can be 
updated on the current status of the enemy.  You find that you are the one who has been 
given the information on the probable characteristics of the enemy units.  REMEMBER – 
time is of the essence! 
 
Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for this situation.   
 
1. Immediately share the information about the enemy with your teammate 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
2. Tell your teammate that you have the information, but only share the specifics if 
asked 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
3. Remember that you have the information, but relay it only if your teammate asks 
for it 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
4. Make a decision about the enemy’s threat level based on the information given to 
you 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
5. Ask your teammate if he or she has any other information about the enemy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
6. Verify your interpretation with your teammate before reaching a conclusion 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
 149
 Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for the following 
situation. 
 
Scenario #3 
 
You and your teammate have just been given your first R&S missions to plan; your 
teammate has just been transferred from another unit and received training from a 
different facility than you did. You are faced with a time critical situation in which you 
need to plan a mission as quickly as possible so that the commander can be updated on 
the current status of the enemy.  You find that you are the one who has been given the 
information about the capabilities of your assets.  REMEMBER – time is of the essence! 
 
Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for this situation.   
 
1. Immediately share the information about your assets with your teammate 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
2. Tell your teammate that you have the information, but only share the specifics if 
asked 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
3. Remember that you have the information, but relay it only if your teammate asks 
for it 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
4. Make a decision about which assets to use based on the information given to you 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
5. Ask your teammate if he or she has any other information about the asset 
capabilities 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
6. Verify your interpretation with your teammate before reaching a conclusion 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
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 Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for the following 
situation. 
 
Scenario #4 
 
You and your teammate have worked together planning R&S missions numerous times; 
your teammate has received a different type of training than you, and you believe you 
have a better understanding of the task than he or she does. You are faced with a time 
critical situation in which you need to plan a mission as quickly as possible so that the 
commander can be updated on the current status of the enemy.  You find that you are the 
one who has been given the information about each Objective.  REMEMBER – time is of 
the essence! 
 
Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for this situation.   
 
1. Immediately share the information about the Objective with your teammate 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
2. Tell your teammate that you have the information, but only share the specifics if 
asked 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
3. Remember that you have the information, but relay it only if your teammate asks 
for it 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
4. Make a decision about how to gather information about each Objective based on 
the information given to you 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
5. Ask your teammate if he or she has any other information about the Objective 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
 
6. Verify your interpretation with you teammate before reaching a conclusion 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at All 
Appropriate 
    Completely 
Appropriate 
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 Post-Teamwork Measure 
 
Please complete the following questions by circling your answer.  Any information you 
provide is voluntary and will be kept strictly confidential.  A participant number will be 
assigned to your responses and in no way will your name be associated with the data.  
The information you provide will be used only for the purposes of this study.  If you have any 
questions, please ask. 
 
Using the scales below, please indicate the extent to which you believe: 
 
1. that you and your teammate had a shared understanding of your task: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL  
SHARED 
    COMPLETELY 
SHARED 
 
2. your teammate anticipated your behaviors: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL  
ANTICIPATED 
    COMPLETELY 
ANTICIPATED 
 
3. you anticipated your teammate’s behaviors: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL  
ANTICIPATED 
    COMPLETELY 
ANTICIPATED 
 
4. your teammate had a good understanding of your role in the team: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL  
UNDERSTOOD 
    COMPLETELY 
UNDERSTOOD 
 
5. you had a good understanding of your teammate’s role in the team: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL  
UNDERSTOOD 
    COMPLETELY 
UNDERSTOOD 
 
6. your teammate understood what you were doing: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NEVER  
UNDERSTOOD 
    ALWAYS 
UNDERSTOOD 
 
7. you understood what your teammate was doing: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NEVER  
UNDERSTOOD 
    ALWAYS 
UNDERSTOOD 
 
 153
  
APPENDIX K 
NASA-TLX INSTRUCTIONS AND FORMS  
 
 154
 NASA-TLX Instructions 
Part I 
 
Rating Scales. We are not only interested in assessing your performance but also the 
experiences you had during the experiment. In the most general sense, we are examining 
the “workload” you experienced. Workload is a difficult concept to define precisely but a 
simple one to understand generally.  The factors that influence your experience of 
workload may come from the task itself, your feelings about your own performance, how 
much effort you put into it, or the stress and frustration you felt.  In addition, the 
workload contributed by different task elements may change as you become more 
familiar with the task.  Physical components of workload are relatively easy to 
conceptualize and evaluate. However, the mental components of workload may be more 
difficult to assess. 
 
Since workload is something that is experienced individually by each person, there are no 
set “rulers” that can be used to estimate the workload associated with different activities.  
One way to find out about workload is to ask people to describe the feelings they 
experienced while performing a task. Because workload may be caused by different 
factors, we would like you to evaluate several of them individually rather than by 
lumping them into a single, global evaluation of overall workload. This set of six rating 
scales was developed for you to use in evaluating your experiences during this task. 
Please read the descriptions of the scales carefully. If you have any questions about any 
of the scales in the table, please ask me about them. It is extremely important that they be 
clear to you. You may keep the descriptions with you for reference while completing the 
scales. 
 
For each of the six scales, you will evaluate the task by marking an X in a multiple of 5 
that can range from 0 to 100 to reflect the point that matches your experience. Pay close 
attention to each scale’s endpoint description when making your assessments. Note that 
when the rating scale for PERFORMANCE appears, the scale will go from “good” on the 
left to “bad” on the right.  This means that a low number will represent good 
performance, while a high number will signify poor performance. This order has been 
confusing for some people. Read the description for each scale carefully before making 
your rating. 
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 NASA-TLX Instructions 
Part II 
 
Pairwise Comparisons.  Rating scales of this sort are extremely useful, but their utility is 
diminished by the tendency people have to interpret them in different ways. For example, 
some people feel that mental or temporal demands are the greatest contributors to 
workload regardless of the effort they expended in performing a given task or the level of 
performance they achieved. Others feel that if they performed well the workload must 
have been low; and if they performed poorly, then it must have been high.  Still others 
believe that effort or feelings of frustration are the most important determinants of their 
experiences of workload. Previous studies using this scale have found several different 
patterns of results.  In addition, the factors that determine workload differ depending on 
the task. For instance, some tasks might be difficult because they must be completed very 
quickly. Other tasks may seem easy or hard because the degree of mental or physical 
effort required.  Some task may seem difficult because they cannot be performed well no 
matter how much effort is expended. 
 
The next step in your evaluation is to assess the relative importance of the six factors in 
determining how much workload you experienced.  You will be presented with pairs of 
rating scale titles (e.g. EFFORT vs. MENTAL DEMAND) and asked to choose which of 
the two items was more important to your experience of workload in the task that you just 
performed. Each pair of scale titles will appear together and you will be asked to circle 
the more important one. After indicating your response to a pair of scale titles, please go 
on to the next pair until you have selected a response for all pairs. 
 
Please consider your choices carefully and try to make them consistent with your scale 
ratings. Refer back to the rating scale definitions if you need to as you proceed. There is 
no correct pattern of responses. We are only interested in your opinions. 
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 RATING SCALE DEFINITIONS 
 
Title Endpoints Descriptions 
MENTAL 
DEMAND LOW/HIGH 
How much mental and perceptual activity was 
required (e.g. thinking, deciding, calculating, 
remembering, looking, searching, etc.)?  Was the 
task easy or demanding, simple or complex, 
exacting or forgiving? 
PHYSICAL 
DEMAND LOW/HIGH 
How much physical activity was required (e.g. 
pushing, pulling, turning, controlling, activating, 
etc.)?  Was the task easy or demanding, slow or 
brisk, slack or strenuous, restful or laborious? 
TEMPORAL 
DEMAND LOW/HIGH 
How much time pressure did you feel due to the 
rate or pace at which the task or task elements 
occurred?  Was the pace slow and leisurely or 
rapid and frantic? 
PERFORMANCE GOOD/POOR
How successful do you think you were in 
accomplishing the goals of the task set by the 
experimenter (or yourself)?  How satisfied were 
you with your performance in accomplishing 
these goals? 
EFFORT LOW/HIGH 
How hard did you have to work (mentally and 
physically) to accomplish your level of 
performance? 
FRUSTRATION 
LEVEL LOW/HIGH 
How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed, 
and annoyed versus gratified, content, relaxed, 
and complacent did you feel during the task? 
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Scoring Form 1 
 
 
1. Mental Demand - Individual 
 
 
 
 Low High 
 
2. Physical Demand - Individual 
 
 
 
 Low High 
 
3. Temporal Demand - Individual 
 
 
 
 Low High 
 
4. Performance - Individual 
 
 
 
 Good Bad 
 
5. Effort - Individual 
 
 
 
 Low High 
 
6. Frustration - Individual 
 
 
 
 Low High 
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  Scoring Form 2 
 
For each of the pairs (e.g., mental demand vs. effort) choose which one of the two items 
was more important to your experience of workload (Circle). 
 
Circle one of each pair: Effort Temporal Demand 
 or or 
 Performance Frustration 
 Temporal Demand Physical Demand 
 or or 
 Effort Frustration 
 Performance Physical Demand 
 or or 
 Frustration Temporal Demand 
 Physical Demand Temporal Demand 
Sources of or or 
Workload Performance Mental Demand 
Comparisons Frustration Performance 
 or or 
 Effort Mental Demand 
 Performance Mental Demand 
 or or 
 Temporal Demand Effort 
 Mental Demand Effort 
 or or 
 Physical Demand Physical Demand 
 Frustration  
 or  
 Mental Demand  
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 Debriefing Form 
 
This experiment was designed to examine team communication and performance in planning 
reconnaissance missions with unmanned ground and aerial vehicles. More specifically, we were 
interested in looking at how and when you engaged in implicit coordination, which is giving 
information or resources to your teammate without being asked for them.  We manipulated 
whether or not you received the same training as your teammate and then also manipulated 
whether or not you believed you received the same training.  Therefore, some of you were in a 
condition in which we deceived you into believing your teammate received the same or different 
training than you when that was untrue.  This deception was necessary to determine whether your 
perceptions influenced your actual performance.   If you have any questions about the study or 
would like to discuss your experience regarding this deception, please feel free to ask them now.  
We want you to know that we could not do our work without your help, so your participation is 
greatly appreciated.  If you would like to learn more about the findings of this study, please feel 
free to contact Raegan Hoeft at 407-921-3554 or hoeft2@hotmail.com. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
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 APPENDIX M 
PERCEPTIONS OF SHAREDNESS MANIPULATION MATERIALS 
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The following materials were read to participants at specified times during the scenarios. 
The highlighted portions are the differences between the Low and High Perceptions 
conditions. 
   
Military Reconnaissance Planning Study Explanation – Low Perceptions 
 
Thank you for your participation in our study.  Today you will be working together as a 
team to plan military reconnaissance missions using robotic assets, specifically 
unmanned aerial and unmanned ground vehicles.  Each of you will be in charge of one 
specific asset.  We are interested in how teams of operators plan these missions, the types 
of information they find important, the strategies they use, etc.  First you will be given 
training on how to plan reconnaissance missions and how you will complete today’s 
tasks.  You will receive two different types of training.  One of you will be the 
“Reconnaissance Equipment Operator” and the other will be the “Surveillance Systems 
Operator”.  You will be given a notepad and pen should you want to take notes during the 
training.  The training will be given via Microsoft PowerPoint.  To move forward to the 
next slide you can either click on the mouse button or use the space bar.  Once you 
complete the training, you will be asked to complete some paperwork and then plan a 
number of reconnaissance missions.  The entire session should last approximately 2 
hours.  Again, you will be given different training for Reconnaissance Equipment 
Operator and Surveillance Systems Operator.  Do you have any questions? 
 
Military Reconnaissance Planning Study Explanation – High Perceptions 
 
Thank you for your participation in our study.  Today you will be working together as a 
team to plan military reconnaissance missions using robotic assets, specifically 
unmanned aerial and unmanned ground vehicles.  Each of you will be in charge of one 
specific asset.  We are interested in how teams of operators plan these missions, the types 
of information they find important, the strategies they use, etc.  First you will be given 
training on how to plan reconnaissance missions and how you will complete today’s 
tasks.  You will both receive the same training as “Reconnaissance Equipment 
Operators”.  You will be given a notepad and pen should you want to take notes during 
the training.  The training will be given via Microsoft PowerPoint.  To move forward to 
the next slide you can either click on the mouse button or use the space bar.  Once you 
complete the training, you will be asked to complete some paperwork and then plan a 
number of reconnaissance missions.  The entire session should last approximately 2 
hours.  Again, you will both be given the same training for Reconnaissance Equipment 
Operators.  Please let me know when you have completed the training.  Do you have any 
questions? 
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 Practice Session Explanation – Low Perceptions 
 
Now that you have completed your individual training as Reconnaissance Equipment 
Operator and Surveillance Systems Operator, you will be given a 15 minute practice 
session before the actual performance portion of this study.   This practice session is to 
allow you to become familiar with how to use the software and with the type of 
information that you will be provided with during each scenario.  You have received 
different training, and during the remainder of the study, you will be in charge of drawing 
the route for only one robotic asset.  The Reconnaissance Equipment Operator at 
Computer A (point to the person at computer A) will be in charge of the UAV while the 
Reconnaissance Equipment Operator at Computer B (point to the person at computer B) 
will be in charge of the UGV.   During the practice session, you will not communicate 
with one another, you will simply take the time to get used to the software and to practice 
planning a route for your asset.  You will receive a packet of information that will help 
you in your planning.  Feel free to write on the paperwork if it will help you.  You can 
highlight or underline important pieces of information, or you can make notes for 
yourself, whatever will help you plan the mission.  On the map, there is a red arrow 
pointing down from the top edge.  This is where your routes should begin and end.  Do 
you see the red arrow? Do you have any questions? Please put your headphones on now.  
You may begin. 
 
Practice Session Explanation – High Perceptions 
 
Now that you have both completed your training as Reconnaissance Equipment 
Operators, you will be given a 15 minute practice session before the actual performance 
portion of this study.   This practice session is to allow you to become familiar with how 
to use the software and with the type of information that you will be provided with during 
each scenario.  You have both received the same training; however, during the remainder 
of the study, you will be in charge of actually drawing the route for only one robotic 
asset.  The Reconnaissance Equipment Operator at Computer A (point to the person at 
computer A) will be in charge of the UAV while the Reconnaissance Equipment Operator 
at Computer B (point to the person at computer B) will be in charge of the UGV.   During 
the practice session, you will not communicate with one another, you will simply take the 
time to get used to the software and to practice planning a route for your asset.  You will 
receive a packet of information that will help you in your planning.  Feel free to write on 
the paperwork if it will help you.  You can highlight or underline important pieces of 
information, or you can make notes for yourself, whatever will help you plan the mission.  
On the map, there is a red arrow pointing down from the top edge.  This is where your 
routes should begin and end.  Do you see the red arrow? Do you have any questions? 
Please put your headphones on now.  You may begin. 
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 First Scenario Explanation – Low Perceptions 
 
We are now ready to begin the performance part of the experiment.  You are now going 
to plan your first mission together as a team.  You will each be given a packet of papers 
to help you plan the mission.  It is up to you to determine what information is important 
and what isn’t, what you want to share with your teammate and what you don’t.  You will 
not necessarily have all of the same information as your teammate.  You will not be 
allowed to talk to one another during the planning; you must communicate with each 
other via the Chat Window on the right hand side of the screen.  While you will each be 
planning the routes for separate vehicles, you must ultimately agree on those routes 
before you are finished.  Remember, you were trained as a Reconnaissance Equipment 
Operator and you will be responsible for the UAV route.  You were trained as a 
Surveillance Systems Operator and you will be responsible for the UGV route.  Your 
computers are already set to the appropriate colors for each route.   As with the training, 
you can highlight or underline important pieces of information, or you can make notes to 
yourself in your packet of information.   
 
For Scenario 1: On the map, there is a red arrow pointing up from the bottom edge. 
For Scenario 2: On the map, there is a red arrow pointing in from the right edge. 
 
This is where your routes should begin and end.  Do you see the red arrow? Do you have 
any questions? You may begin. 
 
First Scenario Explanation – High Perceptions 
 
We are now ready to begin the performance part of the experiment.  You are now going 
to plan your first mission together as a team.  You will each be given a packet of papers 
to help you plan the mission.  It is up to you to determine what information is important 
and what isn’t, what you want to share with your teammate and what you don’t.  You will 
not necessarily have all of the same information as your teammate.  You will not be 
allowed to talk to one another during the planning; you must communicate with each 
other via the Chat Window on the right hand side of the screen.  While you will each be 
planning the routes for separate vehicles, you must ultimately agree on those routes 
before you are finished.  Again, although both of you were trained as Reconnaissance 
Equipment Operators, Computer A will still be responsible for the UAV route and 
Computer B will still be responsible for the UGV route.  Your computers are already set 
to the appropriate colors for each route.   As with the training, you can highlight or 
underline important pieces of information, or you can make notes to yourself in your 
packet of information.   
 
For Scenario 1: On the map, there is a red arrow pointing up from the bottom edge.  
For Scenario 2: On the map, there is a red arrow pointing in from the right edge  
 
This is where your routes should begin and end.  Do you see the red arrow? Do you have 
any questions? You may begin. 
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 Second Scenario Explanation – Low Perceptions 
 
You are now going to plan your second mission together as a team.  Again, you will each 
be given a packet of papers to help you plan the mission.  It is up to you to determine 
what information is important and what isn’t, what you want to share with your teammate 
and what you don’t.  You will not necessarily have all of the same information as your 
teammate.  You will not be allowed to talk to one another during the planning; you must 
communicate with each other via the Chat Window on the right hand side of the screen.  
While you will each be planning the routes for separate vehicles, you must ultimately 
agree on those routes before you are finished.  Again, you were trained as a 
Reconnaissance Equipment Operator and you will be responsible for the UAV route.  
You were trained as a Surveillance Systems Operator and you will be responsible for the 
UGV route.  Your computers are already set to the appropriate colors for each route.   As 
with the first mission, you can highlight or underline important pieces of information, or 
you can make notes to yourself in your packet of information.   
 
For Scenario 1: On the map, there is a red arrow pointing up from the bottom edge. 
For Scenario 2: On the map, there is a red arrow pointing in from the right edge. 
 
This is where your routes should begin and end.  Do you see the red arrow? Do you have 
any questions? You may begin. 
 
Second Scenario Explanation – High Perceptions 
 
You are now going to plan your second mission together as a team.  Again, you will each 
be given a packet of papers to help you plan the mission.  It is up to you to determine 
what information is important and what isn’t, what you want to share with your teammate 
and what you don’t.  You will not necessarily have all of the same information as your 
teammate.  You will not be allowed to talk to one another during the planning; you must 
communicate with each other via the Chat Window on the right hand side of the screen.  
While you will each be planning the routes for separate vehicles, you must ultimately 
agree on those routes before you are finished.  Again, although both of you were trained 
as Reconnaissance Equipment Operators, Computer A will still be responsible for the 
UAV route and Computer B will still be responsible for the UGV route.  Your computers 
are already set to the appropriate colors for each route.   As with the first mission, you 
can highlight or underline important pieces of information, or you can make notes to 
yourself in your packet of information.   
 
For Scenario 1: On the map, there is a red arrow pointing up from the bottom edge.  
For Scenario 2: On the map, there is a red arrow pointing in from the right edge.  
 
This is where your routes should begin and end.  Do you see the red arrow? Do you have 
any questions? You may begin. 
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 APPENDIX N 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TRAINING MODULES 
 167
 Differences between Training Modules 
 
Emphasis on Speed (Module 1) vs. Accuracy (Module 2) 
 
     Module 1            Module 2 
Developing R&S Plan
• R&S planning is extremely time-critical
– Requests for immediate R&S missions are 
common
– Quick decision-making is key
• You must immediately begin planning the mission as 
soon as the request is received
• You must be able to make quick decisions so that the 
mission can commence as soon as possible 
• You must be able to make quick decisions – use all of 
the information that is available and relevant
      
Developing R&S Plan
• R&S planning must be as accurate as 
possible
– Requests are usually placed 24 hours in advance
– Accurate decision-making is key
• You must familiarize yourself with all available 
information first in order to have a complete 
understanding of the task
• You must be able to make accurate decisions so that 
the mission can be as successful as possible 
• You must be able to make well-informed decisions – use 
only the information that is accurate and up-to-date
   
 
Developing R&S Plan
• R&S planning is extremely time-critical
– Continued…
• If you are missing information, you must make your 
best educated guess and plan accordingly
• You are discouraged from requesting additional 
information from your superiors because there is no 
guarantee that they have that information or can get 
it to you in time
• Keep this time-critical factor in mind as you learn 
about the different types of information you may or 
may not have available
– Do not sacrifice quickness for accuracy! It is 
better to be fast than perfect.
      
Developing R&S Plan
• R&S planning must be as accurate as possible
– Continued…
• If you are missing information, you should                    
never guess what that information might be
• You are encouraged to request additional             
information from your superiors in order to                    
make sure your information is up-to-date
• Keep this accuracy factor in mind as you learn about the 
different types of information you may or may not have 
available
– Do not sacrifice accuracy for quickness!!  It is better 
to be correct than fast.
 
 
Summary
1. Planning is time-critical
2. Do not ask superiors for help
3. Use all your assets
4. UAVs can travel great distances quickly, but they 
are strongly impacted by weather conditions and 
can only provide an overview rather than specific 
details
5. Always consider using an Augmenting or 
Redundancy strategy before a strategy that does 
not utilize all assets 
      
Summary
1. Planning must be accurate
2. Ask superiors for help if you are missing 
information
3. Protect your assets as much as possible
4. UGVs can get very close to the enemy to provide 
specific details, but they are strongly impacted by 
terrain conditions and take longer to travel from one 
place to another
5. Always consider using a Cueing strategy or one 
asset only strategy before a strategy that uses all 
assets 
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 Emphasis on UAV (Module 1) vs. UGV (Module 2) 
 
     Module 1             Module 2 
Your Assets
• One unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
– Advantages 
• Eliminates risk to pilot’s life
• Fairly cheap to make and maintain
• Can fly over obstacles on the ground
• Can travel great distances quickly
– Disadvantages
• Can only provide general information about the enemy
• Has a maximum endurance based on fuel supply
• Greater likelihood to crash and be destroyed than UGV
• Strongly impacted by weather conditions
      
Your Assets
• One unmanned ground vehicle (UGV):
– Advantages 
• Eliminates risk to soldier’s life
• Can provide specific information about the enemy or 
location
• Can be shut down to reserve fuel
• More resilient to crashing or malfunctioning than UAV
– Disadvantages
• Fairly expensive to make and maintain
• Must work around obstacles on the ground
• Greater likelihood to get “stuck” than UAV
• Strongly impacted by terrain conditions
   
 
Your Assets
• More about UAVs:
– These robotic planes have been used in Iraq & 
Afghanistan to seek out and destroy enemy 
forces and equipment 
– Most UAVs have a wingspan of  about 20 feet 
and can stay in the air for up to 40 hours
– Military personnel guide UAVs from control 
stations using computers, often from a remote 
location
      
Your Assets
• More about UGVs:
– UGVs are used primarily for information 
collecting, destroying enemy targets, and urban 
search and rescue (USAR) missions
– UGVs range in size from small USAR robots to 
six ton armed robotic vehicles (ARVs)
– Military personnel guide UGVs from control 
stations using computers, often from a remote 
location
 
 
Your Assets
• The “eyes” of the UAV
– The UAV is equipped with powerful cameras that 
can zoom in to provide overview, aerial pictures
– The visibility range of the cameras depends 
greatly on favorable weather conditions (clear 
skies)
– UAVs can determine enemy location and 
movement over time but cannot get close enough 
to provide clear details about enemy specifics
      
Your Assets
• The “eyes” of the UGV
– The UGV is equipped with powerful 360-degree 
revolving camera images so controllers can gather 
enough information to make sound decisions
– The visibility range of the cameras depends on the 
obstacles in the environment such as trees or 
buildings
– Relative to the UAV, the UGV can get up close to 
provide clearer details about enemy specifics, 
such as weaponry 
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 Emphasis on UAV (Module 1) vs. UGV (Module 2) - continued 
 
     Module 1             Module 2 
Your Assets
• Here are some sample views from UAVs
      
Your Assets
• Here are some sample views from UGVs
  
 
Summary
1. Planning is time-critical
2. Do not ask superiors for help
3. Use all your assets
4. UAVs can travel great distances quickly, but they 
are strongly impacted by weather conditions and 
can only provide an overview rather than specific 
details
5. Always consider using an Augmenting or 
Redundancy strategy before a strategy that does 
not utilize all assets 
      
Summary
1. Planning must be accurate
2. Ask superiors for help if you are missing 
information
3. Protect your assets as much as possible
4. UGVs can get very close to the enemy to provide 
specific details, but they are strongly impacted by 
terrain conditions and take longer to travel from one 
place to another
5. Always consider using a Cueing strategy or one 
asset only strategy before a strategy that uses all 
assets 
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 Emphasis on Using All Assets (Module 1) vs. Protecting Assets (Module 2) 
 
     Module 1             Module 2 
Your Assets
• It is important that you utilize all assets that 
are available
– Robotic assets, such as UGVs and UAVs, should 
be used as much as possible
• Military rules state that you must use of all available 
assets
• Robots are fairly inexpensive and easy to replace if lost
• Using one asset to complete a task that two assets can 
do more efficiently can lead a waste of time and other 
resources
– It is inefficient and a waste of money to not use 
assets that are at your disposal
      
Your Assets
• It is important that you protect your assets as 
much as possible
– Robotic assets, such as UGVs and UAVs, should 
not be overused
• Military rules state that you must protect and preserve 
your assets
• Robots are very expensive and difficult to replace if lost
• Using numerous assets to complete a task that one asset 
can do can lead to an unnecessary loss of assets 
– It is inefficient and a waste of money to use all 
assets that are at your disposal when one asset 
can successfully complete the task
   
 
Your Assets
• There are a number of different strategies for 
using your assets
– Use both assets
• Augmenting strategy – sending out both the UGV and the 
UAV along separate routes to cover more area in less 
time
• Redundancy strategy – sending both the UGV and UAV 
along the same routes to the same locations to have two 
views in case one asset is lost
• Cueing strategy – sending out the UAV first to determine 
whether the UGV is needed at all
– Use only one asset (only UGV or only UAV)
      
Your Assets
• There are a number of different strategies for 
using your assets
– Use only one asset (only UGV or only UAV)
– Use both assets
• Cueing strategy – sending out the UAV first to determine 
whether the UGV is needed at all
• Augmenting strategy – sending out both the UGV and the 
UAV along separate routes to cover more area in less 
time
• Redundancy strategy – sending both the UGV and UAV 
along the same routes to the same locations to have two 
views in case one asset is lost
 
 
Your Assets
• As previously noted, it is important that you try to take 
advantage of all your assets
– This decision will be based on an assessment of all available 
information, including time pressures and environmental 
conditions (i.e., When does the commander need the 
information?  Is there enough time to send out both assets 
along the same route or will separate routes be more 
efficient?  What are the weather conditions?  Can both 
assets even be used?)
• Augmenting or redundancy strategy should be considered first
• Cueing strategy should be considered second
• Using only one asset should be a last resort
      
Your Assets
• As previously noted, it is important that you protect 
your assets as much as possible
– This decision will be based on an assessment of all available 
information, including time pressures and environmental 
conditions (i.e., When does the commander need the 
information?  Should both assets be used or will one be 
sufficient? What are the terrain conditions? Which one could 
be sent out alone?)
• Using only one asset should be considered first
• Cueing strategy should be considered second
• Augmenting or redundancy strategy should be a last resort
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 Emphasis on Using All Assets (Module 1) vs. Protecting Assets (Module 2) - 
continued 
 
     Module 1             Module 2 
Summary
1. Planning is time-critical
2. Do not ask superiors for help
3. Use all your assets
4. UAVs can travel great distances quickly, but they 
are strongly impacted by weather conditions and 
can only provide an overview rather than specific 
details
5. Always consider using an Augmenting or 
Redundancy strategy before a strategy that does 
not utilize all assets 
      
Summary
1. Planning must be accurate
2. Ask superiors for help if you are missing 
information
3. Protect your assets as much as possible
4. UGVs can get very close to the enemy to provide 
specific details, but they are strongly impacted by 
terrain conditions and take longer to travel from one 
place to another
5. Always consider using a Cueing strategy or one 
asset only strategy before a strategy that uses all 
assets 
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 Emphasis on Augmenting or Redundancy Strategies (Module 1)  
vs. One Asset or Cueing Strategies (Module 2) 
 
       Module 1             Module 2  
Your Assets
• Using both the UAV and UGV
– There may be occasions where using both assets 
is more effective than using only one asset
– For example, environmental conditions may make 
the UGV or UAV partially inoperable or inefficient 
requiring backup or support from the other asset
– You may not have enough time to send out only 
one asset to collect all of the information
– It will be your job to determine whether using both 
assets is the best solution given the available 
information and resources
      
Your Assets
• Using either the UAV or UGV solely
– There may be occasions where using only one 
asset is more effective than using both assets
– For example, environmental conditions may make 
the UGV or UAV inoperable or inefficient
– You may simply be more familiar and more 
comfortable with one asset as opposed to the 
other
– It will be your job to determine whether using one 
asset is the best solution given the available 
information and resources
   
 
 
Your Assets
• Augmenting Strategy
– Using numerous assets at the same time to 
support the R&S plan
– Sending those assets along different routes; the 
UAV can go to certain Objectives while the UGV 
can go to other Objectives
– This allows for the collection of the most amount of 
information in the shortest amount of time
– Augmenting call also be a useful strategy when 
environmental factors are influencing the 
usefulness of one or more assets
     
Your Assets
• UGV Only Strategy
– Using only the UGV to collect all of the necessary 
information from the various Objectives
– With this strategy only one route is necessary
– There must be enough time for the UGV to navigate along its 
route to collect all the information
– This strategy may be best when extremely specific 
information is needed and the asset must get close to the 
enemy
– This strategy many also be useful when the terrain 
conditions make the UAV inefficient, such as in dense urban 
environments or jungle environments
 
 
Augmenting Strategy
Base
OBJ Alpha
OBJ Beta
OBJ Chi
OBJ Delta
OBJ Theta
OBJ Gamma
Here is a map of Central 
Baghdad.
This is your military base 
from where your assets 
must leave and return.
These are the Objectives, 
the locations where you 
need to gather information.
The augmentation s r tegy 
requires you t  send your 
asse s on different rou es.
Here on  possible route 
for your UAV.Here is one possible route 
for your UGV.
You can see that by sending the UAV and UGV on different 
rout s, you are able to gather information from all of the 
Objectives in a shorter amount of time.
You can s e al o s e th t the UAV does not have to abide by 
the r ads or p ths avail ble, while th  UGV does.
      
UGV Only Strategy
Base
OBJ Alpha
OBJ Beta
OBJ Chi
OBJ Delta
OBJ Theta
OBJ Gamma
Here is a map of Central 
Baghdad.
This is your military base 
from which your asse s 
must leave and return.
ese are the Objectives, 
th  locations where you 
need to gather information.
one possibl  route 
for your UGV.
The UGV only strategy requires the 
UGV to pass by all Objectives to 
collect the necessary information.
You can see that th  UGV must deal with the terrain 
restrictions.  Here, the UGV must follow roads and cross 
bridges; it cannot go through buildings or other obstacles.
is may take more time, but may lso be mor  efficient in 
t r s f getting close to the enemy t  gather specific 
information s opposed to generic information.
N te that city envi on nts can b  e pecially treacherous 
fo  UGVs, a there will likely be obstacles nd/or unsafe 
r utes whi h uld lea t e loss o  the UGV.
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 Emphasis on Augmenting or Redundancy Strategies (Module 1)  
vs. One Asset or Cueing Strategies (Module 2) - continued 
 
     Module 1              Module 2 
Your Assets
• Redundancy Strategy
– Using numerous assets at the same time to 
support the R&S plan
– Sending those assets along the same route; the 
UAV and the UGV both go to all Objectives
– This strategy ensures continuous coverage and 
multiple viewpoints of all Objectives
– Augmenting call also be a useful strategy when 
environmental factors are influencing the 
usefulness of one or more assets
      
Your Assets
• UAV Only Strategy
– Using only the UAV to collect all of the necessary 
information from the various Objectives
– With this strategy only one route is necessary
– This strategy may be useful when there is a limited amount 
of time to collect the information because the UAV can travel 
quickly
– This strategy may be best when only general information is 
needed and the asset does not need to get close to the 
enemy
– This strategy many also be useful when the terrain 
conditions make the UGV inefficient, such as with rivers 
without bridges, mountainous regions, or roadblocks
 
 
Redundancy Strategy
Base
OBJ Alpha
OBJ Beta
OBJ Chi
OBJ Delta
OBJ Theta
OBJ Gamma
Here is a map of Central 
Baghdad.
This is your military base 
from which your assets 
must leave and return.
These are the Objectives, 
th  locations where you 
need to gather information.
Here is one possible route 
for your UGV.
Here is one p ssible route 
for your UAV.
The redundancy strategy 
requires you t  end b th your 
asse s along the same route.
You can see that b s nding the UGV and the UAV along 
similar r ut s, you ar  abl  to have guaranteed coverage of 
each Objective.
You can also se  that the UGV still needs to abide by the 
roads r paths available, while the UAV does not.
Note that even though the UAV can get to the next Objective 
more quickly, it must wait for the  to arrive before 
moving .  Thi  m ans that the amount of fuel the UAV has 
will be important in determining whether to use this strategy.
      
UAV Only Strategy
Base
OBJ Alpha
OBJ Beta
OBJ Chi
OBJ Delta
OBJ Theta
OBJ Gamma
Here is a map of Central 
Baghdad.
This is your military base 
from which your assets 
must leave and return.
ese are the Objectives, 
the locations where you 
need to gather information.
H re is one possible route 
for your UAV.
 UAV only s rategy r quires the 
UAV to pas all O j ctives to collect 
the necessary infor ation.
You can see that the UAV do not have to deal with the 
er ain restrictions.  Here, the UAV can go over buildings 
and river  nd does ot eed to follow roads or paths.
m y tak ess tim , b t may also b mor  efficient if
only generic informati n about th  Objectives is necessary.  
Th UAV c  pr vide aerial views of each Objective.
Note that city environments can be treacherous for UAVs 
because there are numerous buildings, power lines, etc. that 
can inte f  with t  communication between the UAV and 
t  command, which could l ad to omplet  lo s of signal, 
 consequ ntly, the UAV.
  
  
Your Assets
• As previously noted, it is important that you 
try to take advantage of all your assets
– This decision will be based on an assessment of all available 
information, including time pressures and environmental 
conditions (i.e., When does the commander need the 
information?  Is there enough time to send out both assets 
along the same route or will separate routes be more 
efficient?  What are the weather conditions?  Can both 
assets even be used? Which one could be sent out alone?)
• Augmenting or redundancy strategy should be considered first
• Cueing strategy should be considered second
• Using only one asset should be a last resort
      
Your Assets
• As previously noted, it is important that you protect 
your assets as much as possible
– This decision will be based on an assessment of all available 
information, including time pressures and environmental 
conditions (i.e., When does the commander need the 
information?  Should both assets be used or will one be 
sufficient? What are the terrain conditions? Which one could 
be sent out alone?)
• Using only one asset should be considered first
• Cueing strategy should be considered second
• Augmenting or redundancy strategy should be a last resort
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 Emphasis on Augmenting or Redundancy Strategies (Module 1)  
vs. One Asset or Cueing Strategies (Module 2) - continued 
 
     Module 1             Module 2 
Summary
1. Planning is time-critical
2. Do not ask superiors for help
3. Use all your assets
4. UAVs can travel great distances quickly, but they 
are strongly impacted by weather conditions and 
can only provide an overview rather than specific 
details
5. Always consider using an Augmenting or 
Redundancy strategy before a strategy that does 
not utilize all assets 
      
Summary
1. Planning must be accurate
2. Ask superiors for help if you are missing 
information
3. Protect your assets as much as possible
4. UGVs can get very close to the enemy to provide 
specific details, but they are strongly impacted by 
terrain conditions and take longer to travel from one 
place to another
5. Always consider using a Cueing strategy or one 
asset only strategy before a strategy that uses all 
assets 
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 Emphasis on Weather (Module 1) vs. Terrain (Module 2) 
 
     Module 1             Module 2 
Effects of Weather
• You must have a working knowledge of 
weather in order to prepare for possible 
adverse conditions
• Weather factors that can affect R&S planning
– Reduced visibility
– Surface winds
– Precipitation
– Cloud Coverage
– Temperature
– Humidity 
      
Effects of Terrain
• You must have a working knowledge of 
terrain in order to prepare for possible 
adverse conditions
• Terrain factors that can affect R&S planning 
– City
• Buildings and roads
– Desert
• Sand and lack of established paths
– Jungle
• Thick vegetation
   
 
Effects of Weather
• Reduced visibility
– Can be beneficial because conceals positions and 
can aid in achieving surprise
– Can also hinder the effectiveness of R&S when 
cannot see where the enemy is
• Surface winds
– Strong winds limit airborne and aviation operations
– Can damage material and structures, create false 
radar returns, cause personal injury, add to 
reduced visibility
      
Effects of Terrain
• City environment
– Buildings can be used for observation posts and to 
conceal position from enemies but may also 
obstruct views of the enemy and hide snipers
– Buildings and electrical power lines can interfere 
with radio communications
– Roads and alleyways are already established 
routes to navigate through the city but can also 
expose forces to enemy observation and possible 
fire
 
 
Effects of Weather
• Precipitation
– Affects mobility of forces and tracked or wheeled 
equipment or vehicles 
– Can reduce visibility
– Heavy rains can make some unpaved, low-lying, 
and off-road areas impassable
– Can drastically reduce personnel effectiveness by 
causing discomfort, increasing fatigue, and 
creating other physical and psychological 
problems
      
Effects of Terrain
• Desert
– Wide open spaces provide little concealment for 
friendly or enemy forces
– Obstacles including quicksand, wet sand, and 
sand dunes can make travel difficult
– Lack of established roads and the presence of 
landmines can also make travel difficult
– Radio communications and signals should be 
clear unless weather conditions are adverse
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 Emphasis on Weather (Module 1) vs. Terrain (Module 2) - continued 
 
     Module 1              Module 2 
Effects of Weather
• Cloud coverage
– Can influence aviation operations
– Affects ground operations by reducing illumination 
and visibility or by enhancing effects of artificial 
light
• Temperature and Humidity
– High temps can lead to heat-related injuries and 
engine wear that leads to equipment failures
– Low temps can lead to cold weather injuries and 
cause damage to vehicle cooling systems and 
engines
      
Effects of Terrain
• Jungle
– Thick vegetation, rivers, swampy areas, and sharp 
ridges can all slow movement and reduce radio 
communications
– Tree-top canopies can reduce illumination from 
below and limit visibility from aerial vehicles above
– Wildlife can also affect mobility as well as attention
 
 
 
Effects of Weather
• Any of these aspects of weather can 
significantly impact which assets to use
– Will a UAV be able to successfully fly to its 
assigned location, collect the appropriate 
information, and then communicate that 
information back?
– Will the weather significantly impact the terrain to 
impede the ability of the UGV to navigate to its 
assigned location, collect the appropriate 
information, and then communicate that 
information back?
     
Effects of Terrain
• Any of these aspects of terrain can 
significantly impact which assets to use
– Will a UGV be able to successfully navigate to its 
assigned location, collect the appropriate 
information, and then communicate that 
information back?
– Will the terrain significantly impact the UAV’s
ability to view its assigned location, collect the 
appropriate information, and then communicate 
that information back?
 
 
Summary
1. Planning is time-critical
2. Do not ask superiors for help
3. Use all your assets
4. UAVs can travel great distances quickly, but they 
are strongly impacted by weather conditions and 
can only provide an overview rather than specific 
details
5. Always consider using an Augmenting or 
Redundancy strategy before a strategy that does 
not utilize all assets 
      
Summary
1. Planning must be accurate
2. Ask superiors for help if you are missing 
information
3. Protect your assets as much as possible
4. UGVs can get very close to the enemy to provide 
specific details, but they are strongly impacted by 
terrain conditions and take longer to travel from one 
place to another
5. Always consider using a Cueing strategy or one 
asset only strategy before a strategy that uses all 
assets 
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 Emphasis on Not asking for Help (Module 1) vs. Asking for Help (Module 2) 
 
     Module 1             Module 2 
Developing R&S Plan
• R&S planning is extremely time-critical
– Continued…
• If you are missing information, you must make your 
best educated guess and plan accordingly
• You are discouraged from requesting additional 
information from your superiors because there is no 
guarantee that they have that information or can get 
it to you in time
• Keep this time-critical factor in mind as you learn 
about the different types of information you may or 
may not have available
– Do not sacrifice quickness for accuracy! It is 
better to be fast than perfect.
      
Developing R&S Plan
• R&S planning must be as accurate as possible
– Continued…
• If you are missing information, you should                    
never guess what that information might be
• You are encouraged to request additional             
information from your superiors in order to                    
make sure your information is up-to-date
• Keep this accuracy factor in mind as you learn about the 
different types of information you may or may not have 
available
– Do not sacrifice accuracy for quickness!!  It is better 
to be correct than fast.
 
 
Summary
1. Planning is time-critical
2. Do not ask superiors for help
3. Use all your assets
4. UAVs can travel great distances quickly, but they 
are strongly impacted by weather conditions and 
can only provide an overview rather than specific 
details
5. Always consider using an Augmenting or 
Redundancy strategy before a strategy that does 
not utilize all assets 
      
Summary
1. Planning must be accurate
2. Ask superiors for help if you are missing 
information
3. Protect your assets as much as possible
4. UGVs can get very close to the enemy to provide 
specific details, but they are strongly impacted by 
terrain conditions and take longer to travel from one 
place to another
5. Always consider using a Cueing strategy or one 
asset only strategy before a strategy that uses all 
assets 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 178
 APPENDIX O 
SCENARIO MATERIALS 
 179
 Training Scenario Materials 
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 OPERATION ORDER 99-A 
References: 
Map of Baghdad provided on your computer display.  Baghdad is the capital of 
Iraq. It is the second largest city in Southwest Asia.  The city sits on the Tigris 
River and was once the center of the Islamic civilization.  The city is mostly flat, 
with the western side of the city having wider boulevards, more expensive homes 
and more government buildings. Low-income housing is generally located in the 
east. The map provided is an up to date map. 
 
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Local Time 
 
Task Organization:  There is one asset available for this mission: one unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV).  The UAV available for this mission is the Hunter, seen in the pictures 
below.  The Hunter is a short range joint-tactical unmanned aircraft system for 
surveillance and reconnaissance missions. The endurance of the aircraft is more than 11 
hours and the cruise speed is 70 knots.   The Hunter aircraft is 23 ft in length and has a 29 
ft wingspan. The system operates at an altitude of 15,000 ft and at a range of 200 
kilometers. A C-Band datalink ties the vehicle to a ground station. The sensor package 
sends day television or night infrared imagery to the ground. A sample image taken by a 
Hunter is shown below.   You will be in charge of planning the route for the Hunter 
UAV. 
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SITUATION 
 
Enemy Forces 
 
Weather and Light Data and General Forecast 
 
Skies: Clear skies morning and night.  Partly cloudy over night, cloud base 10,000 ft.  
There should be no problems with using any aerial assets. 
 
Visibility: Unlimited at flying level.   
 
Winds: North to Northwest. Speed not expected to exceed 10 knots.  These conditions 
will not affect the flying capabilities of the UAV.   
 
Temperatures: from 65 degrees F to 73 degrees F.  
 
Light Data: Sunrise 6:08 AM. Sunset 8:15 PM.   
 
Trafficability: Good.  
 
Precipitation:  None predicted.  Maximum precipitation per month: 20 inches.  Average 
precipitation per month: 5 inches. 
 
Locations: Previous intelligence suggests that the enemy is at OBJ B, OBJ A, OBJ D.  
The enemy may or may not be present at OBJ C and OBJ E.  The key terrain in this 
mission is near the Tigris River.  In order for us to have use of the river for transportation, 
we need to secure stations along the river.  OBJ A is a drawbridge that is a crucial 
necessity in controlling the river.  OBJ C is the National Assembly building directly on 
the river.  This building is frequented by important officials and therefore needs to be 
protected.  Finally, OBJ E is an open area that would be a good place to establish a 
military post.  In fact, while there are three Objectives, it would be best to travel as much 
of the river as possible during the mission.  
 
Activity: The enemy has been seen at Saddam Hussein Hall with missile launchers; 
therefore you should not fly over the area near the Hall because you could get shot down.  
Also, there has been some activity near the zoo.  In order to not alert the enemy that we 
are in the area, do not fly over the zoo either. 
 
Strength: No data has been provided as to the strength or hostility of the enemy.  
 
Probable Course of Action: Unknown. 
 
Friendly Forces: There are no friendly forces in downtown Baghdad that need to be 
considered when planning your routes. 
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Attachments and Detachments: No attachments or detachments. 
 
Assumptions: Even though we have no intelligence confirming, we must assume the 
enemy is hostile. 
 
MISSION 
 
Commander’s Intent: There are two specific purposes for this mission.  First, we must 
take control of that River.  That is the primary objective.  I want to know everything 
about those locations on the river first!  I want to know if the enemy is there, how many 
there are, what are they doing, and how they are traveling from one location to the other.  
The second objective is to gain as much information about the enemy as possible while 
keeping focus on the river.  So, while we need info on the other Objectives as well, they 
are not the priority.  Taking control of that river is key! 
 
EXECUTION 
 
Concept of the Operation: The unit has a UAV to complete this task.  The asset can be 
used as seen fit by the operator.  The asset should be used to collect all of the information 
requested by the Commander for each of the Objectives.  Start time is set for midnight 
and there is a 2 hour time limit. 
 
Maneuver: It is up to you to task the asset with its route and its specific information 
collection goals.   
 
Fires: None.
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 OPERATION ORDER 099-B 
 
References: 
Map of Baghdad provided on your computer display.  Baghdad is the capital of Iraq. It is 
the second largest city in Southwest Asia.  The city sits on the Tigris River and was once 
the center of the Islamic civilization.  The city is mostly flat, with the western side of the 
city having wider boulevards, more expensive homes and more government buildings. 
Low-income housing is generally located in the east. The map provided is an up to date 
map. 
 
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Local Time 
 
Task Organization:  There is one asset available for this mission: one unmanned ground 
vehicle (UGV).  The UGV available for this mission is the Talon, seen in the pictures 
below.  The Talon is a powerful, durable, lightweight tracked vehicle designed for 
reconnaissance, communications, sensing and security. The robot has a top speed of 5.2 
miles per hour and a single-charge run time of two to four hours.  It weighs less than 100 
lbs (45 kg) and can be easily carried and instantly ready for operation. The Talon has all-
weather, day/night and amphibious capabilities and can navigate virtually any terrain.  
The Talon can hold up to seven color cameras, including night vision and zoom options.  
The Talon’s control station and a sample image are shown below.   You will be in 
charge of planning the route for the Talon UGV. 
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SITUATION 
 
Enemy Forces 
 
Terrain 
 
Terrain: For downtown Baghdad, as seen in map.  Downtown Baghdad is located in a 
desert area, characterized by flat, sandy land. The downtown area contains many 
residential and government buildings.  The Tigris River flows through the center of 
downtown. 
 
Obstacles: The Zawra Park and Zoo should be avoided at all costs, both on the ground 
and in the air.  Frightened animals could alert the enemies of our presence.  Additionally, 
the Jumhuriyah Bridge (Republic Bridge) was bombed last week and can no longer be 
used to cross the river. 
 
Key terrain: The key terrain in this mission is near the Tigris River.  In order for us to 
have use of the river for transportation, we need to secure stations along the river.  OBJ A 
is a drawbridge that is a crucial necessity in controlling the river.  OBJ C is the National 
Assembly building directly on the river.  This building is frequented by important 
officials and therefore needs to be protected.  Finally, OBJ E is an open area that would 
be a good place to establish a military post.  In fact, while there are three Objectives, it 
would be best to travel as much of the river as possible during the mission. 
 
Decisive terrain: OBJ D is a main intersection on the NE side of the downtown area and 
is a prime location to observe the traffic coming in and out of the city.  It would be an 
excellent place to set up an observation post.  OBJ B is an enemy stronghold.  We will 
need to determine their numbers and weaponry to determine if we should attempt to 
attack. 
 
Other key terrain:  The desert conditions could make ground travel difficult.  To avoid 
any issues, stick to the roads on the map. 
 
Avenues of approach:  The main avenues of approach are Port Said Street and the River.  
This is why it is crucial that we have control of both.  You will enter the city from the 
north.  Your line of departure is noted on the map. 
 
Locations: Previous intelligence suggests that the enemy is at OBJ B, OBJ A, OBJ D.  
The enemy may or may not be present at OBJ C and OBJ E. 
 
Activity: Previous intelligence reports suggest that the enemy has not been engaging in 
any significant activity that would affect your route planning. 
 
Strength: No data has been provided as to the strength or hostility of the enemy.  
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Probable Course of Action: Unknown. 
 
Attachments and Detachments: No attachments or detachments. 
 
Friendly Forces: There are no friendly forces in downtown Baghdad that need to be 
considered when planning your routes  
 
Assumptions: Even though we have no intelligence confirming, we must assume the 
enemy is hostile. 
 
MISSION 
 
Commander’s Intent: There are two specific purposes for this mission.  First, we must 
take control of that River.  That is the primary objective.  I want to know everything 
about those locations on the river first!  I want to know if the enemy is there, how many 
there are, what are they doing, and how they are traveling from one location to the other.  
The second objective is to gain as much information about the enemy as possible while 
keeping focus on the river.  So, while we need info on the other Objectives as well, they 
are not the priority.  Taking control of that river is key! 
 
EXECUTION 
 
Concept of the Operation: The unit has a UGV to complete this task.  The asset can be 
used as seen fit by the operator.  The asset should be used to collect all of the information 
requested by the Commander for each of the Objectives.  Start time is set for midnight 
and there is a 2 hour time limit. 
 
Maneuver: It is up to you to task the asset with its route and its specific information 
collection goals.   
 
Fires: None
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 Scenario 1 Materials 
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 OPERATION ORDER 101-A 
 
References: 
Map of Samarra provided on your computer display.  Sāmarrā is a town in Iraq 
situated on the bank of the river Tigris some sixty miles from the city of Baghdad. 
The city is of outstanding importance because of its two shrines.  The map is a 
satellite image from November 2003. 
 
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Local Time 
 
Task Organization:  There are two assets available for this mission, one unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) and one unmanned ground vehicle (UGV).  The UAV available for this 
mission is the Predator, seen in the pictures below.  The Predator is a long endurance, 
medium altitude unmanned aircraft system for surveillance and reconnaissance missions. 
The endurance of the aircraft is more than 40 hours and the cruise speed is over 70 knots.   
The Predator aircraft is 27 ft in length and has a 49 ft wingspan. The system operates at 
an altitude of 25,000 ft and at a range of 400 nautical miles. The synthetic aperture radar, 
video cameras and a forward looking infra-red (FLIR) can provide surveillance imagery 
in real time both to the front line soldier and to the operational commander or worldwide 
via satellite communication.  The Predator’s camera and sample image taken by a 
Predator are shown below.   You will be in charge of planning the route for the 
Predator UAV. 
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SITUATION 
 
Enemy Forces 
 
Weather and Light Data and General Forecast 
 
Skies: Clear skies morning and night.  Partly cloudy in the afternoon, cloud base 3,000 ft.  
A cloud ceiling of at least 2,500 ft is desired when using UAVs.  There should be no 
problems with using any aerial assets. 
 
Visibility: Unlimited at flying level.  Limited ground level when wind gusts lift sand off 
ground.  This means that a UAV might not get a clear picture of the ground.  Remember 
that limited visibility can benefit the enemy because you might not be able to see them. 
 
Winds: North to Northwest. Speed expected to exceed 20 knots until at least 9:00 PM.  
Occasional gusts up to 30 knots in afternoon.  These conditions will affect the flying 
capabilities of the UAV.  These conditions will also lift sand from the desert floor and 
hamper observation. 
 
Temperatures: from 90 degrees F to 98 degrees F.  
 
Light Data: Sunrise 6:00 AM. Sunset 8:20 PM.   
 
Trafficability: Good.  
 
Precipitation:  None predicted.  Maximum precipitation per month: 20 inches.  Average 
precipitation per month: 5 inches. 
 
Locations: Previous intelligence suggests that the enemy is at OBJ Cat, OBJ Dog, OBK 
Elk, and OBJ Fish.  The enemy may or may not be present at OBJ Ant and OBJ Bird. 
 
Activity: Previous intelligence reports suggest that the enemy has not been engaging in 
any significant activity that would affect your route planning. 
 
Strength: Unknown. 
 
Probable Course of Action: No enemy aircraft are expected to be in the area; therefore 
you should not concern yourself with avoiding enemy aircraft when planning your route. 
 
Friendly Forces: There are no friendly forces in downtown Samarra that need to be 
considered when planning your routes. 
 
Attachments and Detachments: No attachments or detachments. 
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Assumptions: None. 
 
MISSION 
 
Commander’s Intent: There are two specific purposes for this mission.  First, I want to 
know if the enemy has strongholds in the positions that our previous intelligence 
suggests.  The goal is to swiftly enter the city, gather the information, and then report 
back to base.  We need to move into the city in full force tomorrow and thus we need all 
this information ASAP. 
 
EXECUTION 
 
Concept of the Operation: The unit has a UAV and a UGV to complete this task.  The 
assets can be used as seen fit by the operators.  The assets should be used to collect all of 
the information requested by the Commander for each of the Objectives. The assets have 
3 hours to collect all of the information.   
 
Maneuver: It is up to you to task the assets with their route(s) and their specific 
information collection goals.  The UAV and UGV are equal assets in that one does not 
command the other.  They can work together or separately as you, the operators, see fit.   
 
Fires: None. 
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 OPERATION ORDER 101-B 
 
References: 
Map of Samarra provided on your computer display.  Sāmarrā is a town in Iraq 
situated on the bank of the river Tigris some sixty miles from the city of Baghdad. 
The city is of outstanding importance because of its two shrines.  The map is a 
satellite image from November 2003. 
 
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Local Time 
 
Task Organization:  There are two assets available for this mission, one unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) and one unmanned ground vehicle (UGV).  The UGV available for this 
mission is the Matilda, seen in the pictures below.  The Matilda is a small-scale, tracked 
vehicle designed for remote reconnaissance, inspection, assessment and sampling. The 
robot has a top speed of 3 feet (1 meter) per second and a single-charge run time of four 
to six hours.  It weighs 61 lbs (28 kg) with the batteries, can be carried by one or two people 
and fits in the trunk of a car. Matilda provides reconnaissance in limited-access areas, 
including under vehicles, aircraft, and inside buildings.  Matilda is a tele-operated robot 
that responds to radio signals and the technology allows vehicles it get from one ground 
point to another and avoid obstacles on its own. The Matilda’s control station and 
cameras are shown below.   You will be in charge of planning the route for the 
Matilda UGV. 
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SITUATION 
 
Enemy Forces 
 
Terrain 
 
Terrain: For downtown Samarra, as seen in satellite map.  Downtown Samarra is located 
in a desert area; therefore any open spaces are sandy. The buildings are both residential 
and commercial.  Samarra sits in a valley, with the center of the downtown area being the 
low point of that valley.  
 
Obstacles: The Tigris River only has one main road that crosses over it to depart from 
downtown Samarra.  This bridge is very well guarded and cannot be crossed by any 
ground vehicles.   
 
Key terrain: OBJ Ant and OBJ Bird are two intersections that are essential to ensuring 
safe routes for friendly patrols and caravans that need to travel through Samarra.  Both of 
these intersections will need to be visited and assessed in order to determine if the enemy 
has patrols there and what their capabilities are. OBJ Dog is the station in the middle of 
the bridge that crosses the Tigris River.  Because that bridge is currently heavily guarded, 
it would be in our best interest to gain control of the area near OBJ Dog.  By gaining 
control of the bridge, we could control who comes in and out of the city from the west 
side.  This would be extremely beneficial in terms of both offensive and defensive future 
missions. 
 
Decisive terrain: OBJ Cat, OBJ Elk, and OBJ Fish are three areas in Samarra where we 
believe the enemy has strongholds.  We need to determine whether these are in fact 
strongholds before we can develop a plan of attack. 
 
Other key terrain:  The white building in the middle of downtown Samarra is the al-
Askari Mosque.  It is a holy building and no US forces should go near it.  To the NE of 
that Mosque is a large rectangular wall with the open sands around it.  That is the Great 
Mosque of Samarra and should also be avoided when planning your mission.  No ground 
vehicles should approach either Mosque and no aerial vehicles should fly over them. 
 
Avenues of approach:  The main roads in Samarra are the only ones that should be used.  
All of the smaller roads and alleyways that connect the main roads are potentially enemy 
territory.  In the past, US forces have been ambushed in these alleys.  You will enter the 
city from the south.  Your line of departure is noted on the map. 
 
Locations: Previous intelligence suggests that the enemy is at OBJ Cat, OBJ Dog, OBK 
Elk, and OBJ Fish.  The enemy may or may not be present at OBJ Ant and OBJ Bird. 
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 Activity: Previous intelligence reports suggest that the enemy has not been engaging in 
any significant activity that would affect your route planning. 
 
Strength: Unknown.  
 
Probable Course of Action: If the enemy is moving, it is likely they will do so via the 
alleyways and small roads.  Therefore, it is advisable to keep ground vehicles to the main 
road. 
 
Friendly Forces: There are no friendly forces in downtown Samarra that need to be 
considered when planning your routes. 
 
Attachments and Detachments: No attachments or detachments. 
 
Assumptions: Even though we have no intelligence confirming, we must assume the 
enemy is hostile. 
 
MISSION 
 
Commander’s Intent: There are two specific purposes for this mission.  First, I want a 
coordinated move into the city.  I want to collect specific information about the two 
intersections so that we know whether these are safe routes for us to move through.  I 
want as specific as possible information about the bridge facilities and whether we can 
capture that location easily.   
 
EXECUTION 
 
Concept of the Operation: The unit has a UAV and a UGV to complete this task.  The 
assets can be used as seen fit by the operators.  The assets should be used to collect all of 
the information requested by the Commander for each of the Objectives.  Start time is set 
for noon. 
 
Maneuver: It is up to you to task the assets with their route(s) and their specific 
information collection goals.  The UAV and UGV are equal assets in that one does not 
command the other.  They can work together or separately as you, the operators, see fit.   
 
Fires: None. 
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 Scenario 2 Materials 
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 OPERATION ORDER 202-A 
 
References: 
Map of Al Kufah provided on your computer display.  Al Kufah is a city in Iraq 
situated on the bank of the middle river Farut some 88 miles south of Baghdad. 
The city is almost 22 meters above sea level.  It was a center of Arab culture and 
learning from the 8th to the 10th century.  The map is a satellite image from 
November 2003. 
 
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Local Time 
 
Task Organization:  There are two assets available for this mission, one unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) and one unmanned ground vehicle (UGV).  The UAV available for this 
mission is the Raven, seen in the pictures below.  The Raven is a small, short endurance, 
low altitude unmanned aircraft system used for surveillance and reconnaissance missions. 
With a wingspan of 4.5 feet and a weight of 3.8 pounds, the hand-launched Raven 
airplane provides aerial observation at line-of-sight ranges of 10 to 15 kilometers at 
altitudes up to 1,000 feet. (Most missions are flown at 100 to 300 feet.) The Raven can 
only fly for 45 to 60 minutes on one battery.  The Raven has three different cameras that 
attach to the nose of the plane, an electrical optical camera that sends data either through 
the nose or a side camera, an infrared camera in the nose, and a side-mounted infrared 
camera. A sample image taken by the Raven is shown below.  You will be in charge of 
planning the route for the Raven UAV. 
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SITUATION 
 
Enemy Forces 
 
Weather and Light Data and General Forecast 
 
Skies: Cloudy skies and heavy fog, cloud base 200 ft.  A cloud ceiling of at least 1,000 ft 
is desired when using small UAVs, such as the Raven.  The clouds will impact the 
visibility of the UAV as well as the flying capabilities. 
 
Visibility: Limited at flying level and partially at ground level. Limited visibility will 
definitely hinder the UAV’s ability to see targets on the ground.  Limited visibility will 
also make maneuvering the UAV more difficult.    
 
Winds: North to Northeast. Speed expected to exceed 10 knots.  Occasional gusts up to 
15 knots in early evening.  The winds will not be strong enough to impact the UAV.  
 
Temperatures: from 72 degrees F to 80 degrees F.  
 
Light Data: Sunrise 7:04 AM. Sunset 5:04 PM.   
 
Trafficability: Fair.  
 
Precipitation:  Uncharacteristic thunderstorms with heavy rains throughout the day and 
night.  Intermittent thunder and lightning expected.  Possibility of lightning striking the 
UAV is minimal, but still a risk.  Rain can limit the visibility of the UAV.  Maximum 
precipitation per month: 6 inches.  Average precipitation per month: .2 inches. 
 
Locations: Previous intelligence suggests that the enemy has used each of the Objectives 
in the past as hideouts. OBJ Arm, OBJ Foot and OBJ Leg are all buildings located in a 
residential area of Kufah.  OBJ Neck and OBJ Hand are commercial buildings where the 
enemy may be hiding.  OBJ Torso is a small building located in a wooded, uninhabited 
area of the city. 
 
Activity: The enemy has kidnapped three US soldiers and is holding them hostage at one 
of the Objectives.  It is likely they are all being held in the same location, but that has not 
been confirmed.  They should be staying at the stronghold for the next 48 hours, before 
moving the hostages again. 
 
Strength: There is a group of 50 enemy soldiers who are heavily armed and dangerous 
guarding the hostages.  
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 Probable Course of Action: It is likely that the enemy will remain in its current location 
for approximately 48 hours before relocating to an unknown location outside of Kufah.  
Once the enemy has moved, it will be much more difficult to track them and to recover 
the hostages. 
Friendly Forces: Unknown. 
 
Attachments and Detachments: No attachments or detachments. 
 
Assumptions: We can assume that the enemy will be waiting for our approach; therefore, 
we must take the most extreme cautions when nearing each OBJ.  If the enemy detects 
our presence, the chances of recovering the hostages will greatly decrease. 
 
MISSION 
 
Commander’s Intent:   This mission has one main goal.  The enemy has captured three of 
our own men.  We need to go in there, find out where they are, and rescue them.  We 
only have a limited amount of time to gather R&S information.  The enemy will be 
moving out within 48 hours and thus we need to know where they are ASAP.   The first 
part of this task will be to send in the robotic assets to determine exactly where the 
hostages are being kept.  Once we have that information we can begin the rescue mission.  
This is a time-critical mission and it is imperative we get to those men before anything 
happens to them! 
 
EXECUTION 
 
Concept of the Operation: The unit has a UAV and a UGV to complete this task.  The 
assets can be used as seen fit by the operators.  The assets should be used to collect all of 
the information requested by the Commander for each of the Objectives. The assets have 
only 1 hour to collect the necessary information.   
 
Maneuver: It is up to you to task the assets with their route(s) and their specific 
information collection goals.  The UAV and UGV are equal assets in that one does not 
command the other.  They can work together or separately as you, the operators, see fit.   
 
Fires: None. 
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 OPERATION ORDER 202-B 
 
References: 
Map of Al Kufah provided on your computer display.  Al Kufah is a city in Iraq 
situated on the bank of the middle river Farut some 88 miles south of Baghdad. 
The city is almost 22 meters above sea level.  It was a center of Arab culture and 
learning from the 8th to the 10th century.  The map is a satellite image from 
November 2003. 
 
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Local Time 
 
Task Organization:  There are two assets available for this mission, one unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) and one unmanned ground vehicle (UGV).  The UGV available for this 
mission is the PackBot, seen in the pictures below.  The PackBot is a rugged, lightweight 
robot designed to conduct search, surveillance and reconnaissance, hostage rescue and 
other tasks.  The robot can move more than 8 mph and has a run time of up to 2 hours.  It 
weighs 40 lbs (18 kg) with the batteries and is designed to fit in the Army’s new standard 
backpack.  With its compact profile and patented mobility platform, PackBot operates 
with confidence on the toughest terrain – from the stairs, curbs and rubble of urban 
terrain to the rocks, sands and mud of the battlefield.  A sample display from a Packbot is 
shown below.   You will be in charge of planning the route for the Packbot UGV. 
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SITUATION 
 
Enemy Forces 
 
Terrain 
 
Terrain: For downtown Kufah, as seen in satellite map.  Downtown Kufah is densely 
populated with both residential and commercial inhabitants. Kufah sits on flat land, 
approximately a mile above sea level. 
 
Obstacles: The major highway that divides the downtown area is well traveled at all 
hours and would be extremely difficult for the small PackBot to cross.  The PackBot 
could travel down the side of the highway but must stay on one side or the other because 
crossing would be too difficult.  
 
Key terrain: OBJ Foot is one of the more likely hiding places.  It is a small apartment on 
the first floor of a three story building.  The building is located on a fairly well traveled 
intersection, so pedestrians will likely be present on any given day.  OBJ Hand is far 
enough away from the residential area that it would require vehicles.  A quick check for 
vehicles would tell us whether the enemy is there.  OBJ Leg is a local hangout for enemy 
trainees.  There is only a slight chance the hostages may be there, but some specifics 
about who is there may shed light on where the hostages are. 
 
Decisive terrain: OBJ Torso and OBJ Arm have seen some recent activity; though that 
activity may be unrelated to the kidnappings.  OBJ Torso is in a wooded, sandy area.  
This area would be quite difficult for a UGV to navigate, especially in adverse weather 
conditions.   
 
Other key terrain:  OBJ Neck, while being the possible location of the hostages, is also 
the likely command base for the enemy.  This location must be surveyed for the hostages, 
but also for its general characteristics and enemy strength.  If possible, both assets should 
be sent to OBJ Neck.  
 
Avenues of approach:  Any routes throughout the city should follow the established 
roads.  No ground assets should take shortcuts through buildings or parks.  The main 
highway should be used to get into the city and back out of the city after the mission is 
complete. 
 
Locations: Previous intelligence suggests that the enemy has used each of the Objectives 
in the past as hideouts. OBJ Arm, OBJ Leg and OBJ Foot are all buildings located in a 
residential area of Kufah.  OBJ Neck and OBJ Hand are commercial buildings where the 
enemy may be hiding.  OBJ Torso is a small building located in a wooded, uninhabited 
area of the city. 
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Activity: The enemy has kidnapped three US soldiers and is holding them hostage at one 
of the Objectives.  It is likely they are all being held in the same location, but that has not 
been confirmed.  They should be staying at the stronghold for the next 48 hours, before 
moving the hostages again. 
 
Strength: There is a group of 50 enemy soldiers who are heavily armed and dangerous 
guarding the hostages.  
 
Probable Course of Action: It is likely that the enemy will remain in its current location 
for approximately 48 hours before relocating to an unknown location outside of Kufah.  
Once the enemy has moved, it will be much more difficult to track them and to recover 
the hostages. 
 
Friendly Forces: Unknown 
 
Assumptions: We can assume that the enemy will be waiting for our approach; therefore, 
we must take the most extreme cautions when nearing each Objective.  If the enemy 
detects our presence, the chances of recovering the hostages will greatly decrease. 
 
MISSION 
 
Commander’s Intent: This mission has one main goal.  The enemy has captured three of 
our own men.  We need to go in there, find out where they are, and rescue them.  We 
only have a limited amount of time to gather R&S information.  The enemy will be 
moving out within 48 hours and thus we need to know where they are ASAP.   The first 
part of this task will be to send in the robotic assets to determine exactly where the 
hostages are being kept.  Once we have that information we can begin the rescue mission.  
The safety of our men depends on the accuracy of our information.  If we send our rescue 
team to the wrong location, the hostages might not survive.  So make sure we get the 
most accurate and specific information as possible! 
 
EXECUTION 
 
Concept of the Operation: The unit has a UAV and a UGV to complete this task.  The 
assets can be used as seen fit by the operators.  The assets should be used to collect all of 
the information requested by the Commander for each of the Objectives.  Start time is set 
for 10 am. 
 
Maneuver: It is up to you to task the assets with their route(s) and their specific 
information collection goals.  The UAV and UGV are equal assets in that one does not 
command the other.  They can work together or separately as you, the operators, see fit.   
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